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INTRODUCTION

Wen one has been threatened with a greatinjustice, one accepts a smaller as afavor.

Jane Welsh Carlyle, 19th-century Scottish poet'
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed Public Law 104132 into effect as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 2 This cumbersome title reflects the divided history and the purpose of the law. While the majority of
the law is designed to provide federal law enforcement with increased powers to confront foreign and domestic terrorism in
the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the law also contains provisions restricting habeas corpus which evolved from
years of debate, scholarship, and legislation! These habeas
corpus reform provisions have been some of the most controversial aspects of the AEDPA. Condemned by many as draconian limitations on the abilities of prisoners to guarantee the
constitutionality of their confinement or death sentence, they
are lauded by others as a necessary and overdue step against
duplicative and abusive litigation by condemned criminals.
In enacting this habeas corpus reform, Congress chose to
make use of an innovative procedural device known as the state
opt-in provisions. Contained in Chapter 154 of the AEDPA,
Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases, these provisions mandate greater restrictions on federal habeas corpus review in exchange for appointing competent counsel to indigent
capital defendants for state post-conviction review. Essentially,
the opt-in provisions are a quid pro quo. If a state provides counsel, the opportunities of state prisoners for federal review are
reduced, thus removing roadblocks to a state's effective and expeditious use of its death penalty.
This paper argues that the opt-in provisions are flawed and
ensure finality at the cost of justice. Far from ensuring that
prisoners receive qualified and skilled attorneys, the provisions
'LAwv E's Wrr AND WISDOM 138 (Bruce Nash et al. eds., 1995).
2110 Stat. 1214 (1996).

S&d at 1217-27.
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expose prisoners to ineffective counsel without remedy or protections. Furthermore, the opt-in provisions are creating federal-state tensions as states seeking to opt in feel thwarted by the
federal judiciary. This paper will explore these and other issues
in several different ways. Part I is a comprehensive examination of the history and background of the opt-in provisions.
This Part looks at the developments in and debate over habeas
corpus and shows how this culminated in the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases-the source of
the opt-in provisions. This Part will also briefly review the legislative history to show how the recommendations of the Ad Hoc
Committee became codified in the AEDPA. Part III reviews the
litigation history of the opt-in provisions. To date, sixteen states
have litigated their opt-in status, either through prisoner declaratory judgments against opt-in status or through normal habeas corpus review, and no state has qualified for the
restrictions on federal habeas corpus review. This Part will look
at these cases to show trends and themes in this litigation. Part
IV is original research into state intent. The purpose of this section is to investigate whether states are still seeking opt-in status
and, if so, by what means and why. Part V provides legal analysis
and critique of the opt-in provisions given their history and the
states' responses. This section will include both criticism and
proposals for reform of the opt-in provisions.
I. ORIGINS: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE OPT-IN
PROVISIONS
A. THE OPT-IN PROVISION MECHANISM AND THE AEDPA

The AEDPA is a major development in habeas corpus law
within which the opt-in provisions operate. Before continuing
with the analysis of the opt-in provisions, it is necessary to look
at both the AEDPA and the opt-in provisions themselves.
The first major effect of the AEDPA is to establish a oneyear period for filing a federal habeas corpus petition-the first
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statute of limitations on federal collateral review.4 This one-year
limitation runs from: (1) the date of final judgment on direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking direct review;
(2) the date of the removal of any unconstitutional state action
which prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the date of the Supreme Court's recognition of a new, retroactive constitutional
right as a basis for the petition; or (4) the date at which new
facts supporting the petition could have been discovered
through due diligence.5
Generally, a state prisoner may only seek federal habeas
corpus review for violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States, and can only do so after exhausting all
state remedies. Violations of federal or state laws are not a basis
for federal habeas corpus review unless they reach a constitutional magnitude. The AEDPA imposes additional requirements. To win federal habeas relief for a state conviction, a
petitioner must show that the state's adjudication resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States; or that resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
The opt-in provisions in Chapter 154 of the AEDPA enforce
Section
and tighten these restrictions on habeas corpus.
2261 (b) of title 28 of the United States Code states:
This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by statute, rule of its court
of last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism
for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings
brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences
have been upheld on direct appeal to the court of last resort in the State

' See RICiARD H. FALLON ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSEM 1341 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997) [hereinafter HART &
WEcHSLER].
'28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. 1997).
628 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1997). This section also provides that a petition may be
dismissed on the merits regardless of compliance with the exhaustion requirement.
States may waive the exhaustion requirement through express waiver.
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or have otherwise become final for State law purposes. The rule of court
or statute must
7 provide standards of competency for the appointment of
such counsel.

Chapter 154 further provides that the counsel mechanism
must offer counsel to all state capital prisoners. Once counsel
has been offered, the mechanism must make an order of court
for each prisoner, declaring that (1) the prisoner is indigent
and has accepted counsel or is incompetent to choose; (2) the
prisoner knowingly rejected the provision of counsel; or (3) the
prisoner is not eligible for counsel because the prisoner is not
indigent.8 The appointed counsel for post-conviction review
may not be the trial counsel unless both prisoner and counsel
expressly request it.9 In laying out this mechanism, § 2261 is the
heart of the opt-in provisions. Once the state has developed
such a system, and has had the system approved by the appropriate federal district court, a number of additional restrictions
apply to any federal habeas review the petitioner pursues.
Primarily, opting in under § 2261 results in a reduction of
the time period for filing a federal habeas corpus petition from
one year to 180 days, tolled only for (1) the date of the filing of
a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court for direct review
of the state conviction until final disposition of the petition, (2)
the filing of the first petition for state post-conviction review until its final disposition, or (3) the filing of a motion for an extension upon a showing of good cause.'0 In response, the district
court must render a final determination within 180 days from
the filing of the habeas petition, bringing the entire federal
post-conviction review to a close within a year." The district
court must give all parties 120 days to prepare their claims, in728 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2265 provides
an identical mechanism for states with a "unitary review" procedure, a procedure
whereby collateral claims may be raised in the course of direct review. In such a case,
counsel must be offered at the completion of trial. All other opt-in provisions apply
identically. This section was included to ensure that California, a unitary review state,
could take advantage of the opt-in provisions.
a 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
'IM § 2261(c)-(d).
'0Id § 2265.
"Id § 2266(b) (1) (A).
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cluding briefs, pleadings, and hearings, before issuing a decision.'2 The court may delay for an additional 30 days based on a
finding that a delay would better serve the "ends of justice."8
4
Court congestion is expressly prohibited as a reason for delay.
The opt-in provisions also specify a scope of review for a
federal habeas petitioner who received state post-conviction
counsel. The federal district court may only consider claims
raised and decided on the merits in state courts, unless the failure to raise the claim was the result of (1) unconstitutional state
action; (2) the development of a new, retroactive constitutional
right; or (3) new facts that could not have been discovered
through due diligence in time for state or federal postconviction review. 15
Once state post-conviction counsel has been appointed under an opt-in system, the petitioner may apply to the federal
court for a stay of execution.16 This stay will expire if the petitioner fails to file a federal habeas petition, waives the right to
habeas corpus review, or fails to prove the denial of a federal
right.
Obviously the interaction of the AEDPA and the opt-in provisions on top of the state and federal post-conviction review
procedures is complex. The key is maintaining the distinction
between state post-conviction review and federal habeas corpus.
Through opting in, states are volunteering to provide counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings. In return, if the petitioner to
whom counsel was appointed then chooses to pursue federal habeas review, that petitioner will face the tighter restrictions per
Chapter 154. Thus, opt-in does not provide a direct benefit to a
state, but serves to ensure that federal review, a roadblock to the
state carrying out its death sentences, will be limited, expeditious, and final.
"Id. § 2266(b) (1) (B).
"Id. § 2266(b) (1) (C).
"Id. § 2266(b) (1) (C) (iii).
,Id. § 2264. This standard is apparently more narrow than the standard for review when states have not opted in. See David Saybolt et al., Habeas Relieffor State Prisoners, 85 GEO. LJ. 1507, 1544-45 (1997).
628 U.S.C. § 2262 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
'7 28 U.S.C. § 2262(b) (Supp.
1996).
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As a last note, both the AEDPA and the opt-in provisions
expressly state that ineffective assistance of counsel in state or
federal post-conviction proceedings shall not be grounds for relief in federal habeas review.' s
B. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

The history of the opt-in provisions must be traced back
through the modem history of habeas corpus itself. Habeas
corpus is shorthand for habeas corpus ad subjiciendum and refers
to a writ used to attack the legality of one's detention or confinement. 19 While this paper focuses on the use of the writ of
habeas corpus by state prisoners to challenge state convictions
in federal courts,20 there are multiple forms of the habeas cor-

pus writ.2 '
Originally, habeas corpus was only available to federal prisoners held under "colour of the authority of the United
States."22 However, with the end of the Civil War and the Reconstruction, congressional distrust of state motives and commitment to constitutional guarantees led to the passage of the
Act of 1867, extending habeas corpus to all persons held "in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States ...."' With this statute, Congress granted state prisoners
access to federal courts for post-conviction review, as long as
these prisoners could assert the violation of a federally protected right.24 This statutory basis for federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners remained largely undisturbed, although there
were periodic amendments.2 The AEDPA in 1996 marked the
"28 U.S.CA §§ 2254(i), 2261(e) (Supp. 1997).
'9See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 1337 (quoting McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S.
131, 136-37 (1934)). Note that there are several other variants of habeas corpus pertaining to prisoner treatment within the legal system. See id. at 1337 n.1.

228 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1997).
21 See

HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 1338-39. Other forms of habeas corpus
are used to challenge federal detention in federal court or challenge deportation or
denial of bail decisions.
'Judiciary Act, ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789).
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
For example, in 1868, the right of appeal in federal habeas corpus proceedings
was repealed. SeeAct of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. In 1874, much of the
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first major statutory amendment to habeas corpus in nearly fifty
years.
Between 1948 and 1996, Supreme Court decisions themselves shaped the doctrinal contours of habeas corpus. 26 In particular, the Warren Court, known for its extension of federal
protections, broadened the scope of federal habeas corpus review. Two decisions in particular embody the Warren Court
approach. In the first decision, Brown v. Allen,27 the Supreme
Court greatly extended federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions by state prisoners. The case has come to stand for the
principle that federal courts may give state courts little or no
deference in questions of law or mixed questions of fact and
law.2 At its root, Brown permits relitigation of the state conviction in the context of the federal habeas review. The second
decision, Fay v. Noia,29 introduced an exception to the procedural default rule." This rule holds that claims not properly
raised on direct or state post-conviction review are unavailable
for federal habeas review; by defaulting a state procedural rule,
the petitioner forfeits the right to federal review. In Fay, the
Court amended the procedural default rule to apply only when
petitioner had "deliberately bypassed the state procedure (i.e.,
through "sandbagging"). 32 An indeliberate default would not
prevent federal review. The Court was also willing to be exexisting habeas corpus law was codified in one body. See Title 13, Revised Statutes of
1874, §§751-66. In 1885, the right of appeal of habeas decisions to circuit courts was
restored. See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437. In 1948, habeas corpus was
again codified into 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255, with some alterations. HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 4, at 1341.
" See HART & WEcHsLEa, supra note 4, at 1345.
27 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
See id. at 504-09 (FrankfurterJ, concurring).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Id. at 438.
"See HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 4, at 1413. The procedural default rule is a
corollary of the principle that federal courts may not review state court decisions resting on independent and adequate state law grounds. See, ag., Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590 (1875); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
-1 Fay, 372 U.S. at 433-34, 438 (emphasis added); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
"Fay, 372 U.S. at 433-34, 438.
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pansive in defining "deliberate."M In this case, where the petitioner had failed to directly appeal his conviction out of fear of
a more severe sentence on retrial, the Court found he had not
deliberately bypassed state procedure but was instead coerced
These two decisions greatly expanded the role of
into default
federal habeas corpus, allowing federal courts significant power
to overturn state court decisions and permitting state prisoners
great leeway to challenge their convictions with little regard for
state law.
The end of the Warren Court brought an almost immediate
stop to this broad definition of habeas corpus. In three subsequent cases, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts issued decisions
that constricted the scope of federal habeas corpus review of
state court decisions. First, in Stone v. Powell 36 the Court held
that where a habeas petitioner had an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim in state proceedStone therefore
ings, federal habeas relief was not required.
reined in Brown's wide-ranging mandate of federal review of
state court convictions. Second, in Wainwright v. Sykes,38 the
Court replaced Fay's deliberate bypass standard for procedural
default with a requirement of cause and prejudice.39 In other
words, for a state prisoner to escape procedural default on a
claim not raised in state court, Sykes requires that the petitioner
show a cause for the noncompliance with state rules and actual
prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation to
the prisoner.4
Third, in Teague v. Lane, the Court completed the habeas
corpus retrenchment with a complex holding on the retroactive
application of constitutional rules. In Teague, a prisoner collaterally attacked his conviction by suggesting a new constitutional
rule that the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement
'4

37

Id. at 440.
Id. at 439-40.

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id at 481-82.

-8433 U.S. 72 (1977).
9 id at 87-88.
4
0 See id. at 84.

4'489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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should apply to the petit jury.4 2
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The Court rejected the pris-

oner's attempt, finding that it would be inequitable to other petitioners and harmful to finality to establish new rules of
criminal procedure and apply them retroactively on collateral
review.1 The Court found that "new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which
have become final before the new rules are announced.""
However, the Court did enunciate two exceptions to this general rule.4 First, the Court acknowledged that new rules could
be applied retroactively on collateral review if such a rule
"places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' 46 Second, rules "which significantly improve the factfinding procedures [and] implicate the fundamental fairness of
the trial" must be applied retroactively. 47 Despite these two exceptions, Teague solidified the retrenchment of habeas corpus.
Before Teague, habeas corpus petitions, like other litigation,
could contribute to the development of precedent and new law.
After Teague, however, habeas corpus petitioners were largely
locked in to the body of law as it existed at the time of their
convictions.
If Brown and Fay can be seen as two lines of habeas corpus
expansion, then Stone and Sykes can be seen as ending and retracting those lines of expansion. Teague serves as a capstone to
the retrenchment, limiting the possible avenues of collateral attack. The Burger Court's approach to habeas corpus can be accurately summarized by the language from a fourth case,
Barefoot v. Estelle:
The role of federal habeas corpus proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited.

Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials. Even less
is federal habeas a means by which the defendant is entitled to delay an
42

Id. at 293.

43

Id. at

44Id

34-05.

at 310.
4Id
at 311-12.
Id. at 311.
7 la at 312.
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execution indefinitely. The procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly
consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not legal entitlements that a defendant has the right to pursue irrespective of the contribution these procedures make toward uncovering constitutional
48
error.

This Supreme Court dialogue regarding the scope of federal habeas corpus review was mirrored in debate among members of the academy and of Congress.49 Generally, these debates
seesawed between those who saw expansive federal habeas corpus review as necessary for guarding prisoners' constitutional
rights and those who saw habeas corpus as permitting repetitive
and never-ending litigation, despite often obvious guilt. An additional concern of those who favored limiting habeas corpus
was that the continued availability of habeas corpus review and
its concomitant stays of execution were functionally preventing
the states from carrying out death sentences.
For example, Justice William Brennan argued in Sanders v.
United Statd ° that, "[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringe48

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887-88 (1983).
See, e.g., FederalHabeas Corpus Reform: EliminatingPrisoners'Abuseof theJudicialProcess: HearingBefore the Senate Committee on theJudiciary, 104th Cong. (1996); Habeas Corpus: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on
theJudiciary,103rd Cong. (1994); Habeas Corpus Issues: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,102nd Cong. (1992);
Habeas Corpus Legislation:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, IntellectualProperty, and
the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. (1991); Habeas Corpus Reform: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. (1991); Who is
On Trial? Conflicts Between the Federaland StateJudicialSystems in CriminalCases:Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Govt Info., Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Govt Operations, House, 100th Cong. (1988); Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary,99th Cong. (1986); Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. (1984); Federalism and the FederalJudiciary:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on theJudiciary,98th Cong. (1984); Habeas
Corpus Reform Act of 1982: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary,97th Cong.
(1983); Habeas Corpus ProceduresAmendments Act of 1981: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Committee on theJudiciary,97th Cong. (1982); H.R. REP. No. 104-518
(1996); H.R. REX'. No. 104-23 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 103-470 (1994); S. REP. No. 98226 (1983); Paul Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HA.v. L. REV. 441, 445 (1963); HenryJ. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments,38 U. CM. L REV. 142 (1970).
50373 U.S. 1 (1963).
49
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ment of constitutional rights is alleged." 1 Brennan's view that
relitigation was a proportional necessity met strong resistance
from Professor Paul Bator, who argued that instead of substantively evaluating the correctness of a state court's conclusion,
federal courts should only ensure that the state processes were
enough to guarantee a "reasoned probability that the facts were
correctly found and the law correctly applied." 2 Bator mustered a number of arguments against invasive federal review, including redundancy and inefficiency, destruction of federalstate comity, and denial of deterrence from delayed fmality.5 3
Bator's approach was backed by Judge Henry Friendly, who responded directly to Brennan's argument:
Why do they have no place? One will readily agree that "where life
and liberty is at stake," different rules should govern the determination
of guilt then when only property is at issue ....But this shows only that
"conventional notions of finality" should not have as much place in
criminal litigation as in civil litigation, not that they should have none.

In contrast to both Brennan and Bator, Friendly's view was
that federal habeas corpus would be available only for "colorable showing" of innocence or where the state processes were
unfair.55
C. REFORM PROPOSALS: THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES ("THE POWELL COMMITTEE")

It was within the framework of these debates and developments in case law that Chief Justice William Rehnquist, as head
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, formed the Ad
Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases in
19886 The Ad Hoc Committee soon became known as the
" I at8.
12

Bator, supra note 49, at 455 (emphasis omitted).

"See idat 451-53. These are now standard arguments for limiting habeas corpus.
'4 Friendly, supra note 49, at 149-50.
See Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV.C.R.-C.L
L. REv. 579, 590-91 (1982).
56See Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRUM. L REP. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Powell Committee Report].
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"Powell Committee" for its chair, retired Associate Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. The other members of the committee included
ChiefJudge Charles Clark of the Fifth Circuit, ChiefJudge Paul
H. Roney of the Eleventh Circuit, District Judge William Terrell
Hodges of Florida, and District Judge Barefoot Sanders of
Texas.
The mandate of the committee was to "inquire into
'the necessity and desirability of legislation directed toward
avoiding delay and the lack of finality' in capital cases in which
8
the prisoner had or had been offered counsel."w
At the same time the Powell Committee was considering its reforms, the Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar Association formed a Task Force for the same
purpose. This Task Force was composed of more members than the Powell Committee and included judges, lawyers, professors, and clerks. The Task Force made six-teen recommendations, seven of which pertain to counsel. See IRA P. ROBBINS,
TOWARD A MoREJusr AND EFFEcI E SYSTEM OF RIw IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES:
A REPORT CONTAINING THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS AND RELATED MATERIALS FROM THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S PROjECt ON DEATH PENALTY
HABEAS CORPUS, at 1-3 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. In general, the Task
Force's recommendations are broader, allowing greater access to habeas review than
the Powell Committee. While the Task Force recommends strong counsel standards,
it also recommends increased funding and better opportunities for training capital
post-conviction counsel. Id. at 1, 11 3-4. Finally, the Task Force turns the Powell
Committee proposal on its head, suggesting that states should provide competent
post-conviction counsel or lose the defenses of failure to exhaust state remedies, procedural default, or the presumption of correctness of state court factual findings
against a prisoner's petition. Id. at 2, 1 6.
For a discussion of the Task Force proposal, see Vivian BergerJusticeDelayed orJustice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1665, 1674-1704 (1990) (comparing the Powell Committee and the
ABA Task Force proposals).
57See Powell Committee Report, supranote 56, at 3245. While the Powell Committee Report stresses that these judges were selected because the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have the greatest number of prisoners subject to death sentences, see id., others have challenged the membership of the committee as a conservative plot by justices opposed to prisoner issues to eviscerate federal habeas corpus. An example of
this view comes from Rep. Edwards, 136 CONG. REc. H8880 (1990):
In 1988, ignoring the separation of powers principle, Rehnquist appointed an ad hoc
committee of the Judicial Conference to write proposed habeas legislation. The committee, chaired by former Justice Powell, was stacked with conservative judges from the two
southern "death circuits" where more than three-quarters of the executions since 1976
have taken place. Ignoring the wishes of the full Judicial Conference, the Chief Justice
adopted their recommendations. This amendment is solely the work of the ChiefJustice
and his handpicked opponents of habeas corpus. It is not the neutral, responsible product
Mr. Hyde claims.
See also Berger, supra note 56, at 1675.
' Powell Committee Report, supra note 56, at 3239.
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The Powell Committee issued its findings and a proposal for
reform on September 21, 1989. 59 The Committee identified
three problems with the existing system of habeas corpus review. First, the system led to "unnecessary delay and repetition. "60 Disconnections between state and federal authorities
led to prisoners bouncing between state and federal courts in
order to exhaust state remedies.6 ' Given this system, prisoners
had no incentive to seek habeas corpus review until an execution date was set.6 Further, the lack of res judicata rules in the
habeas setting produced repetitive and "piecemeal" litigation as
prisoners would litigate individual claims separately to maximize
their time in court and stave off their executions. 63 Second, the
prisoners under capital sentence had a serious "need for counsel." 64 The Powell Committee noted that in light of the recent
holding in Murray v. Giarratanoe the right to counsel only extended as far as direct appellate review. 66 Furthermore, the
counsel provisions in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 were not
seen to be effective because they did not apply to state proceedings. 67 The Committee observed that prisoners under death
sentence were often illiterate or uneducated, facing a compli-

59Id.
60 Id.

SId.
62 id.

"isId.
" Id. at 3240.
"492 U.S. 1 (1989). See infa notes 682-84 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Giarratano.
"Powell Committee Report, supra note 56, at 3240.
67Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) (Supp. 1997). These provisions provide counsel for indigent capital defendants seeking federal habeas corpus. The statute reads:
In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28, seeking to
vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to
obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of
other such services....
Id.
However, federal habeas counsel is often too late to help a prisoner who unwittingly waived his constitutional claims at the state post-conviction level without counsel.
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cated and difficult area of law.r s As a result, these prisoners
were often unable to appropriately raise their claims or exhaust
remedies at the state level. 69 Though counsel was often appointed when execution became "imminent," this was often after the prisoner had effectively waived his constitutional claims
by failing to present them adequately. 7 Third, the Powell
Committee pointed to the phenomenon of "last-minute litigation" from habeas corpus petitions filed shortly before execution to obtain a stay and/or simply create delay.7' The
Committee stated that such last-minute litigation was not conducive to justice, because the judicial system was harmed by the
strain of exceptionally tight deadlines, and because many of
these petitions were without merit.72

In response to these problems, the Powell Committee's solution was legislation. 73 Due to the unique nature of capital
punishment, the Committee proposed that separate procedures
for review of capital sentences be enacted. 7 To prevent delay,
prisoners should be entitled to only one full and fair review of
their case.75 Following the conclusion of this review, there
would be no further litigation permitted.76 To compensate for
this truncation of post-conviction proceedings, the Committee
proposed improving the availability of post-conviction counsel.
The mechanism the Committee suggested for doing so was the
opt-in provisions. 78 In return for providing competent counsel
in state post-conviction proceedings, and thereby "fill[ing] a
gap" between constitutionally-required counsel at trial and appeal and statutorily-provided counsel at federal habeas review,
Powell Committee Report, supra note 56, at 3240.
70
71

73

Icm
d.

Id.

74 &d

73

i
"I
D
A1
"I!.
"SeeAnti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) (Supp.
1996).
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states could "bring capital litigation by its prisoners" within additional proposed terms designed to ensure finality and repose
and prevent last-minute petitions.8 ' These additional terms
proposed by the Committee included a six-month period for
the filing of a federal habeas corpus petition, an automatic stay
of execution to prevent last minute petitions, and the requirement that all claims raised in a federal petition be exhausted in
state courts.2 This proposed litigation is substantially the same
as Chapter 154 of AEDPA. In fact, the Powell Conumittee even
recommended their placement with the U.S. Code-the proposed measures would be designated Capital Cases: Special Procedures, and would follow 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as new Sections
2256 through 2260.8
The critical section of the Powell Committee proposal was
section 2256, which laid out the foundation of the opt-in procedure. This section is virtually identical to 28 U.S.C. § 2261.8
The comments to the proposed section 2256 explain how the
Committee envisioned their function. The Powell Committee
stated that the development of standards for competent counsel
was "[cIentral to the efficacy of the scheme... ."5 While the
Committee explained that the opt-in provisions were meant to
give states "latitude" to establish an appropriate mechanism, the
federal judiciary would be the final arbiter of the "adequacy" of
such a mechanism. The Committee stated:
If prisoners under capital sentence in a particular State doubt that a
State's mechanism for appointing counsel comports with subsection (b)

[providing that the rule of court or statute will establish standards of

a'Powell Committee Report, supra note 56, at 3240. See also Berger, supra note 56,
at 1678.
82 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 56, at 3241.
a3See id. at 3241-45.

"The only difference between the proposed section 2256 and adopted § 2261 is in
subsection (b). Proposed section 2256 provided that the mechanism for appointing
counsel come from statute or rule of court of last resort, while § 2261 also permits an
agency authorized by state law to appoint counsel. This discrepancy has created a
great deal of consternation, as illustrated by the discussion of Booth v. Mayland in
Part UI.I, infra.
' Powell Committee Report, supra note 56, at 3242.
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compecompetency], the adequacy of the system-as opposed to the
6
tency of particular counsel-can be settled through litigation.8

However, within the same comment, the Powell Committee
undercut its previous statement that federal courts and prisoners could effectively police the quality of appointed counsel.
Subsection (e) of proposed section 2256 (as in § 2261) provided
that ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings was not a basis for relief in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding. The commentary states that this follows from the
established precedents of Murray v. Giarratanoand Pennsylvania
v. Finley.ta Instead, the comment suggests, the conduct of trialand appeal-level counsel should be the proper focus of any
claims of ineffective assistance. The comment states, "The effectiveness of state and federal post-conviction counsel is a matter
that can and must be dealt with in the appointment process. " 9
Though the Committee was clear that it sought to avoid ineffective assistance of counsel claims against appointed counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings, it ignored the fact that these
claims are often the most effective way to guarantee attorney
quality. Further, the Committee failed to offer either suggested
standards of competence or proposed means of litigating the issue of the systemic inadequacies in attorney competence.9 This
leaves the matter entirely up to the state seeking to opt in. On a
single page, the Committee stated both that litigation in federal
courts would ensure quality of appointed counsel and that the
appointment mechanism itself would serve this purpose.
D. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OPT-IN PROVISIONS

The Powell Committee proposal was first adopted by Congress as the Hyde Amendment to the Comprehensive Crime
86id.
87

d.

'aId. (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989)); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987). These two recent cases both support the principle that there is no
right to counsel at the post-conviction stage. See Part V for a discussion of the right
to counsel and its limits.
" Powell Committee Report, supranote 56, at 5242.
'0See infra Part III for a discussion of the effectiveness of prisoner suits to challenge state systems for appointing counsel.
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Control Act of 1990.91 Described as the Powell Committee report verbatim,92 this Amendment is simply the effectuation of
the Powell Committee's legislative intent and was accepted by a
vote of 285 to 146.93 Though the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act was passed by the House, the Senate amended the text to
insert Senate Bill 1970 and sent the amended legislation to
committee. No further action was taken on House Bill 5269.
The House began a second attempt at a crime bill with habeas corpus reform in October 1991. On October 16 of that
year, Representatives Brooks, Schumer, Edwards, and Hughes
introduced House Bill 3371, which was called the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1991. 95 In opening debate over the bill,
Representative Henry Hyde again laid out his amendment to
the bill adopting the Powell Committee proposals.9 The House
debated the amendment until time for debate expired and then
97
considered House Bill 3371 as it had been originally set forth.

The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991 was passed by the
House on October 22, 1991. 98 When the bill was sent to the

Senate, the Senate amended it by striking out the House's text.'
The Senate inserted Senate Bill 1241, known as the Biden Bill, 1 °
and then returned the bill to the House and to conference. 10 '
The conference continued into March, 1992, as did debate on
the bill and its counsel provisions. 2 No new amendments were
offered. The bill was sent to conference again in May 1992 after
As
the House and Senate failed to agree on a final product.'
" See 136 CONG. REc. H8876 (Oct. 4, 1990) (adopting H.R. 5259, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990)).
See 136 CONG. REC. H8878 (Oct. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. Harris).
93See 136 CONG. REc. 8881 (Oct. 4, 1990).
See 136 CONG. REc. S16,479-80 (Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
See 137 CONG. REC. H7883 (Oct 16, 1991).
See 137 CONG. REc. H7890 (Ocr 16, 1991).
97 See 137 CONG. REc. H7892-7912 (Oct. 16,1991).
See 137 CONG. REC. H8173 (Oct. 22, 1991).
See 137 CONG. REC. S17,313 (Nov. 21, 1991).
'0 S. 1241, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
101See 137 CONG. REC. S17,313 (Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Seri. Mitchell).
"

bill).

See 138 CONG. REC. S3926 (Mar. 19, 1992) (failing to close further debate on

0s See 138 CONG. REC. S6695 (May 14, 1992).
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with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the Omnibus
Crime Control Act did not survive the conference committee.
The issue remained dormant until February 8, 1995, when
the House passed House Bill 729, the Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1995.14 Representative McCollum described the purpose
and effect of the bill:
The essence of H.R. 729 comes from the recommendations of the Habeas Corpus Study Committee, chaired a few years ago by retired Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell. The Powell Committee established
the basic quid pro quo approach to this bill with regard to death row
inmates. If States provide legal counsel in State habeas review to indigent convicted murderers, even though such provision of counsel is not
required by the Constitution according to the Supreme Court, then the
States will receive the benefits of limited and expedited habeas corpus
procedures when such prisoners bring their claims to the Federal courts.
These procedures could help ensure that defendants are given competent counsel in post-conviction proceedings. If States enact these provisions, the time in which a habeas corpus petition must be filed following
the conclusion of direct appeal of the conviction is reduced to 180 days.
This portion of the bill would also require that Federal courts could not
entertain any claims not raised in the prior State court proceedings unless certain exemptions apply. These optional provisions also certify that
executions will be stayed while a habeas corpus petition is pending, but
limits the granting of further stays if the petition is denied by the district
court and the court of appeals.105

The Effective Death Penalty Act adopted the Powell Committee proposals nearly verbatim.1 6 This act was passed, unamended, 17 marking the second time the Powell Committee
proposals had been adopted and accepted by the House of Representatives.
Three months later, in May, 1995, the Senate began to discuss a potential crime bill and habeas corpus reform in light of
Senate Bill 735, the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act.1°8
See 141 CONG. REC. H1433 (Feb 8, 1995) (adopting H.P 729, 104th Cong.
(1995)).
,05141 CONG. REC. H1400-01 (Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
'06See 141

107

CONG. REC. H1433 (Feb. 8, 1995).

See id.

"' See 141 CONG. REc. S7479 (May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG.
REc. S7585 (May 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Specter); 141 CONG. REC. S7805 (June
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This act incorporated Senate Bill 623, which had been proposed
by Senators Specter and Hatch to reform habeas corpus and
provide for appointment of counsel at the discretion of the
court °9 It was Senate Bill 735 that would become AEDPA, incorporating the Powell Committee proposals into Sections 2261
to 2266 as the present law does. ° While the Senate debate did
focus on the need for strong counsel standards, the Senate ultimately backed away from any amendment stronger than the
Powell Committee proposal. In one exchange, Senators Biden
and Hatch sparred over counsel in habeas corpus cases and the
appointment of counsel under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
21 U.S.C. § 848(q). Senator Biden offered an amendment to
include counsel competency requirements, but, faced with the
possibility of a nullifying amendment from Senator Hatch to his
own 111amendment, Biden backed off, and the bill remained as it
was.
In that same Congress, the House toyed with adopting
the Senate's version. The House went so far as to inject the habeas corpus provisions from Senate Bill 735 into House Bill
2586,112 a bill focusing on debt.1
In the end, it was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Building in Oklahoma City that supplied the needed political
will to reform habeas corpus. Debate on this issue reopened in
the 104th Congress' Second Session as the House considered
House Bill 2703, the Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of
1995, a bill designed to enact measures to prevent and penalize future terrorist acts on American soil. As with House Bill
2586,5 the House agreed to insert the habeas corpus language
from Senate Bill 785 into the bill. 6 However, the next day, the
House backed away from this action and passed Senate Bill 735,

7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter); 141 CoNG. REc. S7812 (June 7, 1995) (stateof Sen. Biden).
ment
'10 See 141 CONG. REC. S7805 (June 7, 1995).
"o See 141 CONG. REc. S7870 (June 7, 1995).
".See 141 CONG. REC. S7810-17 (June 7, 1995).
11 H.R. 2586, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
".See

141 CONG. REC. H11,991 (Nov. 9, 1995).
H.R. 2703, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
"' H.R. 2586.
116See 142 CONG. REC. H2129, H2162 (Mar. 18, 1996).
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which had been rechristened the Terrorism Prevention Act." 7

The bill was sent to conference, and was approved in April
1996.8 President Clinton signed AEDPA, which united terror-

ism prevention with anti-crime measures, including restitution
to victims, stronger penalties for crimes by aliens, and reform of
habeas corpus."19
III. PROGRESS: OPT-IN PROVISION LITIGATION HISTORY
A. AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS BY PRISONERS

Since the passage of the AEDPA and the opt-in provisions,
five states-California, Florida, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia-have had their post-conviction counsel system tested
through affirmative claims by prisoners. Typically, these claims
are filed by prisoners on death row seeking declaratory relief
that the state's post-conviction counsel system does not qualify
under the opt-in provisions and injunctive relief to prevent the
state from claiming the benefits of opt in. These suits have had
largely negative results. While inmates were often able to get
the declaratory relief they sought in the district courts, this relief was often set aside in the courts of appeals on Eleventh
Amendment or justiciability grounds. The utility of such affirmative actions was eliminated with Calderon v. Ashmus,2 0 in
which the Supreme Court overturned a suit by California prisoners on standing grounds.1 2' However, in the long view, these
claims have succeeded for these plaintiffs in definitively establishing their states had not opted in.

7 See 142

CONG. REC. H2247 (Mar. 14, 1996).

See 142 CONG. RE c. H3599 (Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Frost).
,' Vivian Berger, noting that Congress had the ABA Task Force recommendations
before it as well, remarked that Congress had to select between a "band-aid" and
"surgery" in treating habeas corpus. She observes that Congress chose the "band-aid."
Berger, supranote 56, at 1674, 1684.
",

1' 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
121

Id. at 748-49.
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1. Maryland: Booth v. Maryland
In Booth v. Maryland,2 2 five death row prisoners sued for a
Jeclaratoryjudgment that Maryland did not qualify as an opt-in
state and for injunctive relief preventing Maryland from asserting Chapter 154 as a defense to habeas corpus actions.'2
Maryland contended that its Office of Public Defender
(OPD) and associated counsel system qualified as postconviction counsel under Chapter 154, without additional legisOPD is part of the executive
lation, rules, or standards.
branch of Maryland's state government and is required to appoint a deputy public defender and a district public defender
for each district of the District Court.'2 OPD is given a share of
the state budget to be allocated among staff salaries and investigative and support staff costs. The Public Defender, deputy
public defenders, and district public defenders are required to
be admitted to the Maryland Bar and to have practiced for five
126Asitt
years.
Assistant public defenders are appointed by the Public
public defenders and
Defender with the advice of the district
27
simply must be admitted to the Bar.
Beyond OPD, the district public defenders maintain lists of
private attorneys categorized into panels based on their qualifications.2 Panel attorneys are to be appointed as much as possible?2 The authorizing statute requires OPD to establish the
qualification criteria for panel attorneys by considering "the nature and complexity of the type of offense requiring legal representation, the previous trial or appellate experience of the
attorneys, and any other factors considered necessary to ensure
competent legal representation."'"' Maryland regulations sort
attorneys by skill and experience into four panels, with one
panel (Panel A) providing counsel for defendants charged with
" 940 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1996).
Id. at 850.
' Id. at 852.
See MD. ANN. CoDEart. 27A§ 3 (1997).

"

126hi&

1' Id. § 6.
129Id.

,30Id.
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capital crimes. '' To qualify for membership on Panel A, attorneys must have previously participated in two capital cases, or in
ten cases where the penalty was ten years imprisonment or
more.'

Furthermore, OPD also establishes schedules for com-

pensating and reimbursing expenses by panel attorneys.33 Currently, panel attorneys receive $30 per hour for out of court

services and $35 per hour for in-court services, with a maximum
of $500 for post-conviction or habeas corpus proceedings.'3 4
Mileage, lodging, and other expenses are reimbursed subject to
limitations established by the OPD.ss
From the start, Maryland argued that the prisoner suit was
barred by its immunity from suits under the Eleventh Amend-

ment M While Maryland acknowledged that Ex Parte Young was
an exception to this immunity designed to prevent violations of
federal law, the state argued that Ex Parte Young did not apply
because Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Floridaupheld state immunity
"where 'Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for
the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right.'..
. 17 Maryland viewed Chapter 154 as the remedial scheme that
allowed the state to retain its immunity M

'3'

14, § 06.02.05 (1977 & Supp. 1998).
See MD. REGS CODE tit.

1'Id.

'MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 6 (1997).
14, § 06.02.08.
MD.REG. CODE tit.

"'

13 I.

Booth v. Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 849, 851 (D. Md. 1996).
Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996)). In
Seminole Tribe, the tribe sued the State of Florida and its Governor, seeking to enforce
provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA), which required the state to
negotiate with the tribe in good faith to establish a compact regarding gaming on Indian lands. The Court rejected the tribe's claims, concluding that the Indian Commerce Clause, see U.S. CoNST., art. I., § 8, cl. 8, did not give Congress power to
abrogate state sovereignty by authorizing suits. See Seminole Trib 517 U.S. at 62. In
doing so, the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which
permitted Congress to abrogate state sovereignty from suit under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66. Following Seminole Trib4
Congress may only set aside state sovereignty under its authority in the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 59 (stating that authority to abrogate has only been found in
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause); see also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (concluding that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorized abrogation).
"
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The court disposed of this Eleventh Amendment argument

in three quick steps. First, the court stated that state officials
may be named in habeas corpus suits. " 9 This simple fact of procedure negated Eleventh Amendment immunity, since the official, not the state, was the defendant.'4 Second, Maryland had
implicitly waived its immunity by announcing its intention to
seek the procedural benefits of Chapter 154.141 Third, the court
rejected Maryland's contention that Chapter 154 was a "detailed
remedial scheme" under Seminole, finding the chapter completely silent on the mechanism of challenging a conviction
through a state's post-conviction procedures.1 42 Therefore, the
court refused to apply the Seminole doctrine.4
The court then turned to the heart of the suit, understanding the issue to rest on four questions:
First, in order to meet the requirements of § 2261(b), must Maryland
have adopted a rule of court or statute that "provides[s] standards of
competency for the appointment of such counsel?" Second, if Maryland
need not have established such a rule of court or statute, must Maryland's Office of the Public Defender (the agency that appoints counsel
to represent petitioners) establish such standards of competency?
Third, has the Office of Public Defender done so? Fourth, does the
mechanism that Maryland has established provide for the "compensation and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings?"1

In formulating these questions, the court was cognizant that
Maryland's Court of Appeals and General Assembly had taken

For habeas corpus purposes, the Court also held that where Congress has created
a detailed remedial scheme to enforce a federal right, there is no need to supplement
that legislative remedy with a judicial one. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. Thus,
suits against state officers as in Ex paite Young are not permitted where Congress has
already acted. In this case, other provisions of the IGRA provided such a remedy.
Thus the tribe's suit against the Florida Governor was dismissed. See id. at 74-75.
3

'

"'

Booth, 940 F. Supp. at 851.
Id. at 851-52.

'40Id.

at 851.

Id.
I4
SId.
14 Id.

at 851-52.

'4 Id. at 852.
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no action to establish new standards of competence.'4 Further,
though the OPD did have existing standards of competency,
previous fact-finding had shown that these standards
were typi14 6
cally not applied in the post-conviction context.
In tackling the first three questions, the court confronted
the statute itself and the issue of who must specify standards of
competency. The first sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) provides
that the post-conviction counsel mechanism be established by
"statute, rule of [a state's] court of last resort, or by another
agency authorized by State law." However, the last sentence of
§ 2261 (b) only requires that standards of competency be provided by "rule of court or statute"-the reference to an authorized agency was dropped.4 7 The prisoners contended that this
omission was intentional and that standards could only come
from rule of court or statute. As Maryland's Court of Appeals
and General Assembly had not adopted any standards, the prisoners argued Maryland did not qualify.'
Maryland responded
that the omission was accidental and that the first and last sentences should be seen as parallel. 4 9 Thus, both the appointment mechanism and the standards of competency could come
from rule of court, statute, or agency.
The court bemoaned the confusion, stating, "[i]t is unfortunate that a piece of legislation, particularly one of such widespread importance and legitimate public interest, is so poorly
drafted. 15'

The court acknowledged that either interpretation,

though not completely satisfactory, could be seen as appropriate.'5

Either way, the court held, the prisoners would win. 5 2 If

15 Id.
146See

a at 853-54. The Code of Maryland Regulations section 14.06.02.05(B) (1)

requires that OPD attorneys appointed in the post-conviction context have "previously participated in a circuit court in at least two capital cases or ten other cases
where the maximum penalty was 10 years imprisonment or more." MD.REGS. CODE
tit. 14, § 06.0.05(B) (1) (1977 & Supp. 1998).
17As the Booth court noted, the phrase referring to an authorized state agency
was
not present in the original Powell Committee proposal. See Booth, 940 F. Supp. at 853.
The phrase was added in 1995 during Congressional consideration. See i&
14 1&

"9I&at 852.
SId- at 852-53.
151
Id-
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the prisoners' interpretation was correct, they would prevail because Maryland's court and legislature took no action." 3 If the
court's interpretation-agency standards as regulations-was
best, the prisoners would win because the agency had not effectively implemented its existing standards with regard to postconviction counsel.'5
The court turned to the fourth question and found that
Maryland had clearly failed to establish a compensation and exPreviously adduced evidence
penses payment mechanism.
showed that OPD had established budget limits hourly rates and
fees for post-conviction counsel in capital cases.56 This evidence
also showed that OPD did not reimburse computerized research
or photocopying expenses incurred by post-conviction counsel.
In particular the court cited the case of one post-conviction lawyer who had received $12,500 in fees plus $3,212.99 for expenses from 756.5 hours of work. 57 However, the lawyers had
also incurred an additional $3,626.30 of expenses which were
not reimbursed. 58 His effective hourly rate was therefore
$11.73.259 Based on these facts, the court found that Maryland
did not have a satisfactory compensation or reimbursement
mechanism. 160 The court therefore held that Maryland had not
qualified under Chapter 154.161
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit focused on the Eleventh
Amendment issue, reviewing the history of the immunity doctrine and concluding, "[t]hus, the State of Maryland and the
112id. at 853-54.
ISS

Id. at 852-53.

"a Id. at 853-54.
"'Id. at 854.
" See id
OPD requires two lawyers per post-conviction case. Id. at 853-54. The
lawyers earn $30 per hour for out of court time and $35 per hour for in court time.
I&.at 854. Any fees recovered are capped at $12,500 for each lawyer for the trial. Id.
The lawyers may then split $6,250 for their service from appeal through petition for
certiorari. Id. If the petition for certiorari is accepted, the lawyers may split an additional $6,250. Id. A second post-conviction proceeding after certiorari allows the
lawyers to split $12,500. Id.

157Id.

1581.
159I&

160Id.
161Ia

at 855.
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named officials are not subject to this suit unless the plaintiffs
can demonstrate that this case falls within one of the exceptions
"
The plaintiffs responded
162
to Eleventh Amendment immuity.
with three contentions: (1) the suit concerned a continuing violation of federal law and therefore fell under Ex Parte Young,6
(2) the suit fell under habeas corpus, a traditional exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity," and (3) Maryland implicitly
waived its immunity by announcing its intention to invoke
Chapter 154 procedural defenses.'o
The court first addressed the argument that the suit fell under Ex Parte Young. The court flatly rejected this argument,
finding that, in simply stating its intention to claim procedural
defenses stemming from Chapter 154, Maryland had violated no
federal law.'6 The court went on to state that even if Maryland
was found not to have opted in, seeking Chapter 154 defenses
was not improper because the opt-in provisions are voluntary.' 67
The court also rejected the argument that the uncertainty
over whether Maryland opted in harmed the prisoners, comparing the prisoners to any litigant faced with possible affirmative
defenses.'6 If the prisoners wanted an answer, the court held,
they should file for normal habeas review, and the issue would
be determined in the course of those proceedings.1 6
The court then turned to the argument that habeas corpus
proceedings were traditional exceptions to sovereign immunity.
This was true, the court held, but the instant suit was not a habeas corpils action. 70 It was a suit for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief. It may have involved habeas corpus, but it was
their convictions nor contest their unnot meant to challenge
7
lawful detention.1 1
'62Booth
163

v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1997).

r&

Id
. at 144.
145.
16 Id. at 143.
161Id. at
16

6

7 Id

1 1 Id_

at 144.

170
a
17 IM at

4
144-45.
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The court then discussed plaintiffs' argument that Maryland
had implicitly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by raising the Chapter 154 issue. The court held that, under Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, a state may waive its immunity
through explicit statement or "by voluntarily participating in
federal programs when Congress expresses 'a clear intent to
condition participation in the programs... on a State's consent
'
The court found that
to waive its constitutional immunity."'72
neither was present in this case. Maryland had taken no action
explicitly waiving its immunity, and the AEDPA did not qualify
as the type of program permitting implicit waiver.173 In fact, the
court stated that a clear purpose of the AEDPA was to "increase
federal judicial deference toward the states."'74
As a last ditch attempt, plaintiffs argued that litigating and
resolving the issue of Chapter 154 compliance in a single action
would serve policies of judicial economy, efficiency, and litigation cost reduction.' 7 The court rejected this as well, finding
that constitutional guarantees and the sovereignties of the various states were more compelling interests than efficiency.176 After demolishing plaintiff's case, the Fourth Circuit vacated the
district court's judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint.!
2. California:Calderon v. Ashmus
In Ashmus v. Calderon,' 78 Troy Ashmus filed suit against California authorities seeking a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against California asserting Chapter 154
defenses, and a declaratory judgment stating that California had
not opted in.'7 Ashmus' suit also included certification for a
'I&

at 145 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247

(1985)).
173id
174Id.
"5 id
76Id. at

145-46.

at 146. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the state of the case following
the Fourth Circuit's decision and in light of the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions in Calderon v. Ashmus, 536 U.S. 740 (1998); see also Ashmus v. Calderon, 123
F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997).
'7 935 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
'" Id. at 1054.
'77 See ia
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class of 437 other capital prisoners.1"° Many of these class members had been offered and accepted post-conviction counsel
under California's post-conviction counsel system, but administrative backlogs and delays prevented California from appointing counsel.
In response to Ashmus, California contended that an "interlocking" web of statutes, rules, and regulations in existence
since 1989 comprised a qualified "unitary review" system for appointing counsel. 2 This "interlocking" web included: (1) California Government Code Section 68511.5, (2) Rule 39.5 of the
"Rules of Practice and Procedure Adopted by the Judicial
Council and the Supreme Court" ("Rules of Court"), (3) Rule
of Court 76.5, (4) Section 20 of the Standards of Judicial Administration Recommended by the Judicial Council, (5) the
California Supreme Court Statement of Internal Operating
Practices and Procedures ("IOPP"), (6) In re Clark,'8 ' and (7) the
California Supreme Court Statement of Policies Regarding
Cases Arising From Judgments of Death (the 'June 6, 1989 Policies") .
In operation, this interlocking web creates a system of requirements and guarantees that, taken as a whole, ensure postconviction counsel. For example, California Government Code
Section 68511.5 provides that the State Judicial Council will
adopt rules of court addressing appointment of counsel other
than the State Public Defender in criminal appeals by indigents. " In turn, California Rule of Court 76.5 states that each
appellate court will adopt procedures for the appointment of
appellate counsel to indigents.'6 The Internal Operating Practices and Procedures are themselves the appointment mecha'go
Id. at 1054-55.
81Id. at 1055.
,12
Id. at 1056. California is one of the few states that qualifies for unitary review.
An excellent review of California's system and its claims to opt-in status can be found
in Supplemental Memorandum re Applicability of Chapter 154, Ashmus v. California,
No. C-93-0594-TEH, 1998 WL 919840 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (on file with author).
18 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993).
4
Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1056.
,.

§ 68511.5 (West Supp. 1997).
"6CAL. RULES OF COURT 76.5.
'8'
CAL. GOV'TCODE
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nism.1 7 These appointments are to be made considering sec-

tion 20 of the Standards of Judicial Administration. Section 20
refers back to Rule 76.5 and requires that attorneys eligible for
appointment in death penalty cases have:
(1) active practice of law for four years in the California state courts or
equivalent experience; (2) attendance at three approved appellate training programs including one program concerning the death penalty; (3)
completion of seven appellate cases, one of which involves a homicide;
and (4) submission of two appellant's opening briefs written by the attorney, one of which involves a homicide, for review by the court or administrator.s

In addition, appointed appellate counsel is guaranteed "a
reasonable sum for compensation and necessary expenses, " 1
which is augmented in capital cases by compensation and reimbursement schedules established by theJune 6, 1989 Policies. 19

The district court's opinion of this system was evident from
its tone in its findings of fact. Included among these were the
facts that the prisoners were harmed by the uncertainty over

whether the state had opted in, that prisoners were forced to

"guess" whether Chapter 154 applied, and that prisoners would

have to file "hasty" petitions to avoid any procedural bar and
then would have to go back and refile with counsel's assistance.' 9' This "piecemeal" solution was "unworkable," the court
held, and resulted in2 an effective deprivation of the right to ha19
beas corpus review.

'87CAL. Sup.

"aAPP. To

Cr. INTERNAL OPERATING PRAcnlCES AND PROcEDURES XIV.A. (1996).
(Div. I)

CAL. RULES OF COURT, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION STANDARDS

§ 20(c) (1996).
"9CAL. PENAL CODE § 1241 (West 1982).
,9*See CAL. SUp. Cr. PoLucIEs REGARDING CASES ARISING FROMJUDGMENTS OF DEATH,
PoucY 3.2 (1996); CAL. Sup. Cr. PAYMENT GiDELuNs FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL.
REPRESENTING INDIGENT CmNAL APPELLANTS, GUIDFUNES ILA., 11.I.3., 1m (1996); CAL.
Sup. CT. GUIDEmS FOR FIcED FEE APPONTMETS, ON OPTIONAL BASIS, TO AUTOMATIC
APPEALS AND REL.ATED HABEAS CORPus PROCEED INGS, GUIELiNES 1-4, 9 (1996).

" Ashmus v. Calderon, 935 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
' Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed these conclusions, characterizing the harm to
plaintiffs as a double bind. See Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997).
Having accepted counsel without appointment actually occurring, prisoners were
forced to choose. I& at 1205. They could either file their own petitions pro se or
they could await the appointment of counsel. In the first case, if a prisoner filed his
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The court then turned to findings of law.'93 The first hurdle
for the plaintiffs was demonstrating standing and ripeness.'9
The court applied the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife requirement
for standing: "A plaintiff must show he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the conduct challenged in the lawsuit, that the injury can be fairly traced to the
challenged actions, and that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision."' 95 The fact that the plaintiffs were
harmed by uncertainty caused by California's actions allowed
the court to find standing easily.' 96 In reviewing the ripeness of
the claims, the court applied the Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner
balancing test, weighing "both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.",9 7 Given that the issue at stake was "virtually a pure question of law," the court found it sufficiently fit for
review. 198 The fact of harm to the plaintiffs qualified as ample
hardship.'9
The court then turned to the fundamental question:
whether California qualified under Chapter 154. While the
court conceded that California's system was classified as a unitary review system, California failed to opt in for three reasons:
(1) California's mechanism for compensating and paying reasonable litigation expenses was inadequate, (2) California
lacked a rule of court or statute providing standards of compe-

own petition, he would be unlikely to adequately raise all the relevant constitutional
issues. However, once the petition was filed, the district court might not allow later
amendment if counsel was then appointed. In the end, the prisoner would be stuck
with an inadequate petition and would face severe restrictions on subsequent petitions. If the prisoner waited for counsel, he faced the possibility of not meeting the
six month deadline. In either case, the prisoner would not receive appropriate federal review of his otherwise meritorious claims. Id.
See Ashmus, 935 F. Supp. at 1059.

"'

94 See id

" Id.at 1059 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
96
" Id. at

1059-60.

"7

Id. at 1060 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruded
on othergrounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
198

Id

1"Id at 1060-61.
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tency, and (3) California's counsel system failed to make the required offer and appointment of counsel.w
Turning to the first reason, the June 6, 1989 Policies of the
California Supreme Court provided that counsel's responsibility
to:
investigate [factual and legal grounds for the filing of a habeas petition]
is limited to investigating potentially meritorious grounds for relief that
have come to counsel's attention in the course of preparing the appeal.
It does not impose on counsel an obligation to conduct, nor does it
authorizethe expenditure of public funds for, an unfocused investigation
all possible factual bases for a collateral
having as its object uncovering
2 1
attack on the judgment.

0

Thus, counsel could only be compensated for investigation
which stemmed from facts already available. This restriction,
the court held, conflicted with § 2265(a)'s requirement that
compensation be provided for counsel to "raise ...such claims as
could be raisedon collateral attack."2 2 Limitations on a counsel's
duty to raise claims were also incompatible with Ninth Circuit
case law, which required that meaningful assistance of counsel
in collateral review meant "assert[ing] all possible violations of.
203
constitutional rights" through "diligent investigation."
Based on these conflicts, the court found that California's compensation system was inadequate.2
The court then addressed California's standards of competency for post-conviction counsel. California argued that its
standards flowed from section 20 of the Standards of Judicial
Administration Recommended by the Judicial Council and from
Rules of Court 39.5 and 76.5 . The court found these stan-

"0 See id.
at 1070-75.

"'Id. at 1070-71.
Im.
at 1071.
IM.(quoting Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Id. As an aside, the district court also discussed the petitioners' argument that
opt-in provisions required a single rule of court or statute for the counsel mechanism
and that therefore California's web did not qualify. The court found this argument
"hypertechnical," but did state that the AEDPA's intention was for states to affirmatively create a new system. California's attempt to qualify an existing system was
therefore inappropriate. Id.at 1072.
at 1072.
m See id,
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dards unsatisfactory. First, section 20 was not a rule of court or
statute as required under § 2265 (a) but was a "nonmandatory
standard" employing the word "should" instead of "shall."M
Second, these standards were not binding on the courts. 207 Not
only were the standards nonmandatory, but California could offer no proof that the Supreme Court had actually adopted these
standards itself.2 8 While California argued that Rules 76.5 and
39.5 did make these standards binding, the district court
brushed these arguments aside. Rule 76.5, the court held, only
required the California courts to consider the qualification standards, not apply them.2 For its part, the district court found
that Rule 39.5 did not apply to either Rule 76.5 or habeas corpus proceedings.210 Third, section 20 did not require any experience with habeas corpus and thus conflicted with § 2265(a)'s
focus on competent counsel in collateral appeals.
The court
also rejected the idea that experience in criminal law necessarily
involved experience in habeas corpus.2 12
Lastly, the court found that California's mechanism did not
adequately appoint counsel.213 California itself admitted that:
"Every inmate who is awaiting appointment of counsel has been
'offered' counsel and that offer has been accepted; what is
pending is the appointment itself."21 4 Given that § 2265(a) requires appointment "upon a finding that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer," California did not meet this
standard. 215 Based on the harm to the petitioners from uncertainty and the holes in California's "web," the court found that
California was not qualified under Chapter 154.216

26Id

at 1073.

207Id

at 1073-74.

2Id
2101&

at 1073 n.28.

20

211

See i&,

Id. at 1074.

212&
1

IL at 1074-75.
Id at 1074.
21
Id. at 1074-75.
216
See id. at 1075-76.
2

14
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California appealed the district court's holding in Ashmus v.
Calderon,1 7 only to be rebuffed as the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's opinion. The Ninth Circuit's opinion focused on
two key issues: first, whether the suit was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and thus outside of the court's jurisdiction, and
second, whether Ashmus was correct that California did not
comply with the opt-in provisions.
With regard to the Eleventh Amendment claim, the court
acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit had found that declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction suits violated the
State's right to immunity2 8 However, in contrast to the Fourth
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit found that Ashmus's suit fell within
the Ex Parte Young exception for "prospective relief' against a
"continuing or impending violation of federal law."21 9 The violation, the court held, was loss of the right to federal review and
to assistance of counsel in federal post-conviction proceedings.220 The Ninth Circuit thus accepted both the district court's
analysis of the harm to prisoners and the district court's rationale for finding that the unitary review system did not qualify.
The split between the Fourth and Ninth Circuits on the
Eleventh Amendment issue led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari?2 However, in Calderon v. Ashmus,22 the Court never
reached the Eleventh Amendment issue, instead finding that
declaratory judgment suits by inmates did not reach the level of
ajusticiable case or controversy2 4 The Court held that the issue
in dispute was not whether Ashmus was entitled to federal habeas relief, but whether the opt-in provisions would apply.2 As
such, the Court stated, all Ashmus need do was petition for habeas review and the courts would determine whether the opt-in
217128

F.Sd 1199 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id at 1204 (referring to Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1997)). See
supraPart IIIA.1 for discussion of Booth v. Maryland
2

219 Id.

"0Id.
2'

See id.at 1204-08.

2n

See 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).
523 U.S. 740 (1998).

22
2

4

Id. at'746.

=s Id.
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provisions apply. 226 The Court viewed Ashmus's claim as an attempt to gain a litigation advantage over California by getting
an advance ruling on one of the state's defenses (i.e., that Ashmus's claim is procedurally time-barred).2
Furthermore, the
Court. held all collateral attacks on state convictions in federal
courts must be litigated under the habeas provisions in Title 28
of the U.S. Code. 22' By filing a declaratory judgment action under a different statute, Ashmus would be able to litigate portions
of his claim (the statute of limitations) without ever exhausting
state remedies per the habeas laws.
In general, the Court seemed to hold that since Ashmus was
required to petition for habeas corpus to attack his conviction
and the question of California's opt-in would naturally be determined through that procedure, this declaratory judgment action was not justiciable. In analogy, the Court argued that
Ashmus was like a plaintiff who, instead of suing a defendant for
damages, seeks a declaratory judgment that were he to sue he
would be entitled to damages. Since the issue of damages
would be resolved through a direct suit in the first place, there
is no need for the declaratory judgment action.
The Court's opinion effectively ended the series of suits by
prisoners to establish ex ante whether their states had opted in
to the provisions of Chapter 154. At this point, the determination of whether a state had opted in would be made through the
normal course of federal habeas corpus review as cases arose
and the issue was litigated.
3. Flofida:Hill v. Butterworth
In Hill v. Butterworthm Clarence Hill, a Florida prisoner
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for killing a police officer, sought declaratory relief that Florida had
not opted in and a preliminary injunction against Florida's
authorities to prevent them from asserting the privileges that
2itt

at 747.
Id- (referring to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266 (1994)).
See id at 747-48.
941 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1996).

27Ia

23

20001
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accompany opt in.21 The district court reasoned that, to obtain

an preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat
of irreparable injury; (3) that plaintiff's own injury outweighs
any injury to defendants; and
(4) that the injunction would not
22
interest.
public
the
disserve
Florida had argued on the first element that Hill lacked
both standing and the existence of a case or controversy, and

had misinterpreted the opt-in provisions.2s The court turned to
examine these arguments. The court first found that Hill did
have standing, having suffered an actual injury.M The injury
was the same as articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Ashmus. Hill
was caught between the choice of complying with the opt-in
provisions and losing procedural rights if Florida did not qualify, or not complying and losing his rights if Florida did qualify.' Turning to the issue of whether plaintiff presented a case
or controversy, the court applied the Abbott Laboratoriestest of
fitness for review and hardship to the pardes.m The court
found that, under the first prong, the issue of whether Florida
had opted in was sufficiently focused for review.27 Under the
second prong, the court found that continued confusion as to
which procedure applied would handicap plaintiff and would
create irreparable harm.ms Thus, the court held that plaintiff
had presented ajusticiable case or controversy.2 9

"'2

Id. at 1132-33.
Id. at 1137.

2

Id. at 1137.
I& at 1138.

Id. Essentially, the choice before the plaintiff was whether to file a petition for
federal habeas corpus less than six months after final state review or to wait more
than six months. If plaintiff filed after less than six months and Florida had not
opted in, plaintiff would be losing the additional six months he would have to adequately prepare his petition. If plaintiff filed his petition more than six months after
final review and Florida did opt in, his petition would be untimely.
' Id. at 1139 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled
on other
groundsby Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
23
7

2

M

Id.

id.

2 9

Id at 1140.
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The court then tumed to the question of opt-in. The court
held that Florida had not opted in for two reasons. First, 28
U.S.C. § 2261(b) required that a "rule of court or statute must
provide standards of competency."240 The court found that Florida's standards were insufficient to qualify under this provision. 241 At the time, Florida had a statutory post-conviction
counsel system known as the Capital Collateral Representative
("CCR") .242 This system also provided that, if a CCR was conflicted out of a case, a member of Florida's private bar would be
appointed in his or her place. 24 To be appointed as a CCR,
Florida required only that an individual be a member of the bar
for five years.244 To be an assistant CCR, only two years of bar
membership were required. 24 No additional background was
required for the CCRs and assistant CCRs, and there was no
provision at all for replacement private counsel. 246 Similarly
vague standards had prevented opt-in in other states; moreover,
the court found that the legislative intent behind the opt-in
provisions asked for better developed and more stringent standards.247
Second, the opt-in provisions require that states establish a
mechanism for appointing, compensating, and paying reasonable litigation expenses of post-conviction counsel and that this
counsel be offered to all capital prisoners. 248 The court pointed
to recent studies of the CCR system which showed it to be overburdened with too few lawyers, too much work, and too few
cases.249 In fact, in a clash with Florida's Supreme Court and legislature over resource allocation issues, CCR itself had argued it
was ill-equipped.20 Because CCR was overburdened, there were
240
28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (Supp. 1997).
241'Hill, 941

F. Supp. at 1142.

Id- at 1140-41.
24 Id at 1141 (citing FLA.
244Id- at 1142 (citing RA.
242

STAT.
STAT.

ch. 27.708 (1996)).
ch. 27.701 (1996)).

'251M (citing RA. STAT. ch. 27.704(1) (1996)).
246Id, (citing F1A. STAT. ch. 27.708 (1996)).
247Id. at 1142-48.
24 Id. at 1141 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (b)-(c)).
249id
220Id.
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prisoners who had accepted the offer of counsel but had not yet
met with a lawyer.2' The court held that the offer of counsel
must be a meaningful offer and therefore Florida had not opted
in. 52 Once the court had determined the extent of the injury to
plaintiff and had established the public interest in resolving this
issue through effective judicial process, the remaining three
elements of the preliminary injunction test were easily met.25
The victory was short-lived for Clarence Hill. Shortly after
this holding, in January 1997, the same district court approved
certification of a class of similarly situated prisoners to take advantage of the holding in HiAL2 4 The court stated that the injunction would stand until Florida showed it met all the opt-in
provisions.2 5 In June 1997, the Florida legislature amended its
post-conviction counsel system to respond to the district court's
criticism. 6 The single CCR office was split into three Capital
Collateral Regional Counsels to cope with the backlog of
cases.2 7 Florida also adopted specific quality standards requiring post-conviction counsel "to have participated in at least five
felony jury trials, five felony appeals, or five capital postconviction evidentiary hearings, or any combination of at least
five of such proceedings."28 In addition to the above requirements, assistant CCRs were required to be members in good
standing of the Florida Bar, with three years of criminal law experience. 9 The state had appealed the earlier decisions in
Hill's favor, and in light of these new statutory developments,
the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case back to the district
court for a rehearing.260 The case never made it back to the district court. Following the Supreme Court's holding in Ashmus,

at
2'Id.
2
1

1144.
Id. at 1147.

See id. at 1148.
2" See Hill v. Butterworth, 170 F.R.D. 509, 524 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
"'

2s Id.
2' See Hill v. Butterworth, 133 F.3d 783, 785 (1lth Cir. 1997) (citing FLA. STAT. ch.
27.701 (1996)).
2 Id. at 785-86.

Id. at 786 (quoting LA. STAT. ch. 27.703(3) (1996)).
STAT. ch. 27.704 (1996)).
See id.

2"Id. (citing FLA.
2
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the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court opinion, dismissing ihe complaint and dissolving the injunction for want of a
justiciable case or controversy.26
4. Pennsylvania:Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge
2
The case of Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridg6
raises many of the same issues and reaches many of the same
conclusions as the cases above. This case involved a class action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by capital prisoners seeking injunctive
relief against Pennsylvania's use of Chapter 154 defenses and
declaratory judgment that Pennsylvania had not opted in.t In
particular, the prisoners argued that Pennsylvania's postconviction counsel system could not qualify for opt-in status because the system lacked statewide standards of competence or
funding for defense costs.2 4 Instead of a single statewide defense system, Pennsylvania allows each county to appoint counsel. 265
The result of this decentralization, the prisoners
contended, was that the individual counties failed to adequately
compensate post-conviction counsel for time and expenses.2 6
This proceeding in the district court was slightly different
than the other cases in that the named Pennsylvania officials
had moved to dismiss the prisoners' suit for failure to state a
claim.267 The court's analysis therefore focused on whether the
suit survived such a motion and not on whether Pennsylvania's
system complies with the opt-in provisions. The defendant officials offered a series of procedural and substantive arguments
designed to stop the prisoners' suit at the first stage.
Pennsylvania's first argument was that the claim was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.2 ' As above, the plaintiffs responded, and the court agreed, that their claim fell within the
Ex Parte Young exception because of the uncertainty of the ap'6'
26

See Hill v. Butterworth, 147 F.3d 1333, 1334 (1lth Cir. 1998).

948 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

263See

id. at 1262.

2Id
at 1263.
26
1 See id
2W6m

26

See id. at 1262.
d. at 1264.
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propriate time limits and their resulting impact on prisoners'
decisions to exercise their rights to habeas review. 9
Pennsylvania's second contention was that the abstention
doctrine from Younger v. Harrisshould prevent federal review.97
The Younger abstention doctrine holds that:
in a case challenging the constitutionality of a state criminal statute... if
at the time the federal suit is filed there is a pending state prosecution
against the federal petitioner under the challenged statute, a federal
court must not stay or enjoin the pending state criminal proceedings,
nor can the court issue a declaratoryjudgment that the statute is unconstitutional, except under special circumstances.27

The court added that the "Supreme Court has extended the
Younger doctrine to prohibit federal courts from enjoining state
272
civil proceedings that implicate important state interests."
The purpose of the Younger doctrine is to prevent unnecessary
interference by federal courts in state court proceedings.27 3
Given that the state court proceeding is an equivalent forum for
raising constitutional issues, abstention prevents redundant and
invasive federal court intervention.2 4 The court acknowledged
that the Third Circuit had developed its own standard: Younger
abstention would be required where "(1) there are ongoing
state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal
claims."275 Pennsylvania argued that the state post-conviction
proceedings met all three prongs of the Third Circuit's abstention test and therefore that the federal courts should refrain
from hearing this litigation.276 The plaintiffs responded that the
first and third prongs of the abstention test were not met.2
"9Id at 1264-66.
2 Id at 1267.
2'

M
7
23
27
1

Id at 1266 (citingYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).

id.

See id
See id

5Id
2

Id- at 1267.

27

Id.
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First, plaintiffs contended that the relief they sought did not involve a state judicial proceeding, rather a statute of limitations
in a federal proceeding.2 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the
state courts were not an adequate forum because this issuefederally provided time limits-could not be raised in a state
direct appeal or post-conviction proceeding. m Further, the
plaintiffs argued that abstention was always "inappropriate"
suit. 210 The court
when a federal law was involved in a federal
281
agreed with the plaintiffs on all counts.
Pennsylvania's third argument in support of its motion to
dismiss was that the plaintiffs had no justiciable case or controversy because their claim was not yet ripe.282 The court applied
the Third Circuit standard for ripeness, which requires that a
court examine "(1) the adversity of interest between the parties,
(2) the conclusiveness of a final judgment, and (3) the practical
help, or utility, of a judgment."2 8 3 Pennsylvania argued that the
case could not be ripe until one of its officials first asserted a
Chapter 154 defense.s Until that moment, however, no case or
controversy existed. 2 5 Further, Pennsylvania argued that the
plaintiffs had not shown that the probability of such an assertion
occurring was even "real and substantial."2 The prisoners responded by raising the dilemma issue.287 Until the issue of optin and appropriate time limits was resolved, prisoners were
278Id.

SO&
id.
20

'

2" See id at 1268.
2"

Id at 1269 (citing Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1298-1300 (3d Cir.

1996)).
284 d
tm
Id
26 Id.at

1270.
' 7 See id The court explained the dilemma issue as follows:

[E]ither plaintiffs have to assume that the 180-day limitation applies and give up the extra
six months to which they would be entitled under Chapter 153 to prepare a habeas petition if Pennsylvania does not fulfill Chapter 154's opt-in requirements, or plaintiffs have to
assume that Pennsylvania does not meet the Chapter 154 requirements, take the full year
to file a habeas petition, and risk a "serious penalty," i.e. dismissal of their petition for untimeliness.
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caught between two unsatisfactory alternatives for exercising
habeas corpus. 2' Based on the prisoners' arguments, the court
found that the case was ripe.2 The harm to the prisoners from
the uncertainty created the necessary adversity between the parties.20 Further, a determination of opt-in status by the court
would conclusively settle the matter for the parties.? 1 Lastly, judicial resolution would be useful to the parties in planning what
to do next. 2
Pennsylvania then argued that the prisoners could obtain
the relief they sought through normal federal habeas corpus review.13 Pennsylvania based this argument on two Supreme
Court cases, Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Forida and Preiserv. Rodriguez295 Like Maryland had argued in Booth, Pennsylvania contended that Seminole held the Ex Parte Young exception did not
apply where Congress has provided a "detailed remedial
scheme."2 6 Pennsylvania argued that the federal habeas corpus
laws were exactly this type of scheme. 7 Further, Pennsylvania
argued that Preiserheld that "when a state prisoner is challenging the fact or duration of his imprisonment, and the relief he
seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or
speedier release from such imprisonment, the prisoner's sole
federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." 98 While Pennsylvania acknowledged that the plaintiffs' claim was not a direct challenge to their imprisonment, Pennsylvania saw it as a necessary
Therefore, Pennsylvania argued
first step in a habeas action.

"
2"

I& at 1270-71.
See id. at 1271.

Id.at 1272.
m Id.

"'

292Id

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
411 U.S 475 (1973) (stating that habeas corpus is the exclusive means by which
a state prisoner may challenge the fact or duration of his confinement). Preiserthus
distinguishes habeas corpus from civil actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are used
to challenge the conditionsof confinement.
"

29

Ridge, 948 F. Supp. at 1272.

'

97Id.

"

Id. (citing Preiser,411 U.S. at 490).
Id.at 1272-73.
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that federal habeas corpus was the only possible means for
plaintiffs to obtain relief.m The court rejected this argument,
turning Preiser around on the Commonwealth. The court
stressed that the plaintiffs were not challenging the facts of their
detention, but were seeking a declaration on the statute of limitations for a federal statute."' Therefore, a habeas corpus action would be inappropriate for the type of relief plaintiffs
sought.30 2 Essentially the court replied that if challenges to detention can only proceed through habeas petitions, then habeas
petitions can only be used for challenging detention. Further,
the court again raised the dilemma issue. The court reasoned
that, in effect, by being required to file habeas corpus petitions
in order to get a determination of the statute of limitations, the
prisoners would be "forced to concede the point, in order to
contest it."' 03
Lastly, Pennsylvania argued that, because plaintiffs' claim
was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must show both a violation of federal law and that the violations were committed by a
state actor acting under color of law.3" Pennsylvania asserted
there was no violation of federal law because (1) the habeas
corpus law and its statute of limitations created no federal right;
(2) while prisoners may have a right not to be subjected to an
unconstitutional statute of limitations, there is no right to know
the statute of limitations; and (3) Pennsylvania has no obligation to inform prisoners of the applicable statute of limitations."5 In support of this last contention, Pennsylvania pointed
to Texaco, Inc. v. Short, in which owners of mineral leases challenged an Indiana statute that provided for unused leases to
lapse after twenty years unless the owner filed a statement of
claim.N6 The statute in Texaco did not require Indiana to notify
each holder of a lease as to when the statute had run.' The
"IM at 1272.
"'i
Id. at 1273.
303id.
303Id.
04 id.

302Id.
3

at 1274.
See id. (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)).
See id.
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Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that due process did
not require notification and that Pennsylvania could require
that an owner stay informed about the status of his or her property. m Similarly, Pennsylvania argued it bore no burden of informing prisoners when the statute had run on their habeas
petitons.m
The court rejected these contentions, stating that Pennsylvania had misinterpreted Texaco.s' ° The court explained that
due process did not require individualnotices to affected parties
that the statute of limitations was about to run.31 ' Further, the
court reasoned that because the law was not settled in Pennsylvania, in contrast to Indiana, no one, no matter how well informed, could possibly know what statute of limitations
applies.1 In addition, the court held that Pennsylvania's stance
was unconstitutional.1
It was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment under Woodson v. North Carolinato withhold statute
of limitations information from capital prisoners. 4 It was also a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause 15* because capital prisoners were being treated different from non-capital prisoners
who had adequate notice of the limitations period because, not
being subject to opt in, they could only fall within the AEDPA's
one year limitations period.1 6
Lastly, the court found that the named parties to Pennsylvania's suit, Governor Thomas Ridge, Commissioner of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Martin Horn, and Attorney General Thomas Corbett, were sufficiently involved in
30

See id.

0 See id.
$11

See id. (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976)) (holding that state's mandatory death sentence for first-degree murder violated Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments upon finding inter alia, that because of the qualitative difference between death and life imprisonment, there is corresponding difference in
the need for reliability in determining that death is appropriate punishment in spe-

cific case).
"'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1.
Ridge, 948 F. Supp. at 1274-75.
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the processes of criminal conviction, sentencing, detention,
capital punishment, and habeas corpus that they qualified as
state actors acting under color of law.3 17 In a final sweep, the
court found that its previous findings had established the necessary elements for injunctive relief. 18 Based on these conclusions, the court denied the motion to dismiss. 19
Three and half months later, the issue went before the
Third Circuit for oral argument. In a brief order entitled Death
Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge"O the court stated that
though it was prepared to consider the Eleventh Amendment issue, it considered the issue of whether Pennsylvania's system
opted in far more important. The court also stated that it saw
the prisoners' action as a means for resolving this issue and not
rooting out misconduct among Pennsylvania state officials.
Lastly, the court held that Pennsylvania's system would be
evaluated as a single statewide unit, and not on a county-bycounty or case-by-case basis.321 With this final statement, Pennsylvania conceded that it did not qualify as an opt-in state and it
had not done so before.5 2
5. Virginia:Wright v. Angelone
In contrast to Ridge, in which every issue was litigated except
the critical one, in Wright v. Angelone5 2 the district court focused
exclusively on whether Virginia's post-conviction counsel system
met the statutory requirements for opt in. Also in contrast to
Pennsylvania and the other states above, Wright did not sue for
declaratory or injunctive relief. Rather the determination of
Virginia's opt-in status came through a motion for stay of execu-17 See id. at

1275-77.
"' Id at 1277. These elements are (1) violation of a federal right; (2) an adequate
remedy at law, (3) irreparable harm to plaintiffs; and (4) equitable relief requested
by plaintiffs. Id.
-" See id at 1278.
'2 106 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1997).
3 Id. at 36.
Id- Failing dismissal of the prisoners' suit, Pennsylvania was apparently seeking
a determination that individual counties had opted in. There is no provision in
Chapter 154 for governmental entities other than states to opt in.
' 944 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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ion and appointment of counsel prior to the filing of any habeas corpus action. 2 4

Virginia has had a system of providing indigents defense
counsel since 1992. s Virginia's statute provides that indigent
defendants on trial for a capital crime may request and have
counsel appointed from a list maintained by the Public De326
fender Commission.
This counsel represents the defendant
through trial, and on appeal, if the defendant receives a death
sentence. 27 If the sentence is affirmed on appeal, the defendant will be appointed new counsel within thirty days for state
habeas proceedings28 From its inception until June 30, 1995,
the system required that defendants request post-conviction
counsel; from July 1, 1995, appointment of post-conviction
counsel was automatic.32 This switch created issues for Wright's
claim because he was appointed post-conviction counsel on
June 8, 1995, prior to automatic appointments.330 The court
therefore decided to determine if Virginia opted in based on
the state of its system onJune 8, 1995."3'
In evaluating Virginia's counsel system, the court held that
it failed to qualify for opt-in on three grounds: (1) Virginia does
not have a mechanism for appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of litigation expenses under § 2261 (b); (2) Virginia does not have standards of competency provided by rule
of court or statute under § 2261 (b); (3) Virginia fails to affirmnatively provide counsel and enter an order of court regarding
appointment of counsel.
First, the court found that the system as it existed on June 8,
1995, appointing post-conviction counsel at defendant's request, was not a satisfactory mechanism for appointing counsel.8 2 Section 2261(b) clearly intends that all indigent capital
"' I- at 461-62.
'2
2
327

IM at 463.
Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-163.7 (Michie Supp. 1995)).

See id.

3283i

M I&
332Id.

'Id- at 464.
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defendants be provided counsel. While the court conceded that
the system at present did not suffer from this problem, the court
found it was still not in compliance for failure to adequately
compensate or reimburse post-conviction counsel3S Virginia's
statute mandating appointment of counsel was silent on issues
of payment for time or expenses.3m Virginia attempted to argue
that its Appropriations Act filled this gap by providing that
"[t]he state's share of expenses incident to the prosecution of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus by an indigent petitioner,
including payment of counsel fees as fixed by the Court... shall
be paid upon receipt of an appropriate order from circuit
court."03 '

However, the court rejected the argument that this

was an effective mechanism based on evidence that postconviction counsel in Virginia were unaware of the steps necessary to receive payment and did not even know which court had
jurisdiction over such a request.s This system for payment was
clearly inadequate in light of the mechanism intended in Chapter 154.
Second, the court found that Virginia had not established
standards of competence for post-conviction counsel.3 3 7

The

court first confronted the issue raised in Booth regarding the inconsistencies between authorities establishing the appointment
mechanism and authorities laying out standards of competence.
In contrast to Booth, the district court in Virginia harmonized
the two sentences to permit a state agency authorized by state
law to promulgate standards of competence.3s Virginia had
taken such an approach. In Virginia Code Section 19.2-163.8,
the state authorized the Public Defender Commission to develop standards:
The Public Defender Commission... shall adopt standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases, which take into consideration, to
the extent practicable, the following criteria: (i) license or permission to
"'(Id.

"' Id.
at 464-65.
at 465.
3I'&
37Ia

-' See id-at 466.
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practice law in Virginia; (ii) general background in criminal litigation,
(iii) demonstrated experience in felony practice at trial and appeal, (iv)
experience in death penalty litigation, (v) familiarity with the requisite

court system, (vi) experience in death penalty litigation [sic]; and (vi)
demonstrated proficiency and commitment to quality representation.

The court rejected this statutory formulation, finding that
these were not standards, but were guidelines for the development of standards.30 Further, these guidelines lacked any indication as to how each qualification should be met.'"
In
addition, the court pointed out that the guidelines for the Public Defender Commission did not require any familiarity with
habeas corpus in death penalty cases.4'
Third, the court found that Virginia's system had no
mechanism for the entry of an order of court once counsel appointments had been made. 3u The system as it existed on June
8, 1995, also failed to affirmatively provide counsel to defendant
after conclusion of the direct appeal.3 For these reasons, the
court concluded that Virginia had failed to opt in to the provisions of Chapter 154. There was no additional appeal on this
case as there were in the above cases. Moreover, such an appeal
is unlikely because other cases confirmed that Virginia's system
is inadequate to qualify under the opt-in provisions.m
6. Summary
Two separate themes can be seen from the litigation history
above. The first is that prisoner attempts for an ex ante determination of opt-in status are doomed to fail. The Supreme Court's
w 6 denied such attempts on the
holding in Ashmus v. Calderon
grounds of standing, and most of the lower federal courts see
'Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-163.8 (Michie Supp. 1995)).

40

id.

Id.

"'

312Id. at
45

'

467.

id.

4

rd at 467-68.
30 See, &g., Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding, in
the context of a standard § 2254 petition, that Virginia did not qualify as an opt-in
state).
46 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
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the Eleventh Amendment as an additional block. The result is
that prisoners will only learn whether their state post-conviction
counsel qualifies after state post-conviction review when the
prisoner files for federal habeas relief and the court must determine the appropriate time frame. As a result, state postconviction counsel are effectively immune from any sort of quality control. Prisoners may not challenge in advance the standards of competence for the class of potential appointed
counsel, and there is no right to challenge post-conviction
counsel after the fact.
The second theme that arises from the history of this litigation is that federal courts generally will scrutinize, in depth, a
state's chosen method of providing counsel. In four of the cases
discussed above, the district courts conducted a thorough review of the laws and regulations underlying counsel, and in
some cases, adduced additional oral evidence of standard practices. Further, these courts were willing to parse the meaning of
individual words and phrases, as shown by the Northern District
of California distinguishing between "shall" and "should," and
the District of Maryland grappling with the inconsistencies in
§ 2261. The result of this depth of review was that in each of
these cases, the state system failed.
B. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS

The second means by which states have settled the issue of
opt-in to Chapter 154 has been through normal federal habeas
corpus review, as was recommended by the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court above. The following states have had the
opt-in issue addressed through federal habeas corpus review:
Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. u7 In some of
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998) (Arizona); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998) (Alabama); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086
(10th Cir. 1998) (Oklahoma); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768 (10th Cir. 1998)
(Oklahoma); Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (Oklahoma); Mata
v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir. 1996); Ward v. French, 989 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.C.
1997); Lockett v. Puckett, 980 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Mills v. Anderson, 961
F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Scott v. Anderson, 958 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ohio
1997); Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. La. 1996); Zuem v. Tate, 938 F.
17

2000]

SMALL FAVORS: CHAPTER 154 OF THE AEDPA

517

these cases, such as Oklahoma, the determination was brief because the state conceded it had not qualified. In other cases, a
more detailed determination was required because the state
contended it had opted in or otherwise contested the issue.
The typical reason a state may fail to qualify under Chapter
154 is a failure to establish sufficient competency standards. For
example, in Ryan v. Hopkins, the federal district court found
that while Nebraska's post-conviction statute created an adequate appointment and compensation system, Nebraska did not
qualify because the statute did not specify competency standards. s48 The same reasoning prevented Tennessee from qualifying in Austin v. Bell. Though the court found Tennessee did
have an appointment mechanism, the court also found the
state's only requirement for competence-passing the bar-inadequate.3 49 Texas was found not to qualify in Mata v. Johnson
because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals required counsel
to submit questionnaires which the court used to determined
competency on a case-by-case basis.!" The court found that the
intent of Chapter 154 was for states to establish explicit standards; Texas' individualized determination did not provide the
kind of "specific, mandatory" standards sought.!"
In contrast, though Ohio argued it qualified for opt-in in
three cases: Zuern v. Tate, Mills v. Anderson, and Scott v. Anderson,'52 the federal district courts gave five reasons for the state's
failure to qualify. First, the system did not provide counsel to all
indigent capital prisoners under § 2261. The Ohio Public Defender Act provides trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel

Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Austin v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Tenn. 1996);
Ryan v. Hopkins, No. 4:CV95-3391, 1996 WL 539220 (D. Neb. 1996).
" Ryan, 1996 WL 539220, at *3-*4. Nebraska also failed because there was no provision for entry of a court order. Id.
"9Austin, 927 F. Supp. at 1061-62.
30Mata, 99 F.3d at 1267.
" Id. However, the court did find that Mata had not shown that Texas' cap on
compensation and expense reimbursement for post-conviction counsel ($7500 and
$2500 respectively) was systemically inadequate. See id.
"2Zuern v. Tate and Mills v. Anderson employ nearly identical analysis to describe
Ohio's failure to qualify under Chapter 154. For ease of reference, citations are to
Mills, which contains a better description of Ohio's post-conviction counsel system.
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through county public defenders.~ The Ohio statute permitted
the public defenders to refuse to represent prisoners whose
claims lacked merit.- Because some prisoners would be without counsel, the system failed the § 2261 requirements. Second,
the courts found that although Ohio courts may record the
name of appointed counsel, there was no requirement that an
order of court be entered. 5 Third, the Ohio statute set maximum fee amounts for county public defenders. The courts
found that the lack of a minimum fee and the unreasonably low
fees in general did not provide an adequate payment and reimbursement system under § 2261(b).s Fourth, the courts found
Ohio did not provide sufficient standards of competency. Ohio
argued that Ohio Supreme Court Rule 65 guaranteed such
standards by requiring that counsel in death penalty cases be
However, the court recertified by a special committee.
sponded by quoting an affidavit from a member of the committee, who declared that the committee had rejected requiring
certification at the post-conviction stage.m Therefore, Ohio had
no effective standards of competency. Fifth, Ohio did not offer
counsel in the manner intended by Chapter 154. Given Ohio's
system, an indigent prisoner might have to prepare his or her
own petition for post-conviction relief before counsel would be
appointed.. Since the purpose of post-conviction counsel is to
assist the prisoners in just such a manner, Ohio failed to "offer"
counsel under § 2261.39
IV.FUTURES: STATE VIEWS AND INTENTS TOwARD THE OPT-IN

PROVISIONS
Thirty-eight states provide for the death penalty, making
them facially eligible for opt-in under Chapter 154. However, in
the three years since passage of the AEDPA, no state has manSee OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 120.16 (Banks-Baldwin 1984).
'"Mills v. Anderson, 961 F. Supp. 198, 200-01 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Anderson, 958 F. Supp. 330, 332 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
-"'Mills,961 F. Supp. at 201-02.
I& at 202.
5 Id.

"'

I at 202-03.
See Zuem v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468, 471 (S.D. Ohio 1996).

See also Scott v.
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aged to qualify. A critical step in understanding the impact and
the future of the opt-in provisions is to examine the different
state approaches through original research directly contacting
state authorities. To this end, this section summarizes the results of a survey of state attorney general offices.w In general,
the answers to the question of whether states intended to opt in
were "Yes," "No," and "Maybe," though obviously these distinctions are simplistic. A more detailed discussion of the different
state positions is described below, using these answers as basic
organizational tools.
A.

"YES": STATES THAT ARE PURSUING OPT-IN STATUS

Fifteen states have declared they are pursuing opt-in status,
by affirmatively adopting measures to qualify under the requirements of § 2261 or by seeking acknowledgment that their
current post-conviction counsel system is in compliance. These
states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho,
'6While this survey attempted to be methodical and consistent, it cannot be considered scientific, exhaustive, or definitive. As several attorneys general pointed out,
taking the pulse of a state requires contacting not only the state's lawyers, but its
judges, legislative representatives, executives, and its people, at least. However, this
survey does illustrate the general position of the states and helps illustrate the relative
attractiveness of the opt-in provisions.
While some respondents correctly observed that state legislatures, governors, and
executive offices are critical, the survey focused on attorneys general as the best
sources for information on state intent and reactions to the opt-in provisions for several reasons. First, as traditional members of the executive branch, attorneys general
would be involved in policy discussions about the opt-in provisions. Second, given
this position, they would also be cognizant of the legislature's attitude. Third, and
most important, the attorneys general would be the ones responsible for carrying out
a decision to opt in through their representation of the state at post-conviction and
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Alternative sources of information involved tradeoffs. Canvassing state legislators
and committee heads would have been slow and likely duplicative. Similar problems
prevented contacting governor's offices. Private defense attorneys and publicly supported indigent defenders would be good sources for judging the impact of the
state's decision to opt in on the prisoner population and would provide useful critiques, but, given their position, these attorneys would not necessarily have been involved in the state's decision to opt in.
As a last methodological note, the quality of responses to the survey varied greatly,
from handwritten "yes" and "no" answers to detailed letters providing cites and additional legal materials.
In addition, the following states did not respond: Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
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Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington.
1. Arizona
Arizona has 120 prisoners under death sentence, with
Betwenty-eight prisoners currently seeking federal review.'
cause Arizona already provided post-conviction counsel and because federal review was averaging over ten years, the state
judged that the additional cost in enacting competency standards was outweighed by the benefits of the expedited procedure after opt in. 2
Based on this decision, in 1996 and 1998 the state legislature enacted several bills to amend the post-conviction counsel
system and the Arizona Supreme Court passed a court rule requiring standards of competency.63 Arizona now provides a
statutory right to post-conviction counsel for indigent capital
prisoners, though a competent prisoner may knowingly waive
counsel.6 This appointed counsel must be a member of the
Arizona bar in good standing for five years, have practiced in
state criminal appeals or post-conviction proceedings for three
years, and have not represented the defendant before unless the
defendant and appointed counsel specifically request appointment and waive all potential issues that are foreclosed by continued representation.o Beyond these standards, the statute
requires the Arizona Supreme Court to maintain a list of qualified attorneys and permits the court to establish additional
In response, the Arizona Supreme
standards of competence.
Court additionally requires the appointed counsel to:
[w]ithin three years immediately preceding the appointment have been
lead counsel in an appeal or post-conviction proceeding in a case in

- Questionnaire Response from Paul McMurdie, Arizona Office of the Attorney
General, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Nov. 30, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Arizona Response].
62 Id. 1 4.
363Id. 1 3.
'"

SeeARiz.

'6'Id.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-4041(B).

Id § 13-4041(C).

§ 13-4234(D) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
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which a death sentence was imposed, as well as prior experience as lead
counsel in the appeal of at least three felony convictions and at least one

post-conviction proceeding that resulted in an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, an attorney must have been lead counsel in the appeal of at
least six felony convictions, at least two of which were appeals from first

or second degree murder convictions, and lead counsel in at least two
post-conviction proceedings that resulted in evidentiary hearings ....
[In addition, appointed counsel must] [h]ave attended and successfully
completed, within one year of the appointment, at least twelve hours of

relevant7 training or educational programs in the area of capital defense.
However, Arizona's statutes and court rules do permit the
appointment of counsel who do not meet these standards if
qualified counsel is not available and the court is satisfied that
replacement counsel both significantly exceeds these standards
and the replacement counsel associates with a lawyer who does
meet the standards.3 Beyond the required standards of counsel, Arizona compensates appointed counsel, other than public
defenders, at the rate of up to $100 per hour for up to 200
hours, with $7,500 as a presumptive fee." Upon a showing of
good cause, the court may authorize up to $100 per hour for
time worked over 200 hours.7 0 The court will also reimburse investigative and expert expenses which are "reasonably necessary
to adequately litigate" the defendant's claims.8 7'
As a last note, the respondent from Arizona remarked that
the defense bar had reacted negatively to these changes and
that even qualified attorneys had refused to take capital postconviction cases.372 He predicted that continued resistance
might result in the elimination of funding for post-conviction
relief3 73 While such an outcome remains in doubt, it seems dire
7

R. CRIM.P.6.8(c).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4041(D) (West 1989); ARIZ. R. CRM.P. 6.8(d).
' See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4041(G); DoNALD E. WILxES, jR, STATE Posrapp. A (1996 & Supp. 1998) (A Survey of Current
CONVICION REMEDIES AND REI
Post-Conviction Remedies and Relief in Each of the Fifty States and the District of Columbia).
AmiZ.
R

"°ARuz. RLv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4041(H).
',Id.
§ 13-4041(J).

SeeArizona Response, supranote 361,
373Id.
37
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to eliminate post-conviction relief and thereby automatically
disqualify one's state from opt-in status.
2. Arkansas
Arkansas has forty prisoners under sentence of death, with
one seeking federal habeas corpus and two additional prisoners
seeking certiorari in the Supreme Court for the denial of habeas corpus. 7 4
In response to the opt-in provisions, the Arkansas General
Assembly passed both Rule 37.5-Special Rule for Persons Under Sentence of Death-and a special subchapter on postconviction entitled the Arkansas Effective Death Penalty Act of
1997,375 laying out the required procedures to qualify under
Chapter 154. Arkansas' goals were explicit: "The intent of this
rule is to comply with the provisions of 28 United States Code
§ 2261 et seq [,] " 76 and:
[i] t is the express intent of this subchapter to comply with the requirements of the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996... in an effort to obtain the benefits of the act concerning time
limitations in which federal habeas corpus proceeding 7 and appeals
must be considered and decided, and for other purposes.

37"Questionnaire Response from Todd L Newton, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General of Arkansas, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Feb. 11, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Arkansas Response].
3 See Am R. GRM. P. 37.5; AmK. CoDEANN. § 16-91-206 (Michie 1987). The preface to the Arkansas Effective Death Penalty Act contains an emergency clause which
further explains the reasoning of the General Assembly.

It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State ofArkansas that the
current system for carrying out a sentence of death is hopelessly fraught with endless litigation in state and federal court which undermines the deterrent value of the death penalty
and imposes a needless financial burden on the state's resources, while depriving death
row inmates of the right to obtain speedy relief on any meritorious constitutional claims ..
.The most significant delay between sentencing and execution occurs while capital cases
await decision in federal habeas corpus litigation. From 1990 through 1993, the average
time that prisoners sentenced to death in this state awaited execution was ten years and two
months for those prisoners who pursued federal habeas corpus litigation. However, if the
states comply with the requirements of the Antiterrorism Act, the average time that prisoners will await execution in federal court will be reduced to less than three years in most
cases.
Id. § 16-91-200 (Post-Conviction).
3,ARY R. GRIM. P. 37.5(a).
37ARK CoDEANN.

§ 16-91-204. See also Arkansas Response, supranote 374,

2.
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Arkansas is also explicit that Rule 37.5 and the Arkansas Effective Death Penalty Act are meant to be complementary,
though occasionally the two diverge. While the Effective Death
Penalty Act was passed in March 1997, the Rule was passed in
August 1997.37 A per curiam opinion of the Arkansas Supreme
Court found that the Rule is intended to supersede all parts of
the Act, except for provisions on education programs and compensation to appointed counsel.3 7 Both the Rule and the Act
require the circuit court issuing the sentence of death to convene a hearing, with the prisoner present, within twenty-one
days of the Arkansas Supreme Court's affirmance of the prisoner's death sentence. m The purpose of this hearing is solely to
appoint counsel for post-conviction proceedings and the court
is required to make written finding and enter a written order
specifying whether the prisoner is indigent, competent, and accepts counsel.3'
While both the Rule and the Act provide competency standards, and while the language in the Act indicates that these are
the "exclusive criteria counsel must satisfy" in order to be appointed, it is the requirements of the rule that apply3 2 At least
one of the appointed counsel must have: (1) represented a capital prisoner in state or federal post-conviction within ten years;
(2) served as defense counsel in five felonyjury trials to completion, including one capital trial, within ten years; (3) represented prisoners in three state or federal post-conviction
proceedings, one of which involved an evidentiary hearing arid
all of which involved violent felony convictions, including one
murder conviction, within ten years; (4) represented prisoners
in three appeals for violent felony convictions, including one
murder, and represented a prisoner in one evidentiary hearing
in state or federal post-conviction proceedings, within ten years;
(5) actively practiced law for three years; and (6) completed six

ARu. CoDEANN. § 16-91-201; AX. R. CRIM. P. 37.5.
ARK Rt GRIM. P. 37.5 (Publisher's Note).
'40 AR. R. GRm. P. 37.5(b) (1)-(2); ARK. CODEANN. § 16-91-202(a) (1).
GRM. P. 37.5(b) (2).
'ARx.
37
3

4APK.

CODEANN.

§ 16-91-202(c).

BURKE W. KAPPLER

[Vol. 90

hours of professional training in capital trials, appeals, and postconviction proceedings, within two years.M
Both the Rule and the Act allow the court to appoint attorneys who do not meet these criteria but whose experience,
background, and training are clear evidence of their competence upon a written finding m However, the Act requires that
even under these circumstances, the attorney must be licensed
for five years, with three years trying capital murder cases or
post-conviction proceedings in Arkansas courts, and must have
six hours of training in capital trials, appeals, and postconviction proceedings within the previous two years.!" Both
provisions also state that the circuit and appellate courts shall
establish rates for compensation and fees for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services, to be paid by the
Arkansas Public Defender Commission.3
Besides the three prisoners involved in post-conviction review in the federal system, several prisoners are currently seeking state post-conviction review under the system established by
Rule

3 7 .5.M7

Depending on the status of these cases, Arkansas

may be in a position to test the validity of this legislation within
a few years.3 Reaction from the defense community is difficult
to judge, but defense attorneys were involved in drafting Rule
37.5.39

m See AR. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(c)(1)(A)-(B). In contrast, ARx. CODE ANN. § 16-91202(c) (2) mandates that attorneys must have: (1) previously represented a prisoner
in state or federal post-conviction proceedings within five years; (2) served as defense
counsel within five years in three state or federal post-conviction proceedings on felony charges, two of which involved violent crimes and one of which involved murder;,
(3) conducted two evidentiary hearings in state or federal post-conviction proceedings within five years; (4) be licensed to practice law for five years, and be licensed in
Arkansas for three years; and (5) completed six hours of professional training in capital trials, appeals, or post-conviction litigation within two years.
SeeARm R. CRm. P. 37.5(c)(4);Ax CoDEANN. § 16-91-202(e).
ARx. CODEANN. § 16-91-202(e) (2) (A)-(B).
SeeAim R. CRIM. P. 37.50); ARK. CODEANN. § 16-91-202(f).
37 SeeArkansas Response, supra note 374,
3.
u8.d.
389Id. 12.
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3. Califomia
California presently has 520 prisoners under sentence of
death, with 165 seeking federal habeas corpus review.'l Despite
Ashmus v. Calderon,91 California still asserts that it has had a
qualified counsel system under Chapter 154 since 1989, when its
unitary review mechanism for providing counsel became operative.3 9 However, in 1997, California adopted a new Chapter 2.1
of the California Government Code and a new Rule of Court
76.6 to ensure that its interlocking web of statutes qualified.393
Chapter 2.1 was renumbered Chapter 2.3 in 1998 and makes a
number of important changes in California's post-conviction
system. First, it established the California Habeas Resource
Center, a group of up to thirty attorneys available for appointment for state and federal post-conviction proceedings. 3 4 Second, Chapter 2.3 requires the California Supreme Court to
offer counsel to all capital prisoners and to appoint one or
more lawyers as prisoner's counsel, unless the prisoner waives
counsel or is not indigent.395 This is subject to the limitation
that the prisoner's trial and appellate counsel shall not be appointed unless expressly requested by both prisoner and counsel. 396 Third, Chapter 2.3 sets a compensation rate at a
minimum of $125 per hour; the California Supreme Court may
also authorize up to $25,000 in expenses.397
In turn, Rule of Court 76.6 establishes extensive qualifications for appointed appellate and habeas corpus counsel.398
These standards of competence for habeas counsel include four
years of practice in California; experience with five felony ap-

'" Questionnaire Response from Ronald S. Matthias, Special Deputy Attorney
General, California Department ofJustice, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Feb. 25 1999)
(on file with author) [hereinafter California Response].
3'
31 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
'"See California Response, supra note 390, 11 4-5.
Id-. 1 2. See alsoWIKES, supra note 369, at 79 (Supp. 1998).
" See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68661(a) (West 1997). The Center may also employ investigators and experts on staff. I. § 68661(f).
"' Id. § 68662.
"6I. § 68663.
-' Id. § 68666.
'" CAL. RuLES OF COURT 76.6(d)-(e).
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peals and two death penalty post-conviction proceedings; completion of nine hours of training on appellate criminal defense
or habeas corpus issues; proficiency in briefing, research, oral
and written argument (as demonstrated through writing samples), and recommendations from outside counsel5 9 This rule
became effective on February 27, 1998.4
Unfortunately, it is unclear what effect these changes will
have. On December 24, 1998, in a follow-up case entitled Ashmus v. Calderon,4°a the same federal district court judge who previously found that California had not opted in held that the
state still failed to qualify under Chapter 154.402 The case returned for a second hearing because the Supreme Court in Calderon v. AshmuP3 vacated the Ninth Circuit's holding, but failed
to reach the merits of California's system. 4 In response, the
state has repeatedly asserted in different capital cases that it
qualifies under Chapter 154, and, in Ashmus it requested supplemental briefing specifically on this issue.0 The court accepted and heard oral arguments on November 9, 1998, 406 and,
as before, concluded that California did not have an adequate
offer and appointment mechanism, it did not adequately compensate or reimburse appointed counsel, and it did not have
adequate standards of competence. °7 The reasoning behind
these conclusions was largely the same as in the first Ashmus
case.40 8 However, the court did not discuss the effects of the new
Rule 76.6 and it left the door to future opt in open with its conclusion: "Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court remains
confident that, at least until this year, California had no qualifying
' Id. at Rule 76.6(e).
0 Id. at Rule 76.6.
40 31 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
"2 See Supplemental Memorandum re Applicability of Chapter 154, Ashmus v.
California, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C-93-0594-TEH) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Supplemental Memorandum, Ashmus v. California], for a thorough review of California's position.
403 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
4
1,Ashmus, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78.
405 See Supplemental Memorandum, Ashmus v. California, supra note 402, at 2.
" Ashmus, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
17 Id. at 1177-78.
0 See id. at 1178-79. See supratext accompanying notes 178-216.
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mechanism in place for ensuring competent unitary review
counsel."4'0 California is currently in the process of appealing
the district court's decision.1
Thus, the future of California's qualification under Chapter 154 is uncertain. California's failure with the Ashmus series
of cases may stem from the fact that Ashmus litigated his postconviction claims well before the existence of the AEDPA. As
such, California's recent amendments were not considered in
adjudicating his claims. A later petitioner who has received the
benefit of counsel through California Government Code
§ 68661 and Rule 76.6 may see a different outcome.
4. Colorado
Colorado currently has four prisoners under sentence of
death, with one pursuing federal habeas corpus. 1 This prisoner began the review process before the AEDPA was enacted
so the opt-in provisions do not apply. 2
Colorado intends to opt-in and has established standards for
In
appointed counsel and mechanisms for compensation.1
1997, Colorado adopted a unitary post-conviction review system.
Specifically, the legislature identified the following goals:
(a) Ensuring compliance with the requirements of the federal
"Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"... ;
(b) Improving the accuracy, completeness, and justice of review

proceedings by requiring that post-conviction review commence immediately after the imposition of a sentence of death;

(c) Allowing for the full and fair examination of all legally cognizable post-conviction and appellate issues by the trial court and the Colorado Supreme Court; and
(d) Eliminating, to the fullest extent possible, unreasonable and unjust delays in the resolution of post-conviction issues by combining and
reducing the number of proceedings in class 1 felony cases.

4

"Ashmus, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (emphasis added).

410

See California Response, supra note 390, 1 6.
"nTelephone Interview with Paul Wolf, Office of the Attorney General (Feb. 10,
1999) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Colorado Unofficial Response].
412 id.
413 1&

411COLO. REV. STAM.ANN. §

16-12-201 (West 1999).
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In function, Colorado achieves unitary review by conducting
a hearing in the trial court following imposition of a death sentence. The court is directed to advise the defendant that ineffective assistance of trial counsel may only be raised in postconviction review, while ineffective assistance of appeal counsel
may be raised through petition to the Colorado Supreme
Court.415 The court will also appoint post-conviction counsel if
the defendant is indigent and does not waive counsel.416 The
court may appoint one or more attorneys, with the following
qualifications individually or together: (1) membership in the
Colorado Bar; (2) five years experience in criminal law, including trials and post-conviction proceedings; (3) three years experience in trying felony cases, with a minimum of five cases in the
previous five years, or a total of twenty five cases; and (4) three
years experience in appeals, with a minimum of five cases. 417
The court is also permitted to consider an attorney's previous
experience in capital representation, the attorney's education
and familiarity with capital cases, and the attorney's workload
and diligence. 41 The Colorado statute provides for reasonable
compensation and reimbursement of expenses, without establishing specific rates.419
The motivation for opting in is basically procedural speed.4
While Colorado wants to guarantee competent counsel, the
numbers of qualified counsel are few, which means that courts
are well aware of which attorneys are competent and which are
not.421 Interestingly, the defense community did push to make
the qualification standards tougher.422 In the view of the respondent, this was based more on a desire to retain their "expert" status. 423 The respondent admitted that though Colorado

415

Id. § 16-12-204(2) (d).
Id. § 16-12-205.
417
1.&§ 16-12-205(2).
416

41

9

Id. § 16-12-205(3).

'1I9 § 16-12-205(6).
' See Colorado Unofficial Response, supra note 411.
421 I&
4

22id
2Idm

4
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wanted to opt-in, the size and status of death row made it not a
"real issue."424
5. Idaho

Idaho presently has twenty-two prisoners under sentence of
death, with fifteen of these in federal habeas corpus review.3
Like California and Colorado, in order to opt in, Idaho developed a unitary review system for combining direct and collateral
attack on capital sentences.426 After a death sentence is pronounced, post-conviction counsel is appointed and given ninety
days to prepare a petition.4 This petition is then litigated in
Upon appeal of this hearing, the postthe district court.3
conviction appeal and the direct appeal are taken together to
the Idaho Supreme Court.4
Idaho has guaranteed a statutory right to counsel in postconviction proceedings.4 " By a new court rule, Idaho provides
for mandatory appointment of counsel immediately after the
pronouncement of a death sentence. 3 ' Those appointed to
represent indigents must be licensed to practice in Idaho and
must be "otherwise competent. " 432

The state requires each

county to establish a system for indigent defense, either through
an office of public defender or through a system of appointed
counsel, or both.433 Counties are also permitted to create multicounty public defender offices. 4 Idaho has recently organized
a state appellate defender's office to handle capital appeals and
435
Members of the state appellate depost-conviction cases.
Id.

424

425Questionnaire

Response from Ken Robinson, Office of the Attorney General, to

Burke W. Kappler I 1 (Feb. 16, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Idaho Response].
See ii 1 2; IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (1997).
42
See IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 44.2; IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(7).
" See IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(7).
4" Id. § 19-2719.
4'
4"
4"

Id § 19-852(b) (3).
IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 44.2.
IDAHO CODE § 19-855.
Id. § 19-859.
Id. § 19-869 to -870.
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fender office must be licensed to practice in Idaho and meet
any other criteria established by the state appellate defender.4
If private counsel is appointed due to a county's choice of system or conflict in the state appellate defender office, that counsel is entitled to reasonable compensation "with regard to the
complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant
considerations" and reimbursement of necessary direct expenses.48 7 Idaho believes that between the new counsel system
and these rule changes, it qualifies for opt-in status."
The respondent from Idaho explained the rationale for optin:
Our state has attempted to pursue opt-in status more as a public policy
statement. These cases tend to drag on for long periods of time and delay seems to be built in to the current system. In fairness to both the
families of the victims as well as the capital defendant, there needs to be
a more timely method of resolving these cases.

However, the respondent was also sanguine about the
chances of success:
[I] t seems that many of the federal judges are resistant to the idea of expedited review of these cases. In my conversations with other Deputy Attorney's General [sic] from other states, many are skeptical that the
federal court will ever0 find that a state has opted in under the requirements in this circuit.4

The criminal defense community is apparently conflicted in
Idaho. While the community favors the attempt to qualify, they
strongly41 disagree with the approach of the Idaho Supreme
Court.

4Id.

§ 19-870.

7Id.
"

§ 19-860(b).
See Idaho Response, supranote 425, 11 5-6.

439 &i
440

14.

Id 1 3.
441
IM 1 7.
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6. Kansas

Kansas currently has two prisoners under death sentence
Both of these
since reinstating the death penalty in 1994.
Legislation
Supreme
Court.
cases are on appeal to the Kansas
was introduced in 1997 to bring the operation of the Kansas
post-conviction statutes and the board in line with the opt-in
provisions."3
To that end, once a prisoner files a petition attacking his
conviction, the district court is required to make a finding on
the record that either the prisoner is indigent and accepts
counsel or is incompetent to adequately decide, in which case
counsel is appointed, or that the prisoner is competent and rejected counsel, in which case counsel is not appointed.4 " Counsel is not appointed to those prisoners who are neither indigent
nor incompetent.4" The state board of indigents' defense has
responsibility for providing counsel in the form of public defenders, contract attorneys, and appointed counsel . The 1997
legislation delegated to this board the responsibility for developing standards of competence and standards for compensating
attorney time and reimbursing litigation expenses." 7 The Assistant from the Kansas Attorney General's office explained the rationale behind this legislation:
Our decision to pursue legislation which will hopefully qualify us for the
"opt-in" procedure was based primarily on policy reasons. The expedited system benefits the State in those instances where the writ might be
granted and retrial is necessary. Over time, witness memories fade and
unfortunately witnesses either move away or pass on. Expedited review
will likely alleviate those problems, whereas under the prior system a
case might languish for years before a decision is rendered, sometimes
making retrial a virtual impossibility. The obvious advantage of the expedited review for the defendant is where constitutional error is apparent. Expedited review will allow for quicker resolution whereas in the
Questionnaire Response from Jared S. Maag, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Litigation Division, Office of the Attorney General, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1
(Dec. 22, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kansas Response].
44 Id. 13.
44

41 SeeKAN. STAT. ANN.

40 Id. § 22-4506.

Id. § 22-4522.
22-4505.

146

447Id. §

§ 22-4505 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
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past a prisoner might remain incarcerated for years waiting for a decision. The old adage that "justice delayed is justice denied" certainly
rings true with this legislation. "8

He further commented that there have been no challenges
from the defense bar and the legislation to attempt opt-in was
"well received" in the state legislature. 9 Despite these forward
steps to seek opt-in, he acknowledged that with such a new and
small death row population, it will be years before opt-in is an issue. 450
7. Maryland

Maryland currently has fifteen prisoners under death sentence, with seven seeking federal habeas corpus review.451 Maryland has taken the position that the counsel system at issue in
Booth v. Maylan df 2 does comply with the opt-in provisions and
no amendment or alteration is necessary.453
Maryland relitigated the issue of the compliance of its counsel system twice in 1998.

The first case, Colvin-El v. Nuth,"'

raised the issue through a federal habeas corpus petition. The
second, Oken v. Nuth,45" involved a "Motion for Order Declaring
Maryland not to be an Opt-In State," filed by one of the former
petitioners from Booth. In Colvin-E, the court reviewed and accepted Judge Motz's Booth opinion finding the counsel system
not in compliance, in light of Maryland's failure to amend or alter its counsel system. First, the court concurred with Judge
Motz that the system for compensating panel attorneys was "litie more than adequate."45 6 Turning to the issue of standards of
48 Kansas Response, supra note 442, 1 4.

d9
& 1 7.

"'IcdL

1.

4'See Questionnaire Response from Ann Bosse, Assistant Attorney General, Senior
Counsel for Federal Habeas Corpus Litigation, Criminal Appeals Division, Office of
the Attorney General, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Nov. 23, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Maryland Response].

42 940 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 112 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied,
118 S. Ct. 2063 (1998). See also supraPart I.A.1.
" See Maryland Response, supranote 451, 1 3.
" No. Civ. A. AW 97-2520, 1998 WL 386403 (D. Md.July 8, 1998).

4'-No. PJM 97-585, 1998 WL 897340 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 1998).
416
Colvin-E 1998 WL 386403, at *4.
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competence, the court also agreed with Judge Motz. While in
practice, defendants were receiving skilled and experienced
post-conviction counsel, the court found that the skimpy requirements and "catch-as-catch-can system" were not the type of
mechanisms envisioned by the opt-in statute.4 7 The court in
Colvin-El also pointed out that the requirement of participation
in ten felony cases for membership in Panel A (the capital defenders panel) was not sufficient because a lawyer who had plea
bargained ten cases could be seen as "technically" competent;
the fact that this bare bones minimum did not require any experience with habeas corpus or collateral attack was further
proof of its inadequacy.48 Further, the court correctly pointed
out that no Maryland statute or regulation requires these standards to apply to the staff of the Office of Public Defender.* 9
Lastly, the court found that Maryland had not provided for entry of an order of court.460 The State had contended that this
requirement was just a safeguard to ensure appointment of
counsel.46 ' Since the Office of Public Defender was available to
appoint counsel, the State argued the entry of court order was
unnecessary. The court rejected this argument, finding the
Public Defender's purpose not incompatible with requiring a
court order and that such an order was useful for indicating
when the statutory clock should run.6 2 Because this requirement of an order not only started the clock, but guaranteed no
unreasonable delays before counsel was appointed, the court
upheld the need for such an order over Maryland's objection. 43
In Oken v. Nuth, the district court also followed Booth and
Colvin-El in much more summary fashion. In a short opinion,
the court found that Maryland had not offered any substantially
new evidence of compliance and in light of this failure, reaf-

17 Id.at *5.

Id. at *6.
59Id.
0
"46

See id.

' 1d.

42

6 Id.

41 See id at *7-*8.
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firmed the reasons why Maryland did not opt in.46 The opinion
did raise one new issue: Maryland contended that Council Order No. 113, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 1996 and providing substantially the same limitations period for judicial review
of habeas petitions as opt-in under Chapter 154, required the
district court to follow the opt-in deadlines.4 In response, the
court cited Truesdale v. Moore,4 a South Carolina case in which
the Fourth Circuit held that the guidelines in Council Order
No. 113 did not mandate that all courts within the Circuit adhere strictly to the timetable, but that it gave the Circuit Executive the ability to inquire into the reasons for delay. The order
had no impact on the opt-in status of any state in the circuit,
and did not give the states a cause of action for enforcing the
order, such as mandamus. 467
To date, Maryland has litigated the issue of compliance on
three separate occasions, with the same result in each. Each
court has identified the same problem areas in Maryland's
counsel system and has refused to allow Maryland to opt in to
Chapter 154. Maryland is currently appealing the decision in
Colvin-El; obviously the state stands by its position that it is in
compliance with Chapter 154 and seeks affirmation from the
Fourth Circuit.

464See Oken v. Nuth, No. PJM 97-585, 1998 WL 897430, at *2-*3 (D. Md. Dec. 18,
1998). The opinion also described the procedural stance of Booth following the
Fourth Circuit's decision. Oken had applied for a Motion for Stay of Mandate pend-

ing a petition for certiorari, but the Fourth Circuit's view changed after the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160,1160 (9th Cir. 2000). After
the Ashmus decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Ashmus, while holding
the Booth petition for certiorari under advisement. See id. The district court deferred
any decision on opt-in until after the Supreme Court completed its review. The Supreme Court then overturned the Ninth Circuit, dismissed Booth's petition for certiorari, and the district court agreed to review the opt-in issue in Oken. See id. at *2.
'65 Oken, 1998 WL 897430, at *3. See infra Part IV.A.13 (discussing South Carolina's
stance toward the opt-in provisions).
46 525 U.S. 1051 (1998).
7 Oken, 1998 WL 897430, at *3-*4.
4' Given the Fourth Circuit's willingness to adopt Chapter 154-like limitation
periods through Council Order No. 113 and its perceived reputation as the most conservative circuit court, Maryland's decision to persist may be wise.
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8. Missoui
Missouri currently has eighty-seven prisoners under death
sentence, with fifty-five prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus
relief.46 Missouri intends to qualify under Chapter 154 and to
that end in November 1996 enacted Supreme Court Rule 29.16
to establish the necessary procedures.
In essence, the rule
contains four sections. The first establishes the entry of order of
court, appointing counsel or recording the denial of appointment based on the prisoner's indigency and competency to accept or waive counsel.4 71 The second section lays out the
required standards of competence. Based on the rule, all appointed counsel must (1) be members of the Missouri bar; (2)
have completed twelve hours of training on post-conviction and
federal and state death penalty within the previous two years,
and have at least three years experience in criminal litigation;
(3) have been lead or co-counsel in at least five post-conviction
motions for felonies; and (4) have participated as lead or cocounsel to completion in three felony trials or five direct appeals on the state or federal levels. 47 The third section specifies
that appointed counsel cannot have represented the prisoner at
trial. 47 The fourth section requires that the Office of State Public Defender pay "reasonable" compensation and reimburse
"reasonable and necessary" litigation expenses. 474
Missouri was offered a critical chance to litigate this new
rule in Roll v. Bowersox, 47 however the district court avoided the
issue. Petitioner Roll had exhausted his state post-conviction
remedies before Rule 29.16 was enacted and the court refused
to apply the rule in retrospect. In so holding, the court also refused to speculate on whether Missouri's new rule qualified un-

. Questionnaire Response from Unnamed Respondent, Attorney General of Missouri, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Dec. 15, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Missouri Response].
4701& 3.
47 Mo. R.

CRIM. P. 29.16(a).
See Mo. R. CRim. P. 29.16(b).
47 S Mo. R. GRIM. P. 29.16(c).
472

474

Mo. R. GRIM. P. 29.16(d).

47516 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
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der Chapter 154.476 Thus, Missouri is waiting for the next federal habeas petition by an inmate who has received counsel under Rule 29.16. As a last note, the Missouri respondent
indicated that the defense community in Missouri has reacted
"unfavorably" to Rule 29.16. 47
9. Montana
Montana has six prisoners under sentence of death, with
only one pursuing federal habeas corpus review. One other
prisoner is in state post-conviction review and the others are still
in direct state review. s In 1997, Montana passed legislation to
reform its post-conviction review system to meet the standards
in Chapter 154.4"9 In particular, Montana added sections providing for the entry of order of court, directing that post-conviction
counsel could not be trial or appellate counsel unless both prisoner and counsel expressly agree, and providing that all reasonable expenses and reasonable compensation shall be paid.4"
Competency standards have been drafted and are presently
4
' The Montana
pending before the Montana Supreme CourtY.
respondent indicated that the purpose behind attempting to
opt in was an "obligation to try and move cases more efficiently
and bring finality to state court judgments. 482 She commented
that the defense bar in Montana resisted passage of the legislation to opt in, but did participate in drafting the competency
standards.8 3

476
See id. at 1071-72 & 1072 n.2.
4

1

7.
' Missouri Response, supra note 469,
478 Questionnaire Response from Elizabeth

S. Baker, Chief Deputy Attorney Gen-

eral, Legal Services Division, Montana Attorney General, Department of Justice, to
Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Dec. 28, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Montana Response].
479
Id 1 3.
4

SeeMONT. CoDEANN. § 46-21-201 (1997).
0'See Montana Response, supranote 478, 1 6.
482Id. 14.
40

Id. 17.
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10. Nevada
Nevada has eighty-four prisoners under death sentence,

with twenty-two seeking federal habeas corpus relief.4 4 In addidon, one inmate's mother is seeking federal relief as a "next
friend" on the grounds that her son is incompetent.
On December 30, 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court

amended its Rule 250 laying out procedures for capital proceedings. 4 6 The amended Rule 250 requires that counsel in postconviction proceedings in district court must have served as
counsel in at least two post-conviction proceedings arising from

felonies.487 Counsel appointed for direct or post-conviction appeal must have served as counsel in two appeals of felony convictions, though the rule also provides for appointment of
otherwise qualified counsel who do not meet these standards,

after a thorough review.8 Each judicial district is required to
maintain a list of qualified attorneys, and all attorneys, includ-

ing public defenders, are required to apply for membership.489
In addition, the Supreme Court further amended the rule to

provide for reasonable compensation to appointed counsel and
reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred, including investigative, expert, and other services. 490 By statute, Nevada
compensates non-public defenders at a maximum rate of $75

per hour, with a maximum fee of $12,000 for a capital case and
$750 for a writ of habeas corpus or other post-conviction relief.49 Reimbursement for expenses is also statutorily capped at
4 Questionnaire Response from David F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General, CriminalJustice Division, Office of the Attorney General, to Burke W. Kappler I
1 (Jan. 13, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nevada Response].
4Mid
Statutorily, Nevada provides that indigent prisoners filing post-conviction petitions may be appointed counsel. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 34.750 (1957 & Supp. 1998).
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that this statute creates a right to effective postconviction counsel. See McKague v. Whitley, 912 P.2d 255, 258 n.5 (Nev. 1996); Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925-26 (Nev. 1996) (holding in both cases that while
there is no independent right to effective post-conviction counsel, the fact that such
appointment was required by statute creates such a right).
137See NEV. S. CT. RULE 250.
459 a

4

90See at

49NEV. REv. STAT. § 7.125 (1998).
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Both compensation statutes provide escape clauses
which permit the courts to set fee and expense caps aside.9
Compensation for trial level representation is paid by the
county through the trial court, but compensation for post49
conviction review is paid through the State Public Defender.
Nevada's reaction to the opt-in provisions has been positive.
The response from the Nevada Attorney General, while cautioning that it represented only that office,4 9 described its support
for the AEDPA out of concern over "undue delays" with federal
courts in Nevada. 496 Beyond supporting the amendment of Supreme Court Rule, the Attorney General's Office has been
pushing for other measures to improve post-conviction representation of indigent prisoners.4 97 First, the office successfully
persuaded the 1997 Nevada legislature to allocate funds to the
National Judicial College in Reno to create a three-day death
penalty course aimed at educating prosecutors, defense counsel,
andjudges. The first class was held in December 1998, with another anticipated in February 1999, and two more in June
1999. 498 Second, the Attorney General intends to lobby the 1999
legislature to increase the statutory maximum fees for appointed counsel to track closely to the $125 per hour rate for
habeas counsel set by the federal district court for Nevada. The
Attorney General's office believes increasing the fees will provide more incentive for skilled lawyers to accept these cases. 49,
As a final note, the Attorney General's response expressed some
frustration, not with defense counsel, but with the courts:
$300.492

Frankly, the practical reality of cases past and present is that notwithstanding major disputes about the nature and extent of discovery in

these cases, the lawyers on both sides, particularly this office, have com4

9 Id. § 7.135.
413Id §§ 7.125,
4

7.135.

Id. § 7.155.

4" See Nevada Response, supra note 484,1 4.
4 Id. 13.
49 Id. 1 4.

' Id 1 6. See Letter from B. Phyllis Whittiker, Program Attorney, National Judicial
College, to David Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 7, 1999) (on file
with author).
4

9 Id. 1 4.
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plied with federal court requirements to provide state court records,
briefs and other documents pursuant to deadlines imposed by the district and circuit courts. Getting the individual judges and panels of circuit judges to issue any substantive rulings on the merits, much less
timely ones, is problematic. For example, the circuit court recently
"granted" our motion to expedite its disposition of a prisoner's petition
for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, but only after having the matter under consideration for nearly 18 months after its initial
ruling in favor of the state.-"
While the defense community has largely been quiet on this
issue, because Nevada's lawyers have not raised the issue themselves, some members of the community did oppose the
amendments intended to qualify Nevada.50 1
11. NewJersey
NewJersey has fourteen prisoners under sentence of death,
with one pursuing federal habeas corpus review. 502 While New
Jersey apparently intends to opt in, it is still in the process of enacting the required measures to do so. 50' NewJersey has created
a statewide Office of Public Defender which has primary responsibility for representing indigents at all stages of the criminal process, including post-conviction proceedings, 504 but has
not specified standards for competence. 5 5 The Public Defender
Act requires that the Public Defender ensure that outside counsel perform to the level of quality of the Public Defender's office
itself. ° As for the Public Defender, these attorneys are required
to "adhere at all times to the standards and level of performance
established from time to time by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. "10 At present, the Supreme Court has not enacted standards of competence for post-conviction counsel in capital

5w Id 18.
Id. 7.

Questionnaire Response from Unnamed Respondent, Division of Criminal Justice, Department of Law and Public Safety, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Jan. 14, 1999)
(on file with author) [hereinafter NewJersey Response].
5031
Id16.

I& 1 2; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
0 See NewJersey Response, supra note 502, 1 2.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-10.

507M.

§ 2A:158A-13.

BURKE W. KAPPLER

[Vol. 90

cases.5 8 The response from NewJersey indicated that there is a
bill before the legislature to establish guidelines for post-

conviction relief in capital cases. °9 A fair analysis of NewJersey's
ability to opt in can only proceed after this legislation is passed
and evaluated.
12. Ohio

Ohio presently has 190 prisoners under sentence of death,
with seventy-eight seeking federal habeas corpus review. 510 In
1997, following the decision in Scott v. Anderson,51 1 the Ohio Legislature enacted S.B. 258, which revised the post-conviction peti-

tion proceedings contained in Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21.2
The revision adds a section setting out the entry of order of
court, determining whether the prisoner is indigent, competent, and able to waive or accept counsel."" An additional sec-

tion prohibits trial or appellate counsel from serving as postconviction counsel.unless expressly requested, and provides that
counsel will be certified under Rule 65 of the Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas.1 However, this rule has
been superseded and it is not clear what standards for counsel
will be required. Lastly, per the AEDPA, the amendment does
not allow the ineffectiveness of appointed counsel to give rise to
515

any claims for relief

See NJ. RULES OF COURT, CRm. R. 3:22-6 (describing appointment of counsel as
part of post-conviction relief proceedings, but without standards of competence). In
fact, the only standards for public defenders identified in the annotations to the statute are the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and the ability to refuse representation
on the grounds of substantial hardship. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2Az158A-13.
See NewJersey Response, supra note 502, 6.
Questionnaire Response from Stuart A. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, Capi1 (Dec. 24,
tal Crimes Section, Attorney General of Ohio, to Burke W. Kappler
1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ohio Response]. Of the 190 sentenced to
death, one is incarcerated in another state and one case is on remand with no further
action.
1 See supranotes 352-59 and accompanying text.
5 Ohio Response, supra note 510,
3-4. The respondent from Ohio specifically
stated that the fact of revision does not in any way imply that Ohio was not previously
in compliance. See id. 1 3.
13 OHIo REv. CODEANN. § 2953.21(I) (1) (Banks-Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1999).
1I4&
§ 2953.21(I) (2).
515
Id
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Ohio's respondent explained the rationale for the amendment:
In the interest ofjustice and in order to adjudicate sentences in a timely
manner the State intends to continue to pursue all available options under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2265. Additionally, the curtailment of frivolous
claims and dilatory tactics would save countless sums expended on need516
less delays while still preserving the substantive right of habeas review.

He noted that the defense community has opposed the
amendment and Ohio's attempt to opt in because "it reduces
the amount of options for enacting endless delays."517
13. South Carolina
South Carolina presently has sixty-six prisoners on death
row, with sixty-one under active death sentences. Seven of this
latter group are seeking federal habeas corpus review.518 South
Carolina provides appellate and post-conviction counsel
through the Office of Appellate Defense.
In June 1996, South Carolina enacted the South Carolina
Effective Death Penalty Act which amends the state's Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act in order to qualify for Chapter
154 status. South Carolina takes the position that with the passage of this Act, the state is in compliance.519 The Act provides
indigent prisoners a statutory right to two appointed attorneys,
at least one of whom meets the standards for trial attorneys in
capital cases above, has previously represented a capital prisoner
in state or federal post-conviction proceedings, and has completed twelve hours of training in capital appellate or postconviction defense within two years.5 0 South Carolina also
adopted the proscription against appointing trial or appellate
counsel unless expressly requested.5 21 Post-conviction counsel
*11 Ohio

517Id

Response, supra note 510, 1 4.

17.

"&Questionnaire Response from Don Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General,
to Burke W. Kappler I 1 (Feb. 5, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter South Carolina Response].
519
Id. 11 3, 7.
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-160(B) (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
521See id.
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are compensated and reimbursed at the same rates as capital
trial counsel.5 2
The respondent from South Carolina indicated the state's
intent: "Historic delay in federal capital cases demanded that
[South Carolina] take advantage of specific provisions that allow
for expedited review."5 2 He noted that the defense community
was uncooperative, arguing for heightened competency standards in the debate over the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, then declaring that no attorney met the standards.5 2'
The issue of whether South Carolina has opted in is currently
before'the federal court in the case of Richard Tucker v. Michael
Moore, a habeas corpus action to determine if the opt-in limitations apply to Tucker and to South Carolina generally.5
The fact that South Carolina chose to attempt to opt in is
notable in light of the Fourth Circuit's Judicial Council Order
No. 113. This Order, adopted on October 3, 1996, has two
prongs. 26 First, Order No. 113 lays out guidelines to ensure that
indigent defendants receive competent counsel. It directs the
federal courts within the circuit to identify and list qualified attorneys, distinguishing between attorneys competent to serve as
lead counsel and attorneys qualified to serve as co-counsel.
Second, Order No. 113 imposes on the federal courts within the
circuit time limits virtually identical to the time limits for consideration of habeas corpus petitions by prisoners in states which
5
have opted in.In Truesdale v. Moore, this order was challenged
by a petitioner in the course of a federal habeas corpus action
against his South Carolina death sentence. Truesdale argued
that the Order was invalid because it conflicted with the goals of
22 Id.

" South Carolina Response, supra note 518,
7.
525Id. 1
5.
524 Id

1 4.

SeeTruesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 758 (4th Cir. 1998)
7Id Order No. 113 directs district courts to render a decision within 180 days of
the filing of the habeas corpus petition, with possible extensions up to 30 days. This
is similar to 28 U.S.C. §2263(a)-(b), though Order No. 113 provides fewer grounds
for tolling this time limits. Order No. 113 also directs the court of appeals to render
a decision on appeal with 120 days of receiving the reply brief or after entering the
order for rehearing, if a rehearing is required. This limit matches 28 U.S.C.
§2266(c) (1) (A)-(B) (ii) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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the AEDPA. Essentially, by adopting the opt-in limitations period, the court gave the states in the Fourth Circuit the quo
without requiring the quid-states received the procedural
benefits without having to reform their counsel systems in any
way.t5 s The court disposed of this argument by noting that the
Order had no impact on opt-in status under Chapter 154. Instead, the Order was to enable the Circuit Executive to monitor
5
compliance with the limitations period and to police delays.
The Order did not decide the opt-in status of any state and incentives for states to opt in were still present.!" Further, the
court held that in expediting death penalty review, the Order
553
was precisely in line with the purposes underlying the AEDPA.
At base, Order No. 113 appears to be an attempt by the Fourth
Circuit to apply the AEDPA limitations period without tying
their own hands to mandatory and inflexible deadlines.
14. Utah
Utah has eleven prisoners under sentence of death, with
three seeking federal habeas corpus review. 32 In 1996, in an attempt to opt in to Chapter 154, Utah passed the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, which guaranteed the right to post-conviction
counsel for prisoners under sentence of death!" The Act requires that the court enter into the record findings of the pris534
oner's indigency and whether the prisoner accepts counsel.
The Act also states that "[c] osts of counsel and other reasonable
litigation expenses" will be reimbursed.5 - Utah's reasons for at'"

Truesda, 142 F.3d at 759.

'" Id. The court has been shown to be mostly correct. Of the states in the Fourth

Circuit, South Carolina and Maryland are pursuing opt-in. North Carolina is ambivalent, having amended its post-conviction procedures. See discussion on North Carolina, infra, Part W.C.7. Virginia is also hesitant, largely based on the perception that
Order No. 113 renders opt-in moot. See discussion on Virginia, infra, Part W.C.12.
The remaining state, West Virginia, does not have the death penalty.
Truesdal 142 F.3d at 759.
Questionnaire Response from Unnamed Respondent, State of Utah Attorney
General, to Burke W. Kappler I 1 (Dec. 28, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter
"'

Utah Response].
'" See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-202 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
"3
3

Id

5 Id.
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tempting to qualify were "Public policy and popular sentiment.
Capital cases languish for years with no resolution, enraging the
public (especially the victims' families)."M
The contours of the Act were later defined through court
rules and administrative regulations. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure lays out the standards for competence.
The court may appoint one or more attorneys and make a finding that at least one of the appointed counsel is qualified. 7 To
be qualified, the attorneys must have tried four civil or felony
trials in the past four years, or tried ten cases overall.5 5 The attorney must have previous experience with three felony or postconviction appeals, including one evidentiary hearing, or must
have "demonstrated proficiency in . . . post-conviction litigation."M9 Lastly, the attorney must have completed eight hours of
death penalty or capital post-conviction representation training
in the previous five years.m Tellingly, the Rule also provides
that " [ m] ere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not [in and] of itself be
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal."541
The Utah Administrative Code describes the mechanism for
compensating appointed counsel and reimbursing litigation
expenses. In operation, attorneys are compensated in lump
sums for completing certain services in the course of representation. For example, an appointed attorney would receive
$5,000 for correctly filing a petition for post-conviction relief,
54 2
and would receive another $5,000 for an evidentiary hearing.
In addition, appointed counsel may earn an extra $100 per
hour up to a maximum of $5,000 for "extraordinarily legal services that were not reasonably foreseeable" and were "reasonable
"mUtah
7

Response, supra note 532, 14.
W SeeUTAH R. CRIM. P. 8(e) (1998).
538 ad
539Id.
540

"' Id. R. 8 (f).
" UTAHADMIN. CODE R25-14-4 (1996). The rules are rather specific. The attorney
is eligible for the $5,000 for an evidentiary hearing as of the swearing-in of the first
witness.
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and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims."5 " The
Rules also reimburse reasonable and necessary litigation expenses for investigators experts, and consultants, up to a maximum of $10,000.5"
15. Washington
Washington currently has fifteen prisoners under sentence
5 "
of death, with three seeking federal habeas corpus relief.
Washington guaranteed a right to post-conviction counsel to
indigents prior to enactment of the AEDPA.54 6 The responsibility for actually supplying the counsel was delegated to counties
and cities, who were directed to choose between contract attorneys, assigned counsel, and public defender offices. Cities and
counties were also directed to establish standards for this counsel, including compensation, caseload, reporting, and qualifications. 47 Through this counsel, indigent prisoners could seek a
variety of post-conviction remedies and collateral attacks, including but not limited to the writ of habeas corpus.48
However, in 1997 Washington amended its post-conviction
procedure to provide a single remedy known as the personal restraint petition. This personal restraint petition is explicitly designed to supercede the previous remedies of habeas corpus
and other post-conviction applications, though jurisdiction for
this petition limited is to the Court of Appeals.5 9
Prisoners are entitled to appointment of counsel to assist in
filing the personal restraint petition if indigent. More than one
543Id
4

" 1 UTAHADMIN. CODE R25-14-5.

5 Questionnaire Response from John Sansom, Attorney General of Washington,
to Burke W. Kappler 11 (Mar. 5, 1999) (on file with author) (hereinafter Washington
Response].
546 See WASH.REv. CODE. AN. §§ 10.73.150, 36.26.080 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
Though public defenders have a statutory duty to "prosecute any appeals and other
remedies, whether before or after conviction" the public defender is allowed to limit
his representation to those cases he believes "to be in the interests of justice." Id.
§ 36.26.080.
'47
Id.§ 10.101.030.
WAsH.I. APP. P. R. 16.3.
"9 Id. Despite this new remedy, writs of habeas corpus may still be filed in the Superior Court. Id.
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counsel may be appointed, but at least one must have three
years experience in criminal appeals or collateral attacks,
knowledge of the laws governing capital punishment, and the
"necessary proficiency and commitment" required for quality
representation in capital cases.5 50 A list of qualified attorneys
will be kept by the Supreme Court.. The rule appointing counsel additionally states that counsel will not be appointed if "the
court is satisfied that petitioner's election [to proceed pro se] is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."5 ' Trial attorneys will not
be appointed, but attorneys from the direct appeal may be appointed after an express request. 5 2 While this rule does not
provide for compensation of counsel, a separate rule governing
the personal restraint petition process allows the prisoner to
move for investigative, expert, or other services upon a showing
that the services will produce
information that will support the
55
relief.
for
claim
prisoner's
The language and the timing of these new rules for personal restraint petitions indicates they were adopted with an intent to qualify for opt-in status under Chapter 154.- However,
the respondent from Washington refused to publicly speculate
on Washington's motives for doing so, believing that this information might reveal the position
the state would take in any liti55
gation over opt-in prematurely.
B.

"NO": STATES THAT DO NOT INTEND TO PURSUE OPT-IN STATUS

Only three states, Delaware, Georgia, and Nebraska, declared they would not seek to opt in to, or were not in compli-

"' WASH. R. Ap,. P. R. 16.25. Special rules adopted for capital cases in the Superior Court establish similar standards of competency for attorneys representing capital defendants at trial and on appeal. In addition to the standards above, these
attorneys must have five years experience in criminal law and must be familiar with
evidence and expert witnesses. See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. Super. Ct. Spec. P. Crim.

Rules 2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
.. WASH. R. App. P.R. 16.25.
552id

.Id. R. 16.27.
Washington Response, supra note 545, 13.

'"

5" Ia 1 4, 6-8. See also Telephone Interview with John Sansom, Attorney General
of Washington (Feb. 22, 1999).
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ance with, Chapter 154. The states are in different positions
and their answers are instructive.
1. Delaware
Delaware currently has seventeen prisoners under sentence
of death, with two seeking federal habeas review in the district
court and five appealing such review in the court of appeals.55
While Delaware does provide a right to assigned counsel from
557
the initial appearance through the first appeal as of right,
counsel will only be appointed to indigents in the postconviction setting at the court's discretion upon a showing of
good cause 5 Delaware uses a statewide public defender office
to provide counsel, supplemented by contract attorneys in the
event of conflict. In addition, courts may appoint outside counsel if the list of contract attorneys is not sufficient.559 Generally,
in death penalty cases, two attorneys are appointed for trial, one
or two are appointed on appeal, and two are appointed for postconviction proceedings. 56 Unless the defendant requests it, new
counsel is appointed between appeal and post-conviction. 1
Delaware's system does not specify standards of competency.
Although the system does allow reimbursement for necessary
expenses and although compensation is capped at $50 per hour
up to $2000, as a practical basis, these are not followed.562

',' Unofficial Questionnaire Response from Unnamed Respondent to Burke W.
Kappler 11 (Feb. 14, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Delaware Unofficial Response].
517See DEj. R. SuP. CT. CaM. R. 44(a).

" DEL. R.

SUP. Cr. CRaI. R. 61(e) (1).

...
Delaware's criminaljustice community is quite compact. The Attorney General
is the only prosecuting agency. The Criminal Division handles all trials, while the
Appeals Division, composed of seven attorneys, handles all appeals and all state and
federal post-conviction litigation. Beyond the public defender office, there are only
10-12 attorneys on contract with the state and approximately 20 private criminal defense attorneys. See Delaware Unofficial Response, supra note 556.
'"' See Delaware Unofficial Response, supranote 556, 2.
561See id.
" See Delaware Sup. Ct. R. Crim. P. 44(e) (2); Delaware Unofficial Response, supra
note 556, 1 2.
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Delaware has not pursued opt-in status for several reasons.s6
First, there were concerns that establishing the necessary competency standards would be futile. It was obvious that based on
the litigation history these standards would have to be high.5 "
Given Delaware's small defense community, few of these attorneys would qualify, even under the minimal standards for federal post-conviction counsel in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988

.s

Moreover, it appeared that the standards could actually

be used to prevent opt in by those opposed to capital punishment: either the standards could be set so high that no attorney
qualified, or committed defense attorneys would simply avoid
obtaining the required credentials5 6 The response expressed
an additional concern:
[There is] a philosophical objection. [T] he regulation of the practice of
law has traditionally been left to the states. [S]ection 2261, though wellintentioned, is a means by which the federal judiciary can supervise the
qualifications of attorneys admitted to practice. [T]he criminal justice
system already bears the heavy hand of federal intervention [beyond
the] incorporation doctrine; one need only look at the requirements in
the federal crime bills that the states register sex offenders in order to
qualify for federal crime money. [T]he states should resist the invitation
to invite the federal courts
into yet another aspect of state criminal prac67
tice and procedure.5

Second, given the small size of the Attorney General's of-

fice, opting in created practical resource issues. The Appeals
Division has seven attorneys bearing a caseload of 250-300 cases
a year." 8 As such, Delaware simply does not have the manpower
to undertake the complex and time-consuming litigation necessary to achieve opt-in. Moreover, even if Delaware succeeded in
opting in, the resulting accelerated review period would simply
As a tangent, Delaware also litigated the issue of opt-in in a declaratory judgment suit by a prisoner. In an unreported opinion, the district courtjudge struck the
motion down on ripeness grounds in line with Death Row Prisonersv. Ridge, 948 F.
Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Delaware Unofficial Response, supra note 556, 15.

SId 1 3, 4.
See id 13.
5 See
.
56
7 &t.

568See id.
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increase the workload of the Division."9 Furthermore, there
57
appeared to be no need to opt in.*
Generally, the federal
courts were consistent in reviewing both capital and noncapital
cases within a year and there were no indications of intentional
or unreasonable delay.57
Arguably, Delaware may be in a unique position among
death penalty states, given its small size, prosecutorial structure,
and size of the criminal justice community, but the unofficial
response provides useful criticisms of the opt-in provisions and
their utility for expediting habeas corpus review.
2. Georgia

Georgia has between 115 and 120 inmates under death sentences, with twenty-one pursuing federal habeas corpus review
as of December 1998.572 While Georgia has created a multicounty public defender in order to represent all indigent defendants charged with a capital crime, the state does not
provide for appointment of post-conviction counsel at all.57s
However, even the multicounty public defender is limited. For
example, the regular county public defender may retain the
case if he or she chooses.5 7 Further, the multicounty public defender may only represent the client though trial and appeal to
the Georgia Supreme Court; no post-conviction representation
or assistance is permitted. 575 Lastly, there are no real standards
for competency. Georgia's statutes only guarantee that, "[n]o
person may... represent[] an indigent person.., unless such
person is authorized to practice law in this state and is otherwise
competent to counsel and defend a person charged with a capi569See id.
570See

id.

5711id.
'7 Questionnaire Response from Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Law, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Jan. 26, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Georgia Response].
'73 See id. 1 2; GA. CODE ANN. §17-12-91 (1998). Organizations such as the Georgia
Resource Center provide representation and assistance, but are not mandated by the
state. See Georgia Response, supranote 572, 12.
5" GA. CODEANN. § 17-12-97 (1998).
57s

id
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tal felony."576 If the multicounty public defender is unavailable
or is conflicted out of representation, another attorney may be
appointed. 57 This attorney may be compensated no more than
$250 for his or her representation in a capital case, and may be
reimbursed no more than $500 for expenses. 578 The Georgia Attorney General refused to speculate on why Georgia had decided not to provide post-conviction counsel, deferring to the
legislature or other state executive offices.5 " However, given the
lack of any post-conviction counsel, Georgia has effectively declared that it will not pursue opt-in.
3. Nebraska
In contrast, Nebraska currently has ten prisoners under
death sentence, none of whom are presently seeking federal
habeas corpus review.5*° Nebraska guarantees counsel to indigent defendants at trial and direct appeal, but retains discretion
to appoint post-conviction counsel.581 While up to two counsel
may be appointed in capital cases, there are no special requirements for these attorneys.582 The Nebraska legislature proposed
measures to meet Chapter 154 last session, but the bill was held
over and has not been reconsidered." In general, the Nebraska
Attorney General is not seeking passage of the bill for three basic reasons. First, Nebraska is generally not losing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, an indication to the Attorney General
that the present system of counsel provision is adequate. Second, Nebraska echoes many other states in believing that no
federal court will ever allow a state to qualify, or will allow a state
to qualify under objectively reasonable standards. Third, Nebraska has experienced an improvement in federal case man76

7

Id. § 17-12-96.
Id. § 17-12-97.

See id. §17-12-61.
Georgia Response, supra note 572, 14.
50 See Questionnaire Response fromJ. Kirk Brown, Office of the Attorney General,
Nebraska Department ofJustice, to Burke W. Kappler I 1 (Jan. 26, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Nebraska Response].
"' Id. 12.
5
-

53Id. 13.
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agement.8 As the survey response states, "Our successful litigation history on this issue, coupled with an observable hostility to
standards by the federal courts, and the fact that we have seen a
marked improvement in federal case movement just prior to
AEDPA, 5 makes opting in appear more trouble that its [sic]
58

worth.
C. "MAYBE": STATES THAT HAVE NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO
PURSUE OPT-IN STATUS

Twelve states have not yet decided to pursue opt-in. These
states include Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming. In general, this hesitation is because these states have few or no prisoners currently
under death sentence and these prisoners are still in the process
of exhausting their state remedies. In other cases, states are unconvinced that opt-in is possible in light of the experiences of
the states who have tried. These states reserve the right to opt
in, pending a shift in the attitudes of the federal judiciary.
1. Connecticut

Connecticut presently has five prisoners under death sentences, all of whom are in the direct appeal stage.58 Connecticut's Public Defender provides two full time attorneys as postconviction counsel to all capital defendants, except where the
attorneys may be conflicted out of representation.587 Connecticut's response to the survey indicated frustration with both the
Public Defender and the courts. First, the respondent described how the Public Defender was expected to produce standards of competency, but had failed to do so yet. The
respondent attributed this failure to an incentive problem; once
the standards were in place and Connecticut opted in, the PubId. 1 4.

584

'

Id. 18.

Questionnaire Response from Unnamed Respondent, Division of Criminal Justice, Chief State's Attorney, to Burke W. Kappler (Dec. 22, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Connecticut Response]. The response was incomplete because the respondent only returned the first page of the questionnaire.
87Id. 12.
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lic Defender's clients would be greatly limited. Not producing
standards was seen as a way of avoiding this outcome. Second,
the respondent pointed to the reluctance of the courts and said,
"most jurisdictions will never find a system in compliance...."'
The tone of the response indicated that Connecticut might pursue opt-in, but felt constrained by the courts and the Public Defender.
2. F/orida
Florida has approximately 370 prisoners under sentence of
death, with between forty and fifty seeking federal habeas review.:5 In 1997, Florida broke the single Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) office into three regional CCR offices.5 The
sole purpose of the CCR is to represent indigents pursuing collateral attack on their convictions in state and federal courts.5 9'
In the event of conflict, the sentencing court is to appoint one
of the other regional CCRs, and if the conflict is still present, a
private member of the Bar.592 Members of the CCR offices are
required to have not less than three years experience in criminal law practice and must have participated in five felony jury
trials, five felony appeals, five capital post-conviction proceedings, or any combination of at least of these proceedings. 93
CCR offices may contract with private attorneys, who are required to have the same experience 5 9 Private counsel appointed in the case of conflict must have participated in five
felony jury trials, five felony appeals, or five capital postconviction proceedings, or any combination of five such experiences. 595

M

Id

Telephone Interview with Richard Martel, Florida Attorney General's Office
(Feb. 10, 1999).
'9 SeeFL/A. STAT. ANN. § 27.701 (West 1998).
'9' See id § 27.702(1).
"'Id. § 27.703(1).
Id. § 27.704(2).
I'
5 Id. § 27.703(3).
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Though the Attorney General takes the position that Florida qualifies,59 Florida has chosen the "wait-and-see" approach
and is assessing the circumstances.597 Several factors are weighing on Florida's consideration. First, the 11th Circuit vacated
the district court's decision that Florida had not qualified under
Chapter 154 in Hill v. Butteworth. Therefore, at present, Florida
has a blank slate as far as Chapter 154 is concerned.59 8 A second
consideration is the nonretroactivity of the opt-in provisions.
Effectively, a state may only argue that its present system of providing post-conviction counsel is in compliance; a state may not
argue that a prior system was in compliance."
Florida has
amended their post-conviction counsel system greatly over the
past few years and is concerned that nonretroactivity will simply
leave large numbers of their prisoners immune to opt-in status.
Third, Florida is watching internal developments in the federal
system. There have been recent indications that the federal
courts in the state have accelerated their docket. If the trend
continues, Florida may not see the need to opt in.6°°
3. Indiana

Indiana has forty-five prisoners under death sentence, with
seven seeking federal habeas corpus review.60 1 Beginning in
September 1996, the Attorney General, Public Defender of Indiana, and the Indiana Supreme Court shared ideas for reform
proposals which would bring Indiana into compliance. This exchange concluded on a negative, but open, note inJune 1998.
'9 Telephone Interview with Ed Hill, Florida Attorney General's Office (Nov. 20,
1998).
'9 Telephone Interview with Richard Martel, Florida Attorney General's Office
(Nov. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Martel Interview-Nov.]; Telephone Interview with
Richard Martel, Florida Attorney General's Office (Feb. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Martel
Interview-Feb.].
59Martel Interview-Nov., supra note 597; Martel Interview-Feb., supranote 597.
5"Martel Interview-Feb., supra note 597. See also Wright v. Angelone, 944 F.
Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1996).
600Martel Interview-Feb., supra note 597. However, Mr. Martel was unaware of
Judicial Council Order No. 113 and asked this author for a cite where details on the
Order can be located.
6" Questionnaire Response from Jon Laramore, Chief Counsel, Appeals Division,
Indiana Attorney General's Office, to Burke W. Kappler I 1 (Jan. 20, 1999) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Indiana Response].
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While Indiana's Criminal Rule 24 sets forth a comprehensive system for the appointment of trial and appellate counsel,
including requiring years of experience, numbers of previous
cases, hours of training, and a maximum caseload, 2 the Rule
does not guarantee provisions of post-conviction counsel.
Rather, the Rule provides that within thirty days from a rehearing on direct appeal, either private counsel or the State Public
Defender may enter an appearance as post-conviction counsel.s
Furthermore, there are no standards of competence for postconviction counsel.6
Without an automatic offer of post-conviction counsel, Indiana was not eligible under § 2261. Based on this, the Indiana
Supreme Court invited the State Public Defender to propose
rule changes to bring Indiana into compliance.
In September 1996, the Public Defender submitted her
proposal. First, the Public Defender recommended amending
Rule 24 to offer post-conviction counsel to all prisoners under
death sentence. 6°5 Indiana already provides that the Public Defender will represent all indigents,6 the proposal recommends
that the current requirement of filing an appearance substitute
for the entry of an order of court under § 2261 .6
Second, the Public Defender recommended that the Rule
be fleshed out to provide standards of competence and a
mechanism for compensation and reimbursement of expenses.
Indigent defendants would be provided at least two attorneys.0
These post-conviction counsel must be members of the Indiana
Bar, or be admitted pro hac vice.6 Lead post-conviction counsel
would be required to have either represented a capital defendant through state post-conviction relief or federal habeas corpus, or failing that, have met the current standards for trial and
w2IND. R. CRIM. P. 24(B) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
""Id. at Rule 24(H).
6 Wallace v. State, 640 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. 1994).
6' Memorandum from Susan YL Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana 8 (date
unknown) (on file with author) [hereinafter Carpenter Memorandum].
IND. CoDEANN. § 33-1-7-2(a) (West 1996).
7
6 Carpenter Memorandum, supra note 605, at 8.
6 Id. at 31.

w9 Id.
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appellate counsel under Rule 24.610 Further, lead counsel would
be required to have at least two years experience in postconviction or habeas corpus criminal defense.1 If lead counsel
meets these standards, co-counsel would be required to have at
least two years criminal law experience, including at least one
death penalty trial, appeal, state post-conviction relief, or federal habeas corpus petition.1 2 Both counsel would have to
complete six hours training in capital post-conviction or federal
and at least
habeas corpus within one year of appointment,
613
appointment.
of
years
two
twelve hours within
Finally, appointed counsel must "[p]ossess demonstrated
proficiency in and commitment to quality representation of
capital... petitioners."6 4 In terms of compensation, the Public
Defender's proposal suggested that the Public Defender's office
would pay for reasonable and necessary litigation expenses, and
would provide adequate office support for appointed counsel.6 5
If counsel were outside attorneys appointed because of conflicts,
the Public Defender would compensate the attorneys at $70 per
hour.616
In January 1997, at the invitation of the Indiana Supreme
Court, the Attorney General responded to the Public Defender's proposal, gently criticizing the proposal for lack of clarity and for suggesting post-conviction standards of competence
that were lower than the standards for trial and appeal. This
proposal, the Attorney General argued, "diminishe[d] the importance of post-conviction proceedings."6 7
Instead, the Attorney General recommended adding sections to Rule 24(H) to more sufficiently develop the mechanism
for post-conviction counsel. The first additional section pro610 Id.

611Id.
612 I

3 Id. at 32.
Id

614
615
,16

Id.
Id. at 32-33.

Letter from Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, State of Indiana, to the Hon.
Randall T. Shepard, ChiefJustice of Indiana 2 (Jan. 23, 1997) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Modisett Letter].
67
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vides for the entry of an order of the court determining that the
inmate was indigent, competent, and knowingly accepted or rejected counsel. 8 The second additional section provides for
standards of competence and compensation. This section requires that appointed counsel have at least five years of litigation experience, three years of post-conviction experience, prior
experience in at least five felony post-conviction cases, including
one capital case, and have completed twelve hours of training
within the previous two years.61 9 The section provides for the
same basic compensation as the Public Defender proposal: the
Public Defender will cover necessary and reasonable expenses
for Public Defenders and outside attorneys; outside attorneys
will receive $70 per hour in compensation.6 0
On June 30, 1998, the Supreme Court formally communicated its decision. The ChiefJustice wrote to both the Attorney
General and the Public Defender, stating:
Initially, we thought it highly likely that Indiana's high-caliber postconviction system would meet the opt-in requirements in § 2261 ....

The materials provided by both of you and particularly the cases cited in
Susan's September 1996 and March 1997 materials [which provide a
summary of the opt-in litigation history, similar to Part HI, supra], how-

ever, led us to conclude otherwise. In view of the apparent hostility of
the federal courts to attempts by other states to opt in, we concluded at
the time that it was not wise to invest the time and resources necessary to
go forward.
Decisions reported in the last year suggest continued lack of enthusiasm

in the federal courts, and we still perceive that the likely results from an
attempt to opt in do not merit the investment of time and expense that
would be involved.

Despite this pessimistic statement, the letter concluded on
an open note, "[o]n the other hand, we would be glad to reconsider if either of you believe a set of rules could be developed
that would satisfy the federal judiciary and have some specific
618

Id. at 3.

619Id

at 4.
from the Hon. Randall T. Shepard, Chief Justice of Indiana, to Jeffrey
Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana and Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of
Indiana 1 (June 30, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shepard Letter].
620 I.

6"1Letter
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ideas."6 The response from the Indiana Attorney General indicated that the Attorney General still favored opting in and believed the proposed amendment to Rule 24 would enable
Indiana to qualify.
4. New Hampshire

New Hampshire presently has no prisoners under death
sentence. In fact, there was only one capital murder prosecu6 23
tion in 1998, which resulted in a guilty plea and life sentence.
In all criminal cases involving an indigent, the court will appoint
counsel from the public defender's office. If the public defender is unavailable due to conflict, the court will appoint an
attorney from a group of contract defense attorneys and then
can appoint any competent counsel.624 New Hampshire provides for the payment of reasonable compensation at a rate of
$60 per hour, with a maximum fee in homicide cases of
$15,000.62 Reasonable and necessary expenses will also be reimbursed. 26 Given the absence of a death row, qualifying under
Chapter 154 is a decision that is literally years away for New
Hampshire, and the state has chosen to take no position on the
matter.6 7
5. New Mexico

New Mexico is in a similar position to New Hampshire, having a death row with only four prisoners, all of whom are still
pursuing state remedies. Given this position, New Mexico anticipates not confronting opt-in for years in advance. 28 New
Mexico provides post-conviction representation through a state
public defender office with an appellate division, or through
62

at 2.
id.

623 Questionnaire

Response from N. William Delker, Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Justice Bureau, Attorney General, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Jan. 7, 1999)
(on file with author) [hereinafter New Hampshire Response].
624 Id. 1 2; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A2 (1986).
623N.H. SuP. Cr.R. 47.
626

rd

67 New Hampshire Response, supra note 615, 13.
6" Telephone

Interview with Elizabeth Blaisdell, New Mexico Attorney General's

Office (Feb. 1, 1999).
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outside counsel appointed through New Mexico's Indigent Defense Act.6 9 The public defender has the authority to set the
agency's own budget.6-" Private counsel appointed under the
Indigent Defense Act receive a maximum of $150 for a postconviction proceeding, $500 for an appeal to the supreme
court, $150 for a habeas corpus proceeding, and a sum determined by the court for a capital case.6"
6. New York
Likewise, New York only has two prisoners under death sentence since the death penalty was reinstated under Governor
George Pataki in 1994.02 As a trade-off for the reinstatement,
New York statutorily established a capital defender office in
1995.633 Defendants facing possible capital sentences are entitled to two attorneys from the capital defender office or from
the public defender, legal aid society, or other non-profit legal
organization with which the capital defender office has entered
into an agreement.M The capital defender office is instructed
to establish a screening panel to maintain a roster of qualified
attorneys and will provide investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services to their clients and to defendants accused of first degree murder not represented by the capital
defenders office. However, the responsibility of the capital defenders office does not extend to post-conviction representation
and, in fact, the capital defenders are explicitly prohibited from
helping capital prisoners prepare petitions for federal habeas
corpus.6 Given the recent adoption of the death penalty, New
York takes no position and is years away from a decision.

62N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-15-8 (Michie 1978).
6o Id. § 31-15-5.
1Id. §

31-16-8.

6" Telephone Interview with Kevin Gagan, New York Attorney General's Office
(Feb. 1, 1999).
'L; N.Y.JuD. LAw § 35-b (McKinney Supp. 1999).
6' N.Y.JuD. LAw § 35-b(2).
6" Id. § 35-b(1).
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7. North Carolina
North Carolina has 188 inmates presently under death sentence, with twenty-one prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus
review.0 6 The state provides court appointed counsel to indigents at trial, appeal, and in post-conviction proceedings.0 7 The
state has established a public defender system organized by "deIn
fender districts" composed of one or two counties each.6
addition to the public defender, attorneys practicing in any part
of a defender district may be assigned by either the public defender or by the court in the event of conflict with the public
defender, to represent an indigent defendant. 6 9 North Carolina also has established an appellate defender office which represents indigents after conviction, serves as a clearinghouse for
materials and educational resources, and recruits private counsel for indigents in state and federal post-conviction proceedings. 6' ° Appointed trial level attorneys are required to have five
years of experience. Two attorneys are appointed for each postconviction capital case. 64
North Carolina's position is unclear, because while the attorney general's office does not take the position that the state
qualifies for opt-in and does not speculate if the state will try,
the legislature has made changes to its post-conviction review
system which imply that it does seek to qualify under Chapter
154. In a brief response, the attorney general's office indicated,
"[w] e are not aware of any state that has qualified. Also not sure
[sic] we have resources to deal with expedited time frame." 6 2
This response implies that North Carolina is deterred by both
the experience of other states, and, like Delaware, the possibility
that the benefits of opt-in may be outweighed by the costs.
66

Questionnaire Response from William N. Farrell, Criminal Division Senior

Deputy, Department ofJustice, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Mar. 15, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter North Carolina Response].
"' SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-450, 7A-451 (1999).
Id. § 7A-465.
09 Id. § 7A-467.
640

Id. § 7A-486.3. Attorneys from the appellate defender office may represent in-

digents in federal proceedings only if the representation is fully federally funded. Id.
6'' North Carolina Response, supra note 636, 12.
642I , 14.
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However, in 1996, North Carolina passed the Act to Expedite the Post-conviction Process in North Carolina. 6" Among
other changes, the Act altered the basic provision of postconviction counsel. The Act required that two attorneys be appointed to indigent prisoners seeking to file motions for postconviction relief 6 " The Act also requires that trial and appellate counsel be different from post-conviction counsel unless
expressly requested. 6" The Act also provides that the North
Carolina State Bar Council shall establish the rules and procedures for the appointment mechanism "as shall provide for the
protection of the constitutional rights of all indigent persons
and the reasonable allocation of responsibility for the representation of indigent persons among the licensed attorneys of this
State." 6" While these changes do not appear to meet all the requirements under § 2261 (at least through direct state action
instead of delegation to a state agency), in the eyes of one expert in post-conviction remedies, this appears to be an attempt
to opt in. 4 As such, North Carolina's future in unclear. While
the legislature may be taking steps to seek opt-in, the attorney
general's office appears reluctant and perhaps resistant to these
attempts out of a sense of futility and resource constraints.
8. Oregon
Oregon has twenty-three prisoners under death sentence,
none of whom have reached federal habeas corpus review.64"
Oregon provides counsel for indigent defendants at the trial,
appeal, and post-conviction levels. Post-conviction counsel is
available to any prisoner unable to afford the cost of the proceeding or the cost of a suitably skilled counsel.6" Oregon also
provides that when a petitioner has been determined to be inWmES, supra note 369, at Supp. 268.
Id. at Supp. 270; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451 (c) (1999).
6"N.C. GEN. STAT. §7 A-451(e).
6
Id. § 7A-459.
47 WILKES, supra note 369, at Supp. 270.
64 Questionnaire Response fromJanet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Department ofJustice, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Jan. 12, 1999) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Oregon Response].
'4" Id. 1 2; see also On. REV. STAT. § 138.590 (1997).
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digent, counsel's fees and expenses, in addition to postconviction proceeding fees, will be paid by the courts.6e° Oregon further provides extensive standards for post-conviction
counsel in capital cases. Such standards include: (1) demonstrated proficiency and years of experience in criminal defense
trying major felony cases, including homicides; (2) experience
as post-conviction counsel in three major felony cases; (3) legal
training or education on defending capital cases; (4) a written
statement from the attorney explaining why she believes she is
competent to handle these cases; and (5) five certifications of
competence from judges and district attorneys familiar with the
attorney.6e Oregon provides counsel through an overlapping
system of a state public defender office, county public defenders, and available private counsel. Despite the breadth of its
counsel appointment statutes and because Oregon has no prisoners currently seeking federal review, it has postponed any decision on seeking opt-in.
9. Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania currently has 223 prisoners under sentence of
death, with twenty-four prisoners seeking federal habeas review.6 s Pennsylvania provides counsel to prisoners for the first
motion for post-conviction relief after a showing of indigency.
The Commonwealth will provide counsel on a second or subsequent motion only if an evidentiary hearing is required.6
Pennsylvania does not have standards of competency.65
The Capital Unitary Review Act, which went into effect in January 1996, required the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to develop
such standards as part of establishing a unitary review mecha6 See Oi. REV. STAT. § 138.590 (1997).

6"Oregon Qualification Standards for Court-Appointed Attorneys, Standard
3.1(J).
Oregon Response, supranote 648, 13.
"s Questionnaire Response from Christy H. Fawcett, Deputy Attorney General,
Capital Litigation Unit, Office of Attorney General, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Jan. 4,
1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Response]. The response notes
that 121 of these prisoners, or more than half, were convicted in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas. IM
T
Id. 1 2; see also PA. R. CRIM. P. 1504.
Pennsylvania Response, supra note 653, 12.
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nism. However, the Court permanently suspended the Act in
August 1997, prior to establishing any standards. In Commonwealth v. Albrecht, the Court held that Rule 1504 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure guaranteed an enforceable
right to effective post-conviction counsel, with standards identical to U.S. constitutional standards for effective counsel under
Strickland v. Washington.6 6
Pennsylvania has adopted a unique approach to Chapter
154. The Commonwealth's system of criminal defense and
prosecution is highly decentralized. Indigent defense services
are provided through county-level public defenders offices,
funded by the individual counties.0 7 In turn, county district attorneys bear the responsibility for litigating federal habeas corpus actions on convictions from their jurisdictions.0 8 The
Office of Attorney General does not supervise the county district attorneys. As a result, Pennsylvania implies that individual
counties may make the decision to opt in under Chapter 154.6 9
In fact, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office argues that
appointed defense counsel in Philadelphia County do meet the
criteria for opt-in.6
This county-by-county approach was rejected by the Third Circuit in Death Row Prisoners v. Ridge, discussed above, in which the Court held that opt-in status was to
be made by a statewide authority, not individual counties.66'
While Pennsylvania has taken no affirmative steps to opt in following the court's decision, it has also not clearly ruled out the
Id,, (citing Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699 (1998)).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.3 to -.5 (West Supp 1999).

617See

Pennsylvania Response, supra note 645, 3.
69 Id In answering the question, "What is your State's position, if any, regarding 28
U.S.C. §§ 2261-66?" the respondent stated:
[I]t is not possible to answer, in a precise fashion, your question regarding what is my
"State's position, if any, regarding 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266" without a clearer definition of
what is meant by "State." Are you referring to the Governor's Office, the State Legislature,
the Office of Attorney General or the district attorneys in the 67 counties of Pennsylvania?
Each of these entities potentially has an interest in a decision to opt in or out of the provisions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266.

1&13.
I d. 15.
66 Death Row Prisoners of Pa. v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35, 36 (3d Cir. 1997). See also supra Part III.A.4.
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possibility of pursuing either statewide or county-by-county opt
in through alternative means. Given the ambivalence of this
stance, Pennsylvania falls into the "Maybe" category.
10. South Dakota

South Dakota has two prisoners sentenced to death seeking
to exhaust their state remedies."2 The state provides counsel to
indigent defendants up to and including post-conviction petitions through county public defenders and contract attorneys.3
Although the system does not specify standards, South Dakota's
respondent states that the competency of counsel is a practical
reality-all recent capital defendants have had at least three
lawyers during the trial, two during the appeal, and one "highly
South Dakota codified
experienced" habeas corpus lawyer.6
law provides for "reasonable and just" compensation and for repayment of "necessary expenses and costs."r The respondent
states that courts have granted "nearly unlimited funds" for
post-conviction defense and cites a recent case where the
amount exceeded $250,000. Since federal review of the death
sentences is years away, South Dakota has not yet taken a position on the opt-in provisions.6
11. Texas

Texas currently has 492 prisoners under death sentence.67
Texas provides counsel to indigent defendants at trial and on
direct appeal on a county-by-county basis. The legislature has
specified the means by which each county is to ensure such repTexas provides post-conviction
resentation to indigents.6
Response from Craig M. Eichstadt, Deputy Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (date unknown) (on file with
author) [hereinafter South Dakota Response].
60 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-27-4, 23A-40-7 (Michie 1998).
6"South Dakota Response, supra note 662, 12.
"sS.D. CODIuFm LAWS § 23A-40-8 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998).
"6 See South Dakota Response, supranote 662, 13.
"' Questionnaire Response from Unnamed Respondent, Office of the Attorney
General, to author, 1 1 (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Texas Response].
" See TFx. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 26.049 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); TEX. CRIM. P.
CODEANN. §§ 26.041-26.050 (West 1989 & Supp. 2000).
"2 Questionnaire
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counsel to capital prisoners only. The prisoner will be appointed counsel unless the prisoner elects to proceed pro se
and this decision is "intelligent and voluntary." This finding is
to be made on the record.r The post-conviction counsel must
not be the same as trial or appellate counsel, unless both parties
request it or the court finds good cause.6
Post-conviction
6
7
counsel will be reasonably compensated. ' However, no standards of competence are specified for this counsel. 72
After Mata v. Johnson, in which the Texas counsel system was
found not to qualify for opt-in due to the absence of competency standards on the post-conviction level,678 the Texas Attorney General has taken no further action. In the words of the
response, "We are aware of the provisions, have litigated and
lost the issue of their appealability, and are currently awaiting
action by the judicial and/or legislative branches to meet the
opt-in requirements. 67 4 The Attorney General appears to be deferring to the other branches to decide if opt-in is appropriate
for Texas.675
12. Virginia
There are currently forty prisoners under sentence of death
in Virginia.67 6 Virginia takes an ambivalent, yet pessimistic
stance toward the opt-in provisions.6 7 While Virginia takes the
" TEx. CLM. P. CODEANN. § 11.071(2) (a) (Supp. 2000).

67

1 Id. §

11.071(2) (e).

6,,
Id. § 11.071(2) (f).
67Texas Response, supra note 667,1 2.

99 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1996).
Response, supra note 667, 1 3.
675 Given statistics that show Texas leads the nation in executions in 1998 and in to67

674See Texas

tal executions since 1976, opt-in may be unnecessary for Texas. See Death Penalty Information Center, (visited March 12, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicreg.
html>, <http://www.essential.org/dpic/percapita.html>.
676See Death Penalty Information Center (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.essential.
org/dpic/virginia.html>. A description of Virginia's post-conviction counsel system
can be found, supra, Part IlA.5.
67 Telephone Interview with Unnamed Respondent, Virginia Attorney General's
Office (Nov. 20, 1998); Telephone Interview with Unnamed Respondent, Virginia Attorney General's Office (Feb. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Virginia Interviews]. This individual refused to return the questionnaire, stating that he did not believe he could
speak for either the Attorney General's office or the Commonwealth of Virginia. The
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position that it qualifies under the opt-in provisions, the respondent expresses doubts that it will ever be officially approved
by the federal courts.6 8 In particular, the respondent points to
the mandatory timelines required for federal habeas corpus review once a state has opted in. The respondent believes that
federal judges are reluctant to bind themselves to these external
deadlines. 67 Further, given that the Fourth Circuit has adopted
timelines virtually identical to the AEDPA in Judicial Council
Order No. 113, opting in becomes a moot issue. Generally, federal habeas corpus review for Virginia prisoners already follows
the same course as if Virginia had opted in.
13. Wyoming
Wyoming currently has two prisoners under sentence of
death. Both prisoners are currently pursuing state remedies.m°
Wyoming provides counsel to indigents through a public defender through the direct appeal, but does not provide postconviction counsel. By statute, appeal in death penalty cases is
mandatory6l Wyoming's respondent describes its position: "At
present, there has been no attempt to 'opt-in.' The 1999 legislative session might take a look at it. The 'expiditing' [sic] avail"2
able seems minimal at best and illusory as a practical matter. 6
The respondent continues, "Not clear that a decision has been
made at this point. Appears that the debate has just barely
opened."6 Like other states with small death row populations,
Wyoming's decision to opt in remains in the future. Also like
other states, Wyoming's respondent implies that it perceives reluctance among the federal judiciary.

following remarks come from these two telephone conversations and should be considered
personal and unofficial.
7
61 Virginia Interviews, supra note 677.
679See

id

Questionnaire Response from Hugh Kenny, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Attorney General's Office, to Burke W. Kappler 1 1 (Dec. 29, 1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Wyoming Response].
61Id.12.
"'Id-13 (emphasis in original).
68 Id. 14.
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V. QUESTIONS: LEGAL ANALYSIS, CRITIQUES, AND REFORM
PROPOSALS

This section offers two critiques of the opt-in provisions and
a suggestion for reforms. The first critique is that the opt-in
mechanism effectively exposes indigent prisoners to postconviction counsel without providing a remedy for incompetent
or ineffective counsel. As a result, the quid pro quo, the centerpiece of the Powell Committee proposal, is empty. If prisoners
cannot challenge the quality of counsel, states can reap the
benefit of the bargain without paying the price. Second, relying
on federal courts to determine whether states have effectively
opted in is creating tensions in the federal system. Many states
resent the federal intrusion into state prerogatives created by
requiring federal approval of counsel systems. In addition, the
opt-in provisions foster tension between branches of government as the judiciary's reluctance to approve opt-in thwarts
Congress' intent to accelerate habeas corpus petitions.
The solution for reform is to discard the opt-in mechanism
and to recognize a constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel at the post-conviction stage, both in state and federal
courts. The opt-in provisions would be replaced by the one year
period currently laid out in § 2254. This solution would protect
prisoners, while guaranteeing effective assistance of counsel to
allow for meaningful collateral attack. States would get the
benefit of an expeditious and limited review period, without the
cost, effort, and uncertainty involved in designing and implementing a post-conviction system subject to federal court review.
A simple alternative is to adopt the ABA Task Force proposals,
which achieve many of the same ends as the Powell Committee,
but do so more comprehensively and effectively.
A. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL

1. Background
The right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
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Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963.6 Beyond defining when the right
accrues, the Court has also defined in what manner. In 1984, in
Strickland v. Washington, the Court announced standards for ensuring that appointed counsel would provide effective representation.8 The Court held that a petitioner alleging ineffective
assistance must prove two elements. First, a petitioner challenging counsel must show that counsel performed below an objec-

tive standard of reasonable attorney performance. This. showing
alone may be difficult, because the Court instructs the lower
courts to give deference to the attorney and his or her judg-

Second, the petitioner must
ments during trial or appeal.6
show that counsel's performance resulted in actual prejudice
and deprived the petitioner of a fair trial. The required showing is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the
result would be different. 7
The right to counsel, and to proceedings to enforce it, end

with the conclusion of the first appeal as of right and the Court
has strongly resisted any attempts to extend the right to counsel
beyond this point.m In particular, the Court has denied any
"' 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Gideon holding overruled the previous rule in Betts v.
Brady, which made appointment of counsel a case-by-case decision, subject to the "totality of facts in a given case." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). Abe Fortas,
appointed counsel for Clarence Earl Gideon, repeatedly referred to the Betts rule as
"corrosive" for federal-state relations because multiple layers of the federal judiciary
could second-guess the factual judgments of the trial court judge. See ANTHONY
I.E, GiDEON'STRUMPET 127, 172 (1964).
6 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
686Id. at 687-89.
W7 Id. at 692-94. "Reasonable probability" is defined by the Court as "a
probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" which has been interpreted in
later cases as somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 694. See also
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See, eg., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (finding no right to counsel in discretionary appeals); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (finding no right to
counsel where the actual sentence did not involve incarceration); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel extends to the first appeal
as of right). In Ross v. Moffitt, the Court explained why neither due process nor equal
protection required counsel in these proceedings. First, due process did not require
such a right to counsel because instead of needing counsel as a "shield" against state
power, a defendant would use counsel as a "sword" to initiate proceedings and overturn a conviction. This was significant because while a state could not waive the requirement of a trial, it did not have to provide an appeal. Id. at 610-11. Second, due
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implication of a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
For example, in Pennsylvaniav. Finleym the Court held that neither the Due Process clause nor the right of access to courts required the state to appoint post-conviction counsel. The Court
seemed to lay the matter to rest in 1989 with Murray v. Giarratano.m In this case, a group of capital prisoners in Virginia
argued that the state's system of assisting with access to courts
was inadequate. Virginia allowed prisoners time in the prison
law library, permitted taking books back to cells, and even provided "unit attorneys" to assist in preparing documentation?. '
The key issue for the Court was whether the fact of the prisoners' death sentences required a different standard of review
than Finley, a non-capital case. The Court ruled that, unlike at
the guilt and sentencing phase where capital cases required
special procedures to ensure "reliability," no special standards
were required at the appellate and collateral attack phases:
We have... refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has been
imposed requires a different standard of review on federal habeas corpus.... We think that these cases require the conclusion that the rule of
Pennsylvaniav. Finley should apply no differently in capital cases than in
noncapital cases. State collateral proceedings are not constitutionally
a difrequired as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve
appeal.6 2
ferent and more limited purpose than either the trial or

process was only offended if indigent defendants were "singled out" for denial of
counsel because of their indigency. Id. at 611. Third, the denial of counsel did not
violate equal protection because North Carolina's system of providing transcripts, a
Court of Appeals brief laying out errors, and the Court of Appeals opinion provided
sufficient information to the defendant to allow him to adequately present his case
pro se. Id. at 614-15. Fourth, North Carolina's procedures and the Supreme Court's
discretionary review satisfied equal protection because they guaranteed both wealthy
and indigent defendants roughly the same right to review. I& at 616. Lastly, equal
protection did not require that the state duplicate all possible counsel services available to a wealthy defendant, but just ensure an "adequate opportunity" for a defendant to present his claims. i
6"Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
691Murray

v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).

" Id. at 3-5. As in Ross v. Moffit4 the Court argued that since post-conviction procedures are optional-for the state to offer and for the prisoner to use-provision of
counsel should not be compelled. See supra note 688.

6" Murray,492 U.S. at 9-10.
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The Court's holding in Giarratano seems definitive, but subsequent cases have affirmed the importance of post-conviction
counsel to capital prisoners, at least on the federal level. For
example, the case of McFarlandv. Scott9 3 involved the statutory
guarantee of post-conviction counsel in federal habeas corpus
under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (q) (4) (B). This statute provides for appointment "[i] n
any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of
title 28."" The issue before the Court was at what point could a
stay of execution be issued? 28 U.S.C. § 2251 provides any federaljudge "before whom a habeas corpus action is pending" the
power to stay executions. The Fifth Circuit read this statute to
require the actual filing of a habeas petition and found that a
motion for counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) was insufficient.695 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals,
finding that because 21 U.S.C. § 84 8 (q) (4) (B) specifically referred to habeas corpus proceedings under Sections 2254 and
2255, the terms "post-conviction proceeding" and "habeas corpus" were interchangeable, and thus a motion for postconviction counsel qualified as a pending habeas corpus petition for purposes of a stay of execution.6 The Court also noted
that this decision made logical sense, because requiring a prisoner to file a federal habeas petition without counsel, subject to
the stringent requirements of stating a claim and not abusing
the writ, created a "substantial risk" that petitioner's habeas
claim would never be heard on the merits. 7
For purposes of the opt-in provisions, McFarlandv. Scott is
interesting, but subsidiary. The opt-in provisions are concerned
with post-conviction counsel at the state, not federal, level.
However, the Court's acknowledgment of the importance of
counsel to effectively present a prisoner's claims strikes a different note than Giarratano. In fact, one commentator has strongly
criticized McFarlandfor undoing Giarratano'sand Finley's hold'"McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
6'

21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) (1994).

6"

McFarland,512 U.S. at 853.

'96 Id. at 858.
'97 &d at 856.
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ings that death sentences do not require special procedures.08
In effect, by allowing a motion for appointment of counsel to
qualify as a post-conviction proceeding for purposes of a stay of
execution, the Court allows capital prisoners to obtain counsel
earlier than noncapital prisoners who have nothing to stay.m
This commentator sees this distinction as a "total departure"
from previous post-conviction jurisprudence and an "abol[ition
of] death penalty conservatism [with] a greater sensitivity to the
plight of indigent capital defendants." 70° While the point may
be overstated, McFarlanddoes illustrate a recognition that death
is different and that prisoners under death sentence, by virtue
of their position, require a set of procedures distinct from noncapital prisoners. 701
To sum up, while the Constitution provides a right to counsel at trial and first appeal, along with an enforcement mechanism to guarantee effective counsel, there is no parallel right to
post-conviction counsel. Such counsel may be statutorily provided, either by Congress or by the states, but without constitutional recognition of the right, Strickland's enforcement
mechanism does not apply to conduct of counsel in postconviction proceedings. However, indigent capital prisoners
69'

See Steven M. Latino, Comment, Reversing Twenty Years of Supreme Court Post-

conviction Jurisprudence:Enlargingthe Indigent CapitalDefendants Right to Post-conviction
Counsel in McFarland v. Scott, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CoNFn;EMNT 327, 346
(1996).
' Id.(citing McFarland 512 U.S. at 872 n.3 (Thomas,J., dissenting)).
7L0
Id.at 331-32.
711McFarland,512 U.S. 849. In Harris v. Alabama,Justice Stevens, in his dissenting
opinion, stated "[olur opinions have repeatedly emphasized that death is a fundamentally different kind of penalty from any other that society may impose." 513 U.S.
504, 516 (1978). In a second case, Weeks v. Jones, involving a battle over attorneys'
fees, the Eleventh Circuit solidified the holding in McFarland by finding that 21
U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) provided an absolute right to counsel. Three attorneys had
been appointed to represent Varnall Weeks in prosecuting a federal habeas corpus
claim under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B). After the petition was denied, the attorneys
submitted vouchers to the district court for reimbursement. The district court refused to pay the attorneys and issued an order reversing their appointment on the basis that the attorneys had filed frivolous claims on behalf of Weeks. In reversing, the
Eleventh Circuit found that 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) provided an absolute right of
counsel unrelated to the merits of any petition counsel may prepare. The court echoed McFarlandin finding an attorney's assistance critical to ensuring that a prisoner's
claims was properly heard on the merits. 100 F.3d 124 (11th Cir. 1996).
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have an absolute right to appointed counsel in federal habeas
corpus from the filing of a motion for appointment, a right
unique to this class due to their status.
2. Arguments
The language of the opt-in provisions statute and the litigation history together have effectively removed any opportunity
for prisoners to ensure they are receiving qualified and competent counsel. As such, though states may opt in, prisoners may
still receive less than adequate counsel, yet be exposed to accelerated timelines for federal habeas corpus review. The state
thus reaps the benefit of the bargain while prisoners pay the

price.
Practically speaking, a prisoner has two opportunities to
contest the quality of appointed post-conviction counsel. He
can either do so prior to appointment on the grounds that the
state's system is inadequate in regard to competence, compensation, or both, and thus no post-conviction counsel is guaranteed effective. Alternatively, the prisoner can challenge the
appointed counsel's performance during the state proceedings
after the fact in federal habeas corpus review, arguing that this
post-conviction attorney was ineffective. However, as a result of
the language of the opt-in provisions and the litigation history,
neither of these approaches is cognizable. As Ashmus, Booth,
Hill, and Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania show, preappointment actions to contest counsel standards by prisoners
are barred by issues of standing, ripeness, and the Eleventh
Amendment. 7 2 In turn, the explicit language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2261 (e) and Murray v. Giarratanospecify that there is absolutely no right to post-conviction counsel flowing either from
the Constitution or the opt-in provisions themselves, and thus
claims that appointed counsel were ineffective have no merit.
In essence, a prisoner filing a claim ex ante is told he has not
been injured yet, while raising the issue ex post he is told he has
not been injured at all. This is troublesome, because the Powell
Committee clearly believed that federal courts would be a re7

2

See supra Part MAL
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source for litigating the issue of attorney quality.703 Together,
the litigation history of the opt-in provisions and the development in the right to effective counsel have undercut the Powell
Committee's assumptions and left prisoners without the protection they were intended to have.
B. FEDERAUST TENSIONS

1. Background

In response to the questionnaire, several states indicated
frustration with federal courts for their apparent reluctance to
approve opt-in. The fact that California failed to opt in, when
the provisions for unitary review were crafted with the state in
mind,7>° seemed a signal to states that federal courts would hold
states to standards higher than the statutory bar. States with this
sentiment tend to believe that courts are reluctant to bind
themselves to the mandatory timelines in the opt-in provisions.
The Fourth Circuit's action in enacting Judicial Council Order
No. 113 can be seen as emblematic of this approach. While this
court was obviously concerned that habeas corpus petitions
must be expedited, it chose to adopt a discretionary order
which it could disregard when necessary.
The term "federalism" is a catch-all term for relations between governmental entities on both a vertical and a horizontal
axis. The vertical axis is federal-state relations, and focuses in
particular on the relations of federal courts to state courts. The
general principle on this vertical axis is restraint. Out of respect
and comity, federal courts are advised to avoid intruding on
state court decision-making except when federal issues are at
stake. While this is particularly obvious in the area of habeas
corpus review, doctrines such as federal question jurisdiction,
abstention, and deference to independent and adequate state
grounds all express a similar notion of limiting federal review.
The horizontal axis can be thought of as separation of powers
and focuses on intragovernmental relations in the federal system. The guiding principle here is one of respect and defer703See

Powell Committee Report, supranote 56, at 3242.

See 137 Cong. Rec. 6013 (1991).
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ence for each branch's actions, with interbranch supervision or
control only allowed to the extent specified in the Constitution.
This principle is embodied in such doctrines as standing and
Congress' Article III power to establish federal tribunals and
amend federal court jurisdiction.
2. Arguments

The result of the federal courts' reluctance to qualify any
state under Chapter 154 is tension along both these axes. On
the vertical axis, states are frustrated that federal courts have
subjected their post-conviction counsel systems to often excruciatingly detailed levels of review and have rejected systems
which were designed to qualify or were presumed in compliance
at the time of passage. 75 As many of these systems were adopted
through state legislatures or through rules enacted by elected
state judges, refusing opt-in status has an antidemocratic touch
as well. Ironically, by refusing to qualify any state, the federal
courts have given states, such as Virginia, an incentive not to improve their post-conviction counsel systems. It is also ironic that
the opt-in provisions, which were designed to reform habeas
corpus by reducing federal intrusion into state decision-making,
has resulted in greater invasiveness.
Similarly, though this paper focuses on federal-state relations, it is reasonable to expect tension on the horizontal axis
between Congress and the federal courts as the continued failure of states to opt in amounts to denial of congressional intent.
To be sure, it is a sweeping generalization to say that federal
courts, as a unit, are hostile or opposed to opt-in. However,
given that federal courts have a critical role in certifying that
states qualify under Chapter 154, the potential for delay or obstruction based on institutional incentives remains. The fact
that no state has yet opted in is also indicative of the federal judiciary's receptivity, in an informal, anecdotal way.
However, it may be too early to indict federal courts entirely. The majority of cases in which a state's opt-in qualifications were rejected came in the initial rush after passage of the
"'California's experience is notable here. See supra Part VA3.
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AEDPA, in which states effectively submitted previously enacted
and unaltered post-conviction counsel systems for approval. 7°6
After the failure of these systems to opt in, a second generation
of states has developed or amended systems with an awareness
toward the statute and its interpretations as announced in the
case law. This second generation is now waiting for the first test
cases to emerge from state post-conviction review to federal habeas corpus-a wait which in many cases is years away. Thus,
some states may presently be in compliance, and may be recognized as such by the federal courts when such cases come before
them.
Lastly, a strong argument can also be made that this federal
tension is not significant in light of the overall deference
granted to states under the AEDPA. This argument posits that
the return of authority and sovereignty to states under the
AEDPA vastly outweighs any encumbrance imposed by the optin provisions. While states may not be entirely content with the
vestigial federal control imposed by the opt-in provisions, the
states are much freer than they were before the Warren Court.
While this argument has force from a federal perspective, it
is weaker when viewed from the position of the states. First, it is
true that after the AEDPA, federal courts have much less
authority over state convictions and post-conviction procedures,
but the particular authority federal courts still wield is galling.
Federal courts have been placed in position as monitors of a
state court's counsel system, which strikes at the heart of the
opt-in provisions: state independence and freedom to experiment in meeting the opt-in goals. This authority is even more
irritating from the perspective of states who may have taken
steps to opt in and have failed. To have a single federal judge
overturn the collected efforts of legislators, judges, and lawyers
can only be extremely frustrating for states.
Second, federal authority over opt-in is corrosive because
the AEDPA implicitly trusts states to render accurate judgments
on all other constitutional issues. The return of federal deference to state court decisions means that state courts have been
7

Maryland is an excellent example of this approach. See supraPart M.A.1.
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re-established as equivalents to federal courts in interpreting
constitutional guarantees-except with regard to state postconviction counsel systems. It is possible to envision an opt-in
system in which state courts have final approval over a state's
post-conviction counsel system. Instead, the AEDPA sends states
the message that while they may be competent to judge Fourth
Amendment issues, for example, counsel issues remain best left
under federal control.
Finally, it is clear from such states as California, Florida,
Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware, among others, that there is
great frustration with federal courts. These opinions should be
given due consideration as the statements of state officials grappling with post-conviction procedures, the AEDPA, and federalWhile Congress and other federal
ism on a daily basis.
authorities may think they have done enough to restore state
authority, the responses of the states themselves belie this perception.
C. SOLUTIONS FOR REFORM
The underlying principle behind the opt-in quid pro quo is
that effective post-conviction counsel can solve the problem of
balancing the need to prevent constitutional errors in death
sentences with the need to expedite federal review and achieve
finality. By appointing qualified counsel, states and the federal
courts can rest assured that all of a prisoner's meritorious claims
will be raised and adjudicated in his single opportunity for federal habeas review.707 However, as described above, the opt-in
provisions guarantee no such thing. As written and as implemented, there is no opportunity for prisoners to ever challenge
the quality of appointed counsel and therefore there is no real
guarantee that counsel is effective. An even deeper flaw in the
opt-in provisions is the logic of making necessary reform voluntary. As Vivian Berger observes, "[1]f death penalty administration is unsatisfactory, as most agree, it seems misguided to allow

""Berger, supra note 56, at 1695 ("[The Powell Committee has) implicitly premised [its] scheme on the false assumption that qualified counsel, significantly aided
only by an automatic stay, can without any further reforms ensure that prisoners on
death row receive fair and rational treatment.").

BURKE W. KAPPLER

576

[Vol. 90

the system, or portions of it, to remain enmired in its serious
problems."7
For this reason, this paper proposes two separate reforms.
First, Congress should abolish the opt-in provisions in favor of
the existing time frames within the AEDPA. This innovative
mechanism should be recognized as a costly experiment in creative statutory drafting and should be retired. Second, Congress
and the federal courts should recognize a constitutional right to
effective post-conviction counsel and should provide appropriate statutory procedures for implementing it, amending the
AEDPA as necessary.
A third possibility is simply to adopt the recommendations
of the ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. These proposals not only provide a comprehensive and detailed mechanism for ensuring competent
post-conviction counsel, but also recommendations for reforming other doctrinal areas of habeas corpus, including procedural default, stays of execution, and successive petitions. The
solutions below are simply meant to correct the Powell Committee proposals, but the ABA Task Force recommendations are
more effective for truly systemic reform.
1. Abolition of the Opt-In Provisions

The first idea for reform is to abolish the opt-in provisions
by essentially repealing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266. The federal
habeas corpus statutes would then remain as amended by the
AEDPA, with the one year limitations period for petitions, limits
on successive petitions, and limits on the availability of the writ
itself. One necessary change would be to include language expressly permitting claims on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel in state and federal post-conviction proceedings. The
result would be a statute which is substantially closer in spirit to
the ABA Criminal Justice Task Force's report than to the Powell
Committee. Without the opt-in provisions and with these minor
changes, the statute would be faithful to the legislative intent to

7'6

Id. at 1686.
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reform and accelerate habeas corpus, though the reforms allow
greater protection of constitutional rights while doing so.
The opt-in provisions have been an expensive and ultimately futile experiment in habeas corpus reform. Three years
after passage of the AEDPA, no state has yet to opt in and qualify for the procedural benefits under Chapter 154. The opt-in
provisions remain, in a sense, uncharted territory. However, the
time and money poured into attempting and adjudicating optin has been inestimable. The provisions have been raised in
almost twenty states, with five states litigating the issue through
multiple layers of the federal judiciary. This litigation involves
significant time and effort spent by state officials, legislators,
and judges debating the merits of seeking opt-in and constructing the necessary counsel systems. The sheer drain of resources
poured into an as-yet fruitless quest is remarkable.
In addition, abolishing the opt-in provisions would automatically remove the growing federalist tensions described
above. States would be freed from intrusive federal review, and
federal courts would no longer be seen as the roadblock to expeditious habeas corpus adjudication. However, federal courts
would still maintain their traditional role as guardians of constitutional rights through the habeas corpus process.
2. The Right to Post-conviction Counsel

Beyond abolition of the opt-in provisions, federal courts and
Congress should both recognize a constitutional right to effective post-conviction counsel. The federal courts should confirm
that there is such a right and should develop the doctrinal basis
behind it. In turn, Congress should make necessary changes in
the habeas corpus statutes and rules to accommodate this right.
a. Arguments for Post-conviction Counsel
The logic behind a right to post-conviction counsel is powerful. First, prisoners acting pro se are simply unable to effectively assert their rights without assistance of counsel. These
individuals are often indigent and poorly educated, even illiterate. Many of these prisoners suffer "mental pain" which pre-
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vents them from adequately representing themselves.7 9 In preparing their petitions, they face sharp time limits under the psychic pressure of their own impending death. Habeas corpus
and post-conviction remedies are extremely complex areas of
law, and effectively presenting a claim requires substantial familiarity with the doctrines as well as the opportunity for ample
research and additional investigation.710 As Joseph Giarratano
explains:
Picture yourself in this situation. You've been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. You are indigent, functionally illiterate and
mildly retarded. Your court-appointed lawyer tells you that you have a
right to appeal your conviction and sentence but that he will no longer
represent you.... You've been moved into the death house. Your only
choice is for you to represent yourself. You must file something with the
court or be executed in less than 14 days. You have the right to file a petition for certiorari and a petition for habeas corpus and a motion for a
stay of execution. But before you can file you must learn to read, write,
overcome your retardation, obtain your trial transcript, understand the
science of law, learn how to conduct legal research, analyze vast amounts
of case law, formulate your issues, learn all the procedures, learn all the
various court rules, understand civil procedure, constitutional law,
criminal law and acquire the art of legal writing. You must do all of this
....
and much more in less than 14 days

For these reasons, prisoners simply cannot effectively prepare and present their own claims, a fact illustrated by the success rates-while prisoners who were represented by counsel
won in 13.7% of their cases, pro se petitioners won in 0.9% of
theirs.712 The complexity of this area of the law doubly pushes
709Brian L. McDermott, Comment, Defending the Defenseless: Murray v. Giarratano
and the Right to Counsel in CapitalPost-convictionProceedings, 75 IOwAL. REv. 1305, 1324-

26 (1990).
710 Id.

at 1326-27. See also 'Tou Don't Have Be a Bleeding Heart," Representing Death
Row: A DialogueBetween JudgeAbnerj Mikva andJudgeJohn C. Godbold, HUMAN RIGHTS,

Winter 1987, at 22.

7,1 Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in Post-conviction

Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CoNsT. L. Q, 211 (1990) (quoting IRA P.
ROBBINS, RationalizingFederalHabeas Corpus Review of State Court Criminal Convictions in
Capital Cases, A.B.A SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENAmlY HABEAS
CORPUS 45 n.85 (1989) (quoting McCarthy, A Defender on Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr.
15, 1989, atA21)).
712TASKFORCE REPORT, supranote 56, at 65.
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for a right to effective post-conviction counsel-not only to remove the responsibility from the shoulders of prisoners who are
unable to bear it, but to ensure that their appointed attorneys
can.
Second, post-conviction proceedings are an accepted and
conventional stage in capital litigation and the need for postconviction counsel is widely recognized. One of the standard
arguments against a right to post-conviction counsel, first employed in Ross v. Moffitt, is that these proceedings are not constitutionally required. While states may not convict and impose
punishment without a trial, states are under no obligation to offer post-conviction proceedings to allow prisoners to test their
convictions and sentences. To use the Ross metaphor, states
must provide a "shield" against a trial, but need not provide a
"sword" for a prisoner to brandish at will.718 However, on a practical basis, every state offers some form of post-conviction remedy and post-conviction litigation has become a standard part in
the lifecycle of a capital case. Furthermore, the analogy to a
sword which the prisoner uses at his discretion to initiate the
collateral attack is inapt, because the federal habeas corpus
statute requires exhaustion of state remedies.7 4 For a prisoner
to choose not to pursue state post-conviction remedies is a procedural default and a bar to federal habeas corpus review. Direct appeal and post-conviction attack are not simply options for
the capital prisoners; they are required steps he must take to be
vindicated.
Third, beyond the mandatory and pervasive nature of postconviction review, it is a widely recognized fact that postconviction counsel is a necessary and critical component to
making this review meaningful and effective. Congress announced such a view through establishing the right to such
counsel in federal habeas corpus through the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 and through passage of the AEDPA. President Bill
Clinton acknowledged this need through signing the AEDPA.
The Supreme Court has expressed its view that post-conviction
counsel is especially important to the capital prisoner in McFar71'Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
7"28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (A) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
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land v. Scott.7 5 Two separate bodies with the mission of reforming habeas corpus, the Powell Committee and the ABA's Criminal Justice Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, both
Scholars, aca
proposed varying levels of counsel provision.
demics, judges, practitioners, and students have also argued for
post-conviction counsel. 7 While popular acclaim alone cannot
make a measure constitutional, it can illustrate a widespread
understanding that post-conviction counsel is consistent with,
and required for, constitutional guarantees.
The case of Gideon v. Wainwrigh 8 and the context surrounding the decision to extend the right to counsel to all
criminal defendants are striking in their parallels to the issue of
post-conviction counsel. In Gideon, recognition of the right was
compelled by the realization that the average layperson would
be unable to effectively defend himself at trial.719 Similarly, it is
clear that the average capital prisoner is unable to effectively
present his claims in a post-conviction proceedings. The Gideon
decision was also compelled by the fact that the majority of
states had already seen the value of providing counsel and
adopted systems.720 Likewise, a significant portion of the states
with the death penalty provide for post-conviction counsel. In
addition, Gideon was prompted by a desire to avoid overly intrusive federal review of state trial court decisions.7 1 Extending a
right of post-conviction counsel similarly obviates the need for
intrusive federal court review of opt-in compliance. Lastly, the
711512 U.S. 849 (1994).
6
71
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
77 See

g., Michael Millemann, CapitalPost-ConvictionPetitioners'Rightto Counsel: IntegratingAccess to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles,48 MD. L. REv. 455 (1989);
McGill, supra note 710; McDermott, supra note 708; Brad Snyder, Note, DisparateImpact on Death Row: M.LB. and the Indigents Right to Counsel at Capital State Postconviction Proceedings, 107 YALE LJ. 2211, 2211-12 (1998); Donald P. Zeithaml, Jr.,
Note, Sixth and FourteenthAmendments-ConstitutionalRight to State CapitalCollateralAppeal: The Due Process of Executing a Convict Without Attorney Representation,80 J. CGlM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1190, 1208 (1990); William H. Brooks, Recent Development, Meaningful Access for Indigents on DeathRow: Giarratano v. Murray and the Right to Counsel in
Post-convictionProceedings, 48 VAND. L. REv. 569, 591 (1990).
718372 U.S. 335 (1963).
719See id. at 344-45; LEwIs, supra note 682, at 126, 170-71, 187-89.
LEmi, supra note 682, at 132.
" Id. at 126-2 7 , 172.

7'
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fact that the right to counsel enjoyed widespread support across
7
the field of law was a factor militating for its recognition. 2
Similarly, the right to post-conviction counsel enjoys such widespread support.
b. Arguments against Post-conviction Counsel (and Responses)
Despite this, strong arguments against post-conviction counsel remain. First, though the involved parties are convicted, incarcerated criminals, federal habeas corpus is technically a civil
proceeding. One concern is that requiring mandatory appointment of counsel in an effectively civil proceeding will open
the door to claims for counsel in other, more traditional civil
law settings, such as personal injury litigation. At the extremes,
this argument could be seen as trying to prevent a constitutional
right to a lawyer, for any and all purposes. While it is true that
creating a right to post-conviction counsel conjures images of a
slippery slope, the nature of the habeas corpus proceeding is
sufficiently different from other civil proceedings to enable firm
distinctions and to cabin the right to post-conviction counsel
from a general right to a lawyer. The fact that audiences must
be reminded that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, shows the
common perception that this is a facet of criminal law. The participants in post-conviction proceedings-prisoners, wardens,
criminal lawyers, and prosecutors-confirm this impression. M
Habeas corpus procedures are entirely unique and specific to
habeas corpus itself. Finally, the interests at stake are qualitatively different. The normal civil plaintiff argues she has been
physically or emotionally injured and she deserves monetary
compensation for her damages. In contrast, the habeas corpus
petitioner contends she is currently being injured through an
ongoing constitutional violation. Instead of money, she demands liberty or her life-items without price. These distinctions are significant enough to enable courts to draw a firm line
Id. at 146-52.
This is also confirmed by the fact that most attorneys general specializing in
post-conviction review or habeas corpus can be found in offices with titles like
"Criminal Division," "Criminal Bureau," or "Criminal Appellate Division." Postconviction and habeas corpus issues are almost never considered part of the civil attorneys' general duties.
7"
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between a right to post-conviction counsel and a right to general counsel.
A second criticism of the right to post-conviction counsel is
the implied lack of finality. On a simple level, creating a right
to post-conviction counsel creates yet another claim that a petitioner can raise to delay final adjudication. On a more complex
level, there is a fear that, like an Escher drawing, the right to
post-conviction counsel would always permit another layer of review and would prevent any ability to finalize a petitioner's sentence. This fear emerges from the fact that rights to effective
counsel can only be enforced through a subsequent proceeding. Therefore, to effectively enforce a right to post-conviction
counsel, courts will have to develop multiple levels of postconviction proceedings solely to address counsel claims.
However, this argument exaggerates the threat posed by
such a right. The right to post-conviction counsel can be easily
prevented from spiraling out of control. Again, the right to trial
counsel provides a useful parallel because this right is not absolute and is limited where it might pose excessive costs or inefficiencies, as when the defendant is not facing incarceration.
Prisoners can be required to accept appointed counsel, as are
defendants at trial. Opportunities to raise a claim of ineffective
counsel can be limited to the first habeas hearing and its appeal, with possible discretionary review by the Supreme Court.
This would ensure that the prisoner could defend his right to
counsel, without allowing this right to swamp the system. It is
more important to provide some form of guaranteed postconviction counsel, even if limited by the nature of the proceeding, than none at all. TM
The third argument against post-conviction counsel is that
there has never been a right to post-conviction counsel. As
such, the denial of counsel or the ineffectiveness of appointed
counsel does not harm the prisoner. Since there is no right,
there can be no injury from its deprivation; the prisoner is insisting on protecting an entitlement he simply does not possess.
While Giarratanomakes this point all too clear, the right to post7"See infra Part V.C.2.d for alternatives for limiting repetitive review.
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conviction counsel has come to be seen as a critical procedural
necessity. As post-conviction law has grown more complex and
as the numbers of prisoners have increased, the need for experienced and competent counsel to help both the petitioners
and the system is significant.72 The importance of counsel at
the post-conviction stage cannot be underestimated; ensuring
access to a lawyer is the critical focus of the Powell Committee
Report. Providing such a privilege without ensuring its quality is
tantamount to not providing it at all.
Fourth, the litigation battles between the states and the federal courts to opt in show the commitment of the federal judiciary to maintaining high quality post-conviction representation.
In light of this commitment, there is no need to enable prisoners to protect themselves; the courts will do this for them. It is
true that the federal courts have required high standards for
states to qualify. This is one reason no state has. However, the
state of the law is always in flux and mounting political and federalist pressures may encourage federal courts to start lessening
the required standards. Furthermore, several states, such as
South Carolina, have enacted post-conviction counsel statutes
and rules specifically with an eye to the language of the opt-in
provisions and the established precedents.7 26 These states are
simply waiting for the first case to go through state postconviction review and on to federal habeas corpus to test their
systems. The level of the bar could change dramatically.
An additional problem with depending on court enforcement of counsel standards is that states have little incentive to
"over-qualify" their capital post-conviction attorneys. Given the
probable standards necessary, it takes time to develop a group
of attorneys with the requisite experience and training to qualify

75 An additional consideration is the role of post-conviction counsel if the opt-in
provisions remain in effect. If so, the provision of counsel would be a critical procedural linchpin. Before the enactment of the opt-in provisions, incompetent or unqualified counsel could only substantively prejudice a prisoner's claim. Now,
following establishment of strict rules against second or successive petitions, counsel
bears responsibility not only for success or failure on the state level, but also during a
prisoner's single opportunity for federal review of his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997) for a description of these rules.

See supra Part IV.
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for post-conviction representation. It also costs money to train,
employ, compensate, and reimburse these attorneys. As a result, states will require only what is necessary to opt in, and no
more. This possibility is enhanced by the facts that many states
allow appointment of counsel who do not qualify under their
standards, but are "otherwise qualified."
Furthermore, ex ante competency standards are ultimately
no true guarantee of attorney quality. Requiring attorneys to
leap hurdles in terms of years of practice, numbers of cases, or
hours of training reveals nothing about the meaningfulness of
those experiences. Regrettably, some of the worst lawyers are
the ones with the greatest caseloads and the largest docket, and
stories of attorney incompetence, by attorneys who might arguably meet state standards for experience with capital cases,
are legion. 72 This is a dilemma parallel to that faced by employ-

ers. While paper credentials offer insight and guidance into the
suitability of a candidate, ultimately they are no real guarantor
of a candidate's ability to do the job effectively within the constraints of the organization. For this reason, employers use
other screening methods, such as interviews, to gain a better
sense of a candidate's strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore,
many employers hire on a probationary basis, with the ability to
dismiss candidates whose credentials outstripped their ability or
compatibility. Unfortunately, prisoners under death sentence
lack the time, opportunity, or background to effectively screen
counsel and must often settle for whichever counsel is appointed.
Another concern with competence standards is that there is
no indication of how broadly standards will be interpreted. For
example, does Nevada's requirement of "serving as counsel in
two felony appeals" mean that counsel was appointed prior to
the proceedings and represented the client through to judgment, or just that the counsel was involved and had client contact? Does a requirement that an attorney have experience in
capital cases allow for plea bargains, or must counsel actually try
the case to the jury? The opt-in provisions give no guidance as

7

See, e.g., TASKFoRcE

REPORT,

supra note 56, at 49-76.
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to how strictly the standards must be followed, and the greater
the latitude permitted, the wider the range in post-conviction
counsel competence.7 s
A last issue with competency standards was pointed out by
the response from Delaware. Practically speaking, setting competency standards may be used as a weapon by death penalty
opponents to prevent opt in, since these standards are likely to
be set through a democratic process. These opponents can either set the standards so high that no attorney will qualify, or if
the opponents are attorneys, they would simply refrain from
getting the necessary qualifications. Either way, the state is left
without competent counsel to appoint.
The final argument against a post-conviction counsel right
is that states have already proven their ability to provide effective counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Despite a constitutionally enacted right to counsel and means for enforcing its
effectiveness, however, the quality of attorneys for indigent defendants often suffers. 729 Gideon v. Wainwright has notably been
compared to a promise-a promise that all defendants unable
to afford counsel for serious crimes shall be appointed counsel.
However, despite constitutional mandates, states are often unable to fulfill this promise. As one commentator writes:
It requires a fair amount of credulity to expect that states that have

countenanced practices such as assigning capital work to the lowest bidder without considering any criterion other than cost and sanctioned
convictions and sentences of death in the kinds of situations recounted
earlier would now hasten to furnish attorneys adequate to the demands
of the job.

There is one additional argument raised by the idea that counsel standards
might be interpreted broadly. Some states, such as Colorado or Nebraska, have very
small populations of eligible attorneys. While both states have small death row populations as well, this raises the issue that a state may conceivably be faced with a dearth
of qualified attorneys and may seek a broad interpretation of competency standards
7

in order to increase the ranks of "qualified" practitioners.
See, &g., Stephen B. Bright, Gounselfor the Poor. The Death Sentenwe Not for the Worst
Crime butfor the Worst Lauyer,103 YALELJ. 1835 (1994).

' Berger, supra note 56, at 1690 (footnotes omitted).
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The unfortunate parallel is that the opt-in provisions are
also a promise, but without enforcement mechanisms or guarantees, these promises, too, are likely to be broken7 1
c. Doctrinal Bases for Post-conviction Counsel
A basic question in providing a right to post-conviction
counsel is locating such a right among existing constitutional
guarantees. For example, the right to trial counsel is plainly
stated in the 6th Amendment, but is only applied to the states
through the 14th Amendment Due Process clause. There are
possible doctrinal bases for the right to post-conviction counsel.
The first conception, and the strongest, suggests the use of a
Mathews v. Eldridgebalancing test to find a procedural due process right to post-conviction counsel.7 2 This test determines
whether a particular procedure is due by balancing three factors: "the private interest at stake, the risk of violating that interaction . . . and the government's
est through government
" s
matter.
the
in
interest
Applying these three balancing factors to the issue of postconviction counsel, the Mathews test finds that the "private interest at stake" is the prisoner's interest in being unconstitutionally or erroneously executed and therefore is very strong.73
The "risk of violation through government action" is also high
because statistics show that errors are found more often when
prisoners are represented than when they petition pro se. 7"
The above discussion of the limitations faced by pro se petitioners confirms this risk of error.7 s The test concluded that the
731id!

7" See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See McDermott, supranote 708, at
1332-33 (1990); Zeithaml, supra note 716, at 1208. Another commentator has elaborated on the Mathews v. Eldridge approach by suggesting a right to post-conviction
counsel from the fusion of procedural due process with the right of access to the
courts exemplified by Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). See Millemann, supra note
716. However, in light of the limitations on the right of access to the courts imposed
by the more recent holding in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996), Millemann's
approach may be obsolete.
7
Zeithaml, supra note 716, at 1208.
M Id
7"Id at 1208-09.
7
3 McDermott, supra note 708, at 1333.
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"government's interest," on net, is positive. Though states
would incur the cost of maintaining the attorney system, they
would reap the benefits of better petitions and a more efficient
process.7 7 While the balance on the last item might vary depending on the state and its commitment to a strong death
penalty, the enthusiastic reaction of many states to the opt-in
provisions indicates that states are seeing greater advantages in
providing counsel than in denying it. As each factor weighs
heavily toward requiring post-conviction counsel, the Mathews
test indicates that post-conviction counsel would be considered
part of procedural due process.
A second approach sees the right to post-conviction counsel
as emanating not from procedural due process but from equal
protection. 7m This approach, advocated by Brad Snyder, is
based on the Supreme Court case of M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,739 which
held that an indigent woman was entitled to a free transcript to
appeal the state's decision to take away custody of her children.
In so holding, the Court found that parental termination proceedings were "quasi-criminal" and therefore the woman was
entitled to the transcript under Griffin v. illinois's right of equal
access under the Equal Protection Clause.740 In doing so, Snyder argues, the Court opened the door to a fundamental rights
exception to the requirement of discriminatory purpose for
suspect classifications under Washington v. Davis.7 1
Snyder begins his argument by reviewing the history of
wealth as a classification for equal protection purposes. In Griffin v. Illinois,742 the Supreme Court struck down a requirement
that defendants seeking to appeal their conviction must pay for
transcripts. While the decision rested on both due process and
equal protection grounds, the case came to stand for the proposition that a defendant's ability to defend himself would not be
The Court, however, refused to expand
based on his wealth.
See Zeithaml, supranote 716, at 1209; McDermott, supranote 708, at 1333.
See Snyder, supranote 716, at 2211-12.
7'9 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
"'

740Id

741I at 2229.
742351 U.S. 12 (1956).
7
Snyder, supranote 716, at 2215-17.
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Griffin into full-blown equal protection for wealth by deciding in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that wealth was
not a suspect classification. T4 In addition, the Court held in
Washington v. Davis7 that a showing of discriminatory purpose,
and notjust disparate impact, was required for proving an equal
protection violation.74
Snyder argues that, applying this background to M.L.B.'s
case, M.L.B. should be unable to challenge the statute on equal
protection grounds using strict scrutiny.747 Such a challenge
would require showing that a law involved a suspect classification or burdened a fundamental right.7 s Though Mississippi's
statutory requirement of purchasing transcripts disparately impacted the poor (because only they would be denied appeals),
any equal protection claim would be foreclosed by the fact that
wealth is not a suspect classification under Rodriguez 749 Though
M.L.B. could argue that according to Griffin v. Illinois, she had a
fundamental right to access the criminal justice system, this
would not be sufficient because she could not prove that Missis70
sippi had a required discriminatory purpose under Davis.
Moreover, parental termination proceedings were considered
civil, and thus Griffin would not apply.751
However, in finding that M.L.B. did have a right to a free
transcript for an appeal, the Supreme Court opened cracks in

7

U.S. 1 (1973).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).

747

Id. at 2214 (stating that wealth, the reason M.L.B. was unable to obtain a tran-

744411

746Snyder,

supra note 716, at 2217-18.

script,
748 is not a suspect classification).
Id.

749

Id. at 2217.

7'0 Id. at 2224. Snyder writes:
Sidestepping Davis was the key to the Court's decision in M.L.B. The respondents in
M.L.B. contended that Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement applied in this case....
In effect, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion can be read as accepting Justice Marshall's
view [from City of Mobile v. Bolden. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) that discriminatory purpose is not
required for strict scrutiny where fundamental rights are at stake] and rejecting respondents' arguments.
7 Id. at 2221 ("First, due process concerns for the indigent are limited in civil
cases.") See also id. at 2220 (discussing how the M.L.B. court classified the Mississippi
proceedings as "quasi-criminal" in order to take advantage of the holding in Griffln).
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each of these doctrines.5

2
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By describing parental termination

proceedings as "quasi-criminal" and applying the Griffin right,
the Court has allowed considerations of wealth to return to
equal protection analysis, since Griffin rests on the idea of indi-

gency.75 Moreover, in finding for M.L.B., the Court has identified circumstances where discriminatory purpose need not be

proved to make out an equal protection violation. 754 Snyder argues that these chinks in the doctrines create the idea of wealthbased disparate impact, and clear the way for an exception to
the requirement of discriminatory purpose for fundamental
755
rights.
Snyder then argues that this fundamental right of access to
the criminal process arising from Griffin and immune to the requirement of discriminatory purpose can develop into a right to
post-conviction counsel. 756 Essentially, the failure to provide

post-conviction counsel would be an equal protection violation
with disparate impact on indigent capital prisoners, since

71 See, e.g., id. at 2220 (describing how M.LB. was found to be "quasi-criminal"
and
therefore under Griffin); id. at 2225-26 (describing how the M.LB. holding created
an exception to Washington v. Davis).
71 Id. at 2215-16 (describing Griffin); id. at 2225-26 (finding a fundamental rights
exception to Davis based on Griffin).
4
7 Id. at 2225-26.
7" Id. at 2226. As support for this idea of a fundamental rights exception, Snyder
points to three additional factors. First, Justice Marshall, dissenting in City of Mobile v.
Bolden, resisted the universal discriminatory purpose test and advocated a fundamental rights exception, even going so far as to list those rights he believed were fundamental. Among them were the Griffin right to access the criminal process. Id. at
2224. Second, Marshall's argument has been echoed in Plylerv. Doe and the work of
scholars, most notably Daniel Ortiz, who argues that discriminatory purpose has been
more strongly applied in certain contexts, such as housing and employment. Id. at
2224 & n.103. Third, Snyder argues that the reliance in MLB. on Williams v. Illinois
suggests such an exception. Id. at 2224-26 (discussing Williams and the M.L.B.
Court's analysis). Based largely on Griffin, Williams struck down on equal protection
grounds an Illinois requirement that indigent prisoners serve additional time beyond
their sentence to work off fees and court costs. Id. at 2225. Though Williams preceded Davis by six years, it remains good law and has been approvingly cited by the
Court. Snyder draws the inference that the reason Williams has survived is because of
the fundamental rights exception to Davis;,otherwise, presumably, Williams would be
overruled. Id. at 2225. Its sudden reemergence in MLB. implies that the Court was
of this fundamental rights exception. Id. at 2225-26.
taking
6 advantage
7 Id at 2237-38.
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wealthier prisoners would have access to counsel] 7 Snyder further argues that post-conviction proceedings should be viewed
as "quasi criminal" in the language of M.L.B., and certainly as
more criminal than parental termination proceedings.78 Given
the interests of the prisoner at stake, the risks involved, and the
state's non-neutrality, a post-conviction case seems closer to Griffin than to M.L.B. 9 Thus, Snyder calls for the overrule of
76
Murray v. Giarratano.
Snyder's argument is a complex and convoluted one, resting on a case he admits is "ambiguous."7 61 He is aware of the
strong arguments against his proposal, and he tackles each in
turn. First, he recognizes that Ross v. Moffitt, Pennsylvaniav. Finley, and Murray v. Giarratanoall suggest that the right to free
transcripts is broader than the right to counsel.7 62 As such,
M.L.B. would stand for exactly its result, and for no more. Snyder responds that the history of the right to counsel before
Gideon, such as Griffin and Powell v. Alabama (the Scottsboro
Boys case), demonstrates that the Court saw capital cases as different and allowed appeals in these cases which would not be allowed in a non-capital case. 763 However, Snyder overlooks the
key holding of Giarratano: after the death sentence, death is not
different. While capital cases require special procedures at trial,
no special procedures are required in post-conviction stages.
Second, Snyder confronts the idea that there is no due process right to post-conviction counsel. 7r4 He argues that equal
protection, not due process, should underpin a right to this
counsel. 76 While due process is based on traditional ideas of
"fundamental fairness" which would militate against recognition
1 Id. at 2237 (arguing that a right to state post-conviction counsel should be analyzed under equal protection like M.L.B. and should qualify as a fundamental rights
exception to Davis).
m Id. at 2240-41.
9 Id. at 2239-41.
76Id at 2237.
71 Id. at 2226.
762
Id.at 2241-42.
7 Id. at 2242.
7'4 Id.

765Id.

at 2242-43.
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of a brand-new right, equal protection is "counterhistorical" and
reflects newer values. 7r While this is true, Snyder himself fails to
adequately address the issue that Grffin was decided on both
due process and equal protection grounds. 67 As such, while
equal protection may spur the development of such a right, due
process remains tied to traditional rights formulations and may
prevent recognition.
Lastly, Snyder faces the issues of federalism that would
block such a right.7 6 He argues that post-conviction counsel
would decrease federal intrusion into state court decisions because post-conviction claims would be presented effectively
(with minimal repetition and invasion), that the federal government could pay for the state post-conviction counsel, and
that recognition of such a right is appropriate given the Court's
historical involvement in death penalty issues.76 In the end,
while intriguing, Snyder's argument is not entirely persuasive.
His hypothesis is either too hasty in declaring a right to postconviction counsel based on a single case, or it is too farfetched,
premising a substantial constitutional correction on a shaky
foundation of overlapping ideas.
d. Ensuring Effective Post-conviction Counsel
There are two ways to ensure effective assistance of counsel:
(1) ex ante qualification-based systems, which require attorneys
to meet certain requirements and assume that qualified attorneys are, by definition, effective, and (2) ex post mistake-based
systems, such as Strickland v. Washington, which evaluate an attorney's performance after the proceeding to determine if the
attorneys committed any prejudicial errors. Both of these approaches have flaws which, if left untended, could undermine
the meaningful provision of post-conviction counsel.

7'7 See id. at 2215-16.
I/, at 2244 ("On the other hand, telling all thirty six capital punishment states
they have to provide counsel at state post-conviction proceedings ... is tantamount to
acting like a super-legislature.").
79 Id. at 2244-45.
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For example, the Strickland standard for an ex post mistakebased system has been widely criticized for failing to adequately
ensure effective assistance of counsel7 0 By presuming attorney
competence, deferring to attorney judgments, and requiring a
strong showing that even clearly erroneous conduct would have
actually changed the outcome of the proceedings, critics argue
that Strickland has become the proverbial needle through which
the camel must pass.71 In light of this critique, it therefore
seems dubious to rely on a Strickland-like standard in the postconviction setting as well. Furthermore, defenders of the
AEDPA argue that prior to the opt-in provisions, there was no
guarantee of any kind of post-conviction counsel at all. Now, by
requiring states to enact qualification standards and by stationing federal courts as monitors, prisoners have far more protection than they ever did. While this protection may not be
perfect, given Stricklands weaknesses, the AEDPA's ex ante
qualifications-based system seems a more effective solution. Finally, an ex post mistake-based system is inherently procedurally
intensive, requiring a second attorney and a second proceeding
to evaluate the performance of the first. As above, it is easy to
envision an unfolding array of multiple procedures as prisoner
cycle through attorneys by mounting endless ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims.
The problems with an ex post mistake-based system would
seem to argue for enhanced and enforced ex ante qualifications
standards. However, as discussed above, reliance on an ex ante
qualification-based system also cannot fully protect prisoners
against attorney errors in the course of a proceeding. Even a
qualified attorney can make errors in judgment, miscalculate,
lack concentration or focus, incorrectly interpret a new case, or
simply perform below expectations. While ex ante qualificationbased standards do ensure that prisoners are represented by arguably better and more skilled attorneys, by foreclosing ex post
77oSee

e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Casefor an Ex Ante

ParityStandard,88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 242 n.3 (1997) (citing articles critical of Striddand); id at 278-85 (critiquing Strickland-style ex post facto review).
"'See, eg., TAsK FORCE REPORT, supranote 56. The analogy to Stricklandas the "eye
of the needle" was made in Sullivan v. Fairman,819 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987).
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review, these attorneys are insulated and rendered immune to
any challenge; there is no functional check on their performance, and hence, no reason for care.
The best way to ensure effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is to combine both approaches, while taking additional
steps to minimize the weaknesses in both. Post-conviction attorneys should be required to meet ex ante qualification standards, and should also be exposed to ex post mistake-based
inquiries into their performance.
The ex ante qualifications-based standards can be strengthened through Congressional action to either establish uniform
standards or to provide greater guidance and direction to states
in setting their own. This improved management would replace
the piecemeal and completely open requirements presently in
the opt-in provisions. These improved standards would include
specific requirements for attorney experience, skills, knowledge,
and training in post-conviction representation. Tougher qualification standards will ensure that post-conviction counsel is
competent and effective from the outset. Moreover, these
qualifications standards can be tied to increased resources for
post-conviction counsel, including more opportunities for training, better funding and compensation, and establishment of
death penalty resource centers to assist appointed counsel. m
In turn, Congress and the states should back these qualification standards up with an improved ex post mistake-based system. One possibility for reforming the Strickland standard to
increase its effectiveness is simply to remove the burden of proving prejudice-if a defendant or a client can prove that the attorney's performance was ineffective in comparison to other
attorneys, such a failure would be per se prejudicial.77
Another suggestion for improving the Strickland standard is
to establish a checklist of actions and conduct expected of effec77

Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials,

107 HARV. L REV. 1923, 1939 (1994).
7' Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standardfor Claims of Ineffective Assistance of CounseL Emasculatingthe Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1259, 1276-81, 1285 (1986); Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v.
Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 1544, 1573 (1983).
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five counsel-failure of the attorney to adequately "check off'
the items is by definition ineffective. A proposal for enacting
such a procedure was put forth in a note by Martin C. Calhoun.774 Calhoun recommends a two tiered "hybrid standard"
in which the first tier is the checklist. Examples of items on the
checklist include:
(1) Defense counsel must interview the defendant as soon as practicable
to determine all relevant facts known to the defendant and must explain
to him the attorney's obligation of confidentiality and the importance of
disclosing all relevant facts ....
(3) Defense counsel must promptly investigate the circumstances of the
case by pursuing all avenues that might lead either to facts or witnesses
that could affect the merits of the case or the potential severity of the defense. If only one plausible line of defense is available, defense counsel
must conduct a substantial factual and legal investigation into that defense; if more than one plausible line of defense is available, defense
counsel must substantially investigate all of these defenses, unless, after
partial investigation, time or monetary constraints force him to make the
tactical choice of discontinuing the investigation of certain lines of defense ....

(6) Defense counsel must make:
(a) an opening statement either before the prosecution has presented its case or before presenting the case for the defense;
(b) timely objections that further the defense's interests both at
trial and in the event of an appeal; and
(c) a closing argument that does not hurt the defendant's case and
points out any weaknesses in the government's case.

In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "substantially
satisfy" one or more of the checklist items.77 6 Upon this showing, the defendant has established a presumption that his counsel was ineffective and would be entitled to judgment unless the
7 Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based StandardforEvaluatingIneffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEo. LJ. 413, 436 (1988).
See also Richard Klein, The EmperorGideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel 13 EHAsGs CONsT. L.Q. 625

(1986).
'" Calhoun, supra note 774, at 438-39. While these checklist items are obviously
aimed at trial, they could be easily adapted to expected tasks required of a postconviction attorney, such as adequate review of the record, investigation into alternative claims, advocating all possible claims of the client, etc.
776Id. at 440.
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government could prove that counsel's omission was "justified"
or "insubstantial." m Calhoun deliberately avoids any requirement of proving prejudice m If the government successfully rebuts the presumption of ineffectiveness, Calhoun suggests a
second tier. Here the defendant could prove ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that, despite substantially satisfying
the requirements of the checklist, the attorney's performance
was ineffective under the particular circumstances of the case.m
Calhoun argues that this second tier could be relatively cursory,
requiring only a review of the record for any unusual or extraordinary behaviors by counsel in light of the facts of case.78°
Strickland and the above proposals are alike in presuming
that an attorney's performance is effective absent some showing
by the defendant. An alternative possibility for enhancing the
ex post mistake-based standard is to reverse this presumption of
competence. Under this alternative approach, if the attorney is
unsuccessful during the post-conviction proceeding, the presumption is that the attorney was ineffective. The attorney
would then be forced to prove effectiveness, rather than disproving ineffectiveness, by reviewing and justifying the course of
his involvement in the case, including discussions with the client, preparation, investigation, research, strategy, and tactics.
As with Calhoun's proposal, this review could be expeditious,
consisting of the attorney submitting a memorandum to the
court, or a brief hearing in front of the judge in the postconviction proceeding. This single hearing would obviate the
need for repetitive, layered review and for multiple counsel appointments; it would not even need to be adversarial.
Reversing the presumption of competence can be justified
in several ways. First, from an economic perspective, this approach is correct because unskilled and often illiterate prisoners
are least able to judge whether their attorney performed competently. Such a rule would encourage disclosure because the
attorney has the best information on his own performance;
m

Id.

mid
M'

Id. at 442.

7
W Id.
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faced with possible penalties or at least a declaration of inadequate representation, an attorney has an incentive to share information with his client and the court.78' Second, while
flipping the presumption might be unworkable at the trial court
level because of the large numbers of cases, it would be less
burdensome in the context of post-conviction proceedings for
capital prisoners-there are simply fewer prisoners at this procedural stage and the issues are more confined than at trial.
Third, applying this new approach to capital post-conviction
proceedings can also be justified as an extension of McFarlandv.
Scott,782 which recognized that capital prisoners demanded spe-

cial post-conviction procedures due to the nature of their sentences. Because McFarland finds that "death is different,"
heightened procedural review for counsel in capital postconviction proceedings makes sense.
Of course, the procedures required to enact a meaningful
and effective post-conviction counsel system are more demanding and expensive than the simple qualification-based standards
which presently exist. Creating such a complex system involving
higher qualifications standards, increasing funding, and additional post-conviction proceedings smacks of a return to the
height of the Warren Court, where repetitive procedure was
valued more than finality. The argument against such a complex system to ensure effective assistance is simply that it tips the
balance too far in favor of procedure and prisoners whose guilt
has already been adjudicated. Unfortunately, there is no good
response to this final argument-it represents the paradox of
habeas corpus and post-conviction proceedings in general. On
one hand, procedural rights of prisoners must be upheld and
protected, for fair and just outcomes can only emerge from fair
" As an additional possibility, evidence of attorney ineffectiveness in postconviction settings could be divorcedfrom considerations of professional responsibility. The fact that attorney ineffectiveness or incompetence is relevant to charges of
ethical malfeasance may be one reason why ineffectiveness is so difficult to prove:
courts and other attorneys may be reluctant to penalize trial or appellate attorneys
operating under often difficult circumstances in this manner. However, in such circumstances, the clients bear the brunt of the attorney's errors. By divorcing attorney
effectiveness from ethics, there may be less of a stigma to finding ineffectiveness and
clients may be better protected.
782512 U.S. 849 (1994).
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and just procedures. On the other, a system must be able to
reach a final determination or it will be paralyzed under the accumulated weight of unresolved matters. While this paper
clearly illustrates the need for meaningful and effective postconviction counsel and advocates the reforms necessary to ensure it, this is not a uniform, or even a majority, view.

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted an exhaustive review of the opt-in
provisions under Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act. Part II reviewed the origin of the provisions,
born out of the tension in habeas corpus between guaranteeing
constitutional rights of prisoners and preventing endless repetitive litigation of procedural minutiae. This Part showed how
the Powell Committee proposal containing the opt-in provisions
became Congress' choice, over arguably better designed and
fairer proposals.
Part III reviewed the litigation history of the opt-in provisions, with a focus on those states forced to confront the issue
through affirmative prisoner suits. As a result of this litigation,
inmates have been foreclosed from testing or ensuring that a
state's system of providing post-conviction counsel meets set
standards. Such claims are simply nonjusticiable to federal
courts.
Part IV inquired into the policies and intentions of those
states with the death penalty toward the opt-in provisions.
While the majority of death penalty states are seeking or believe
themselves to have opted in, some states remain undecided or
hostile to Chapter 154. One notable trend among many of the
states-optimistic, pessimistic, or undecided-was the perception that federal courts are opposed to allowing opt in and will
not, or will reluctantly, find states to qualify under Chapter 154.
Part V synthesized the previous parts to critique the opt-in
provisions. This Part concluded that in fostering tensions
within the federal system, the opt-in provisions have created
more trouble than they have prevented. In addition, because
prisoners cannot effectively challenge the competency of their
representation, the opt-in provisions' guarantee is effectively
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empty. This Part recommends reforming the system by abolishing the quid pro quo mechanism in favor of the AEDPA's present timelines and by recognizing a right to effective postconviction counsel; alternatively, this Part recommends adoption of the ABA Task Force proposal as an effective means of reforming habeas corpus overall.
This Part concludes by
reviewing arguments for a right to such counsel and concluding
that such a right should be recognized through the Constitution
and through statutory amendment to the AEDPA.
In the end, proposals for reform of the opt-in provisions return one back to where this paper started: the debate over habeas corpus. Those in favor of expedited review and limited
ability to litigate would seem to favor the opt-in provisions, as
they give states freedom of choice, freedom from intrusion and
freedom from delay. In contrast, those who favor habeas corpus
as a means of defending constitutional rights of prisoners are
inclined to see the opt-in provisions as a faster road to "slaughterhouse justice."m The workings of the opt-in provisions and
this paper's proposed reforms show that neither of these positions is entirely correct. While the opt-in provisions would theoretically increase the speed of capital post-conviction review, it
would only do so through federal critique of a state's chosen system. Rather than make states freer, opt-in provisions station
federal courts as monitors against states providing incompetent
counsel. In turn, the proposed reforms of abolishing the quid
pro quo and guaranteeing right to post-conviction counsel
would meet many of the demand of those who favor prisoners'
rights, but such reforms would have to come in the context of
limited review and the remaining timelines in the AEDPA. The
debate over habeas corpus has been tense and polarized since
the early days of the Warren Court; only through considered
compromise and balance among the competing interests can a
meaningful and effective position be found.

"s Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, TheAntiterrorismand EffectiveDeathPenaly
Act of 1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse Door or SlaughterhouseJusticen, 47
CATH. U. L. REv. 603 (1998).

